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FORD, CHRIS, Ph.D. Creative Fidelity: The Study of Compassionate 
Consciousness in a Technological World. (1993) Directed by Dr. Fritz 
Mengert. 195 pp. 
In the tradition of western philosophy often focused on in the perennial 
search for wisdom is the foundations of philosophy that have based ontology 
and epistemology on abstract systems of thought. In these systems, thought is 
considered in and of itself, not in terms of its interrelationship to feelings and 
actions. These traditions of philosophy, founded on abstraction rather than 
on the concreteness of human experiencing, rarely touch the meaning of the 
questions, dilemmas, joys of being human. A void ensues in our 
understanding which both shapes and continuously reinforces existence 
thought of as thinking separated from feeling, mind separated from body and 
soul, and knowledge separated from being. 
Throughout western philosophy, there have been thinkers who have 
resisted this thought that systematically divides and abstracts that about 
human experiencing which is interrelated and concrete. These 
phenomenological existential thinkers have sought and seek language that 
describes consciousness as the embodiment of mind, body, and soul and thus 
as the interplay between each of these dimensions. In this concept of 
embodied consciousness, thoughts are inextricably related to feelings, and 
thoughts and feelings to actions. In this sense, intellectual and ethical 
concerns are grounded in questions of meanings that are aesthetic and 
spiritual. 
This dissertation is an exploration of Gabriel Marcel's work, particularly 
his work about living in creative fidelity in terms of what it contributes to the 
phenomenological existential perspective of human meaning. The first 
chapter discusses the philosophical background of Marcel's work and how he 
extends the meanings of his philosophical education to seek to bridge the 
existential and spiritual dimensions of human experience. The second 
chapter explores the concrete texture of what it means to live in just 
relationships of creative fidelity. The third chapter examines different 
anthropological and cultural perspectives on why the human propensity to 
avoid meeting one another in relationships of meaning and existential truth. 
The fourth chapter explores the hope of finding compassion in a world of 
abstract technology, describing a language and concept of love that indicates 
creative fidelity. 
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CHAPTER I 
AN INQUIRY INTO THE CONCRETENESS OF HUMAN EXPERIENCE 
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CHAPTER I 
AN INQUIRY INTO THE CONCRETENESS OF HUMAN EXPERIENCE 
A Personal Introduction to Creative Fidelity 
Reflecting on why I have chosen in particular to write about the works 
of Gabriel Marcel, primarily on his concept of creative fidelity, I piece together 
moments, thoughts, and feelings that have brought me to graduate study in 
general. I was searching for people willing and able to help me address an 
"unthought known" that I held. This unthought known was a feeling that 
something was very wrong in my world and that these wrongs were not 
being addressed by me or anyone else. 
I met this feeling of "wrong-ness" in workplaces I was exposed to, 
through religion that seemed institutionalized beyond meaning, in troubled 
relationships between lovers, friends, family members, and in the 
tremendous social problems involving sickness, poverty, abandoned 
children, and domestic violence. I think even more poignant for me than the 
magnitude of these problems was the almost desperate need I felt for other 
human beings whom I could trust to affirm in my presence that "yes, 
something is very wrong" and who subsequently had the experience, 
knowledge, and wisdom to help me language the predominant problems and 
questions. Courage was a quality absented more than not in so many of the 
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lives I knew. I wanted to meet human beings in whom there was courage to 
admit, address, and live out questions relevant to human experiencing. 
To meet human beings who had not given up on participating in life in 
the justice-seeking or aesthetic or spiritual sense of participating was 
important to me. So many seemingly had given up their individual 
encounter with life to money, alcohol, drugs, or to escapist transcendental 
mantras such as "life is beautiful, really." 
Though I had not languaged it as such, I understood that meaning is 
constructed not solitarily but in communion with one another. I needed 
intellectual, spiritual companionship that was real, real meaning that the 
intent of these relationships would be to inquire into what was actually 
happening in the realms of our social, cultural, personal experience and out 
of shared insights to weave meaningful experiencing into our concrete lives. 
What was becoming apparent to me is that the actual dilemmas, 
challenges, and conflicts of human life are often unaddressed because we 
have allied our consciousness with the appearance side of the appearance/ 
reality dichotomy. We pretend that what appears to be is what is happening 
in human lives when in actuality something very different is going on. For 
example, we teach our children that America is a rich and generous nation, 
and yet we hide the actuality that many children are allowed to starve. Or 
children are told that a parent is asleep (actually is passed out) on the chair at 
8:00 pm because she is tired when in fact she is drunk. 
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To consider the source of our affiliation with the appearance side of the 
dichotomy as epistemological, that we are limited to knowing only what 
appears to be because there is a limit to that which we can actually know, is to 
elevate this dichotomy to the realm of philosophy and to elevate it beyond 
the meanings that I am wishing to illuminate. Though there are important 
philosophical questions to raise about appearance and reality, as Kant did in 
his Critique of Pure Reason, the dichotomy I am struggling with here is not a 
result of philosophical tenets but rather seems to have evolved out of a need 
and desire to avoid embodied feeling life. This dichotomy stems less from 
the purity of philosophical concerns and more from a psycho-social affliction 
having to do with our tremendous fear of meeting our own feelings and 
those of one another. We must overcome this affliction, the fear of meeting 
human existence, before we can look to philosophical idealist explanations 
for the why of our limited knowledge of being. There is more that we can 
know than we admit to knowing. Or said another way, there are different 
experiences to experience than we allow. 
Though I believed the appearance/reality problem needed initially to be 
approached in terms of psycho-social questions, my prior inquiries into 
psychological ways of thinking were unfulfilling. Too often I found 
psychological works geared towards simplistic explanations about the human 
psyche and human behavior rather than enriching explorations into the 
complexities and wonders of the human experience. 
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I became curious about philosophy. In the first place, it was 
philosophical questions (Who am I? What am I doing here?) that led 
humans to seek explanations about the human psyche. Throughout my 
philosophical studies my interest has tended towards existentialism and 
phenomenology. Idealism, as mentioned above, seemed to evade the 
dilemma of embodiment, viewing consciousness as a pure entity unaffected 
by the vicissitudes of human experiencing. 
While the idealist explanations about consciousness were in no sense 
simplistic and were brilliantly worked out, the little that I could distill out of 
the works of Kant and Hegel, for example, led me to think about human 
experience in terms of abstract ideals rather than in terms of the concrete 
human struggle that includes body, mind, and soul. I became interested in 
phenomenological existentialists in that they were addressing the 
phenomenon of human life as it is experienced. Though Gabriel Marcel 
preferred to call himself a Neo-socratic rather than an existentialist, his work 
is enlightening both in the phenomenological and existential sense. 
Gabriel Marcel was educated in idealism and yet he had experiences in 
his life that defied these pure explanations. In Marcel's first major work 
Metaphysical Tournal (1927/1952a), he writes: 
Beyond this idealist theory, which though not denying existence 
brushes it away to an infinite distance, it is possible to construct a radical 
thesis which views existence as capable of being called into question and 
perhaps even as self-contradictory. ... The ever-widening gulf between 
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this (idealistic) mode of thinking and integral human experience with 
its life that trembles with tragedy, is enough to show up its inadequacy, 
(pp. 320,322) 
Marcel in his work is called to address the actuality of life experienced rather 
than to construct abstract ideas about life that sterilize humans against the 
acknowledgement of wrongs, problems, conflicts, and desires. Marcel is a 
philosopher who fought against the seduction of hiding from pain and 
confusion. 
Opposition and conflict were essential to Marcel in order that important 
questions in relationship to one another be lived out. Marcel was usually 
receptive to the moment of facing an adversary, for what he trusted with 
others and within his own inner life of thought was challenge. Without 
challenge, there is a tendency, Marcel believed, to evade, distort, and deny the 
most relevant and humane dimensions of existence. 
Marcel's friend of twenty years, E. M. Cioran, describes in a character 
sketch he wrote about Marcel, that to speak of courage in relation to Marcel, it 
would be most descriptive to use the word temerity. Marcel's way in his life 
and work is a way of audacity and a rash boldness toward the encountering of 
concrete human dilemmas (Cioran, 1971). 
Marcel had a unique relationship to problems, according to Cioran, 
different from the tendencies in humans towards the denial of problems or 
the tendency of others to immerse themselves in problems for problems sake, 
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an immersion, which in itself, can become a kind of hiding place of 
negativity. In the former cases of those who deny, their withdrawal from 
problems is hidden in the pretense that "all is fine," the appearance that there 
are no problems. In the latter case of those immersed in problems, Cioran 
describes skeptics who present problem after problem only to deconstruct the 
problem until all that remains is a sense of the inane and meaningless nature 
of life. 
Marcel has little in common with the former group, those who deny, 
since his thirst is for encountering concrete problems. What Marcel has in 
common with the skeptics is this thirst, a sense of "the sensual pleasure of the 
problem." How Marcel differs, however, from these skeptics is in the way he 
thought about and lived out problems. The deconstructive process of the 
skeptics begins and ends in nihilism. For Marcel, living out problems begins 
and ends with hope. Unlike the nihilists, for Marcel everything has a deep 
inner foundation. All experiencing is a contribution to inner life. 
"Everyone has known times when he has been tempted to posit 
universal nonsense," Marcel wrote during the Second World War (cited in 
Cioran, 1971, p. 75). About Marcel: 
One might say that the basic meaning of his work and of his life was his 
refusal to succumb to this temptation, which is the most terrible of all 
temptations, since it is the product of our negative states, of our weak 
moments, and of all the gaps in our beings. Such temptations are also 
characterized by a certain sick quality that gives them a dangerous, 
irresistible charm. (Cioran, 1971, p. 75) 
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In this time when it is easily arguable that denial of human experiencing 
exists on a massive scale and that also present is a nihilistic postmodern 
mood, Marcel's temerity has become significant to me. 
If we hide from the confusions of certain desires, from poverty, from 
desperate lives of loneliness, sickness, and hopelessness, then our lives will 
appear to be without these complexities and challenges and yet our lives are 
constituted by these dilemmas. When denied, our shared experiences become 
based not on what is happening but on what we make-believe is happening. 
In the psychological sense this often creates a condition of emotional 
schizophrenia, physically it creates wretched conditions that are ignored, and 
spiritually a community of amputated souls. 
I grew up in an environment where my family and our friends often 
lived committed to appearance, to a pretense of what was happening. There 
was an implicit agreement to pretend that the horrors and difficulties were 
not. Life seemingly was a party - scotches, bourbons, cheese and crackers, 
music. Poverty a block from our house, alcoholism, deceit toward one 
another, inane educational experiences - the party eliminated the worries. 
I was never comfortable growing up in a world where human 
experience was not honestly and directly addressed, where fear was modeled 
rather than courage, where talk was too often shallow. I think I blended 
rather willingly in this world until the day my mother died. I was eighteen. 
My mother had had five malignant tumors removed, yet there were still 
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relatives trying to convince themselves that she had a bad cold. The morning 
that we rushed my mother to the hospital because she could not breathe, my 
grandmother referred to her illness as a bad case of pneumonia. It was not 
pneumonia. My mother had metastasized cancer in her lungs. She died that 
afternoon. The pretense ended. She was gone. 
My mother is gone physically from my life — no more of her voice, 
seeing of her eyes, feeling her touch. Her absence is hard for me emotionally. 
Intellectually it has been sobering, an experience of mortality, loss, the 
fragility of relationship, and the feelings of love that absence can amplify. 
Making meaning out of these complexities continues to be important to me. I 
have come to believe that meaning is not constructed out of attempts to 
avoid life but only through embracing life. 
Through the death of my mother as through other experiences, human 
existence has come to have meanings both physical and spiritual. The 
physical dimension has to do with living in time, with ongoing experiences, 
and persistent and changing desires. The spiritual has to do with faith and 
with beliefs and values that persist, unchanged by the flux of experiencing. 
Though the physical and spiritual are explained here as if separately 
experienced, this separation is solely for the purpose of explicating the 
meanings. In concrete experiencing, the dialectic between the physical and 
the spiritual is ever present, so the lines of demarcation are not so clear. 
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Embodiment is the term that will be explored in this paper as 
descriptive of the belief that the body is spiritual, the spiritual embodied. 
Marcel used the term embodiment and incarnation interchangeably. In terms 
of embodiment, I have an ongoing spiritual relationship with my mother 
though our relationship is not present in the physical sense of us both being 
sensorially present. And yet, though not physically present, I have an 
embodied sense of her. 
I am drawn to Marcel not only for his commitment to the study of the 
actualities of individual lived experience but also to his response to life 
understood as comprised of body and soul. At the same time that Marcel is 
committed to the physical emotional pulls and tensions of the everyday, he is 
deeply committed to the belief that there is an ontological, spiritual mystery 
underlying these concrete daily experiences. This ontological foundation is 
not based on sensory phenomenon nor on the vicissitudes of mood but 
rather on the constancy of faith, a faith in life as embodied soul. 
It is interesting to note that Marcel's mother died when he was a very 
young child so he never knew his mother in the experiential daily sense and 
yet he felt her spirit with him throughout his life. Her presence in his life 
past her death was the initial impetus that took him to his understanding of 
ontology as spiritual. 
To think beyond the either /or dichotomies created by philosophically 
perceiving life as primarily the spiritual and mental separated from the 
physical body is to think towards complex questions about human life and yet 
appropriately so. Human life is complex. Perhaps one urge for thinking of 
existence as either body primarily (taking explanation to the positivistic 
scientific realm) or spirit (taking explanation to transcendent ideals) other 
than the prior explanation that there seems to be an urge to avoid feeling is 
the desire for simple explanations about our existence in which we may rest 
our minds. 
Life understood as composed of body, mind, and soul is difficult to grasp 
intellectually. Experiencing that it is so has brought profound meanings to 
my life. And yet simultaneously, my choices have become significantly more 
confusing, perplexing, and at times so paradoxical as to paralyze my 
understandings and actions. 
Marcel, through his concept of creative fidelity, raises questions relating 
to the complex issues that arise from human life understood as emotional, 
intellectual, and spiritual embodiment. Are there commitments that one can 
make that will not change based on what unfolds in the future? In other 
words, are there spiritual truths that are eternal, absolutely unaffected by the 
vicissitudes of experience? If there are these truths, how does the individual 
come to feel them if not through her own individual experiencing? What 
happens to commitments, the foundations of which are altered through the 
experiences of time? If one follows through on these commitments, is she 
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not risking betraying herself, or if faking that the commitment is still felt, 
does she not risk betraying or deceiving the other? 
I am committed to the idea that meaning is made through the sharing 
of life between human beings. The questions that Marcel makes explicit in 
his work with creative fidelity I believe to be the questions that we are living 
out implicitly in relationship. I think that a lot of the suffering, self-betrayal, 
and deceit of one another could be redeemed and transformed if we could 
address the dilemmas and challenges explicitly of being embodied in the spirit 
of body, mind, and soul through a language in which the meanings could be 
felt by many different human beings, not just those committed to 
philosophical study. 
In my dissertation, I am seeking a language that is more communicable 
than some of Marcel's thick and obscure philosophical language, for I wish to 
extend his meanings. I think that Marcel's work around creative fidelity if 
more widely understood would take us to richer, more textured, self-honest 
lives individually and to more compassionate, interesting, ethical 
relationships with one another. I also think that to understand the intricacies 
of creative fidelity takes us to lives that are less floundering in terms of 
freedom and responsibility. 
In essence Marcel's voice calls out to us in a world where love is 
degraded, where experience is often inane and shallow, to re-collect the 
meaning of being human. Though the ways past this recollection are not 
simple nor emotionally easy, recollecting the meaning of being human takes 
us to our souls. What could be more important? 
Philosophical Foundations Underlying Creative Fidelity 
"I think, I feel, I do; therefore, I exist." Creative fidelity has to do with 
all three, with the dialectic between thoughts, feelings, and actions. In 
response to the philosophical traditions that study thinking as a process 
abstracted from concrete experiencing, philosophers such as Kierkegaard, 
Heidegger, Buber, Merleau-Ponty, and Marcel in their works wish to stress the 
importance of a different kind of thinking, thinking that is inextricably 
related to the experiencing of the individual and thus existential. 
A simplified way to differentiate existential thought from the tradition 
of rational thought is that feelings and actions are necessarily a part of 
thinking existentially whereas rationalist thinking is not considered 
dialectically bound to feelings and actions. In the rational tradition, the 
thinking process is a realm considered in and of itself, not considered in 
terms of an individual's feelings about her experiencing nor necessarily 
foundational to her actions. Thought that is existential, however, is a 
synthesis of feelings about what has been experienced and the evolution of 
intentions toward future experiencing. 
The quality with which I feel God is different from the quality of solely 
thinking God. When I feel God, I am thinking God and feeling the feelings 
contained for me within the thought God. When my actions are associated to 
my feeling thoughts of God, that is born out of my own relationship to God, 
there is a quality to my acts that signifies me. My acts are mandated by what I 
have come to know, feel, believe through my own experiencing rather than 
mandated based on thoughts I have been taught to think but that are not 
related to my own existence. 
The process of thinking abstracted from the concreteness of individual 
experiencing can result in brilliant ideas, creative imaginings, as it can lead to 
grossly destructive ideas, yet these ideas and imaginings, whatever their 
texture, are not founded on the fundamental and unavoidable struggles, 
questions, and confusions which life continually presents. Fundamental 
problems such as death, the perplexity of choice, relationship to others, 
commitment, separation and loss, and illness shape the context of every 
individual's life. The ways in which struggles are addressed and acted on 
determine a person's being-in-the-world. 
Though the fruits of abstract thought can be profoundly enlightening 
(E=mc2) or demeaning (Caucasians are superior) when acted on and in that 
sense consequential to human experiencing, abstract thought can also be 
irrelevant to human existence as in the example "purple cows dance at 
night." Whatever the impact abstract thought may have on human 
existence, this effect is a byproduct. Abstract thought is not founded on the 
inwardness of experiencing. 
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Conversely, the content of existential thinking is based on the 
individual's inwardness of experiencing. There is an interdependent 
relationship between experiencing existentially and existential thought, for 
existence can not be viscerally felt and responded to without this thinking. 
This thought does not start with abstraction that may later apply to concrete 
human life rather it begins with the questions and concerns of being human, 
situated in contexts with one another. 
Existence can not be represented by one concept nor by a rational 
thought, according to Kierkegaard, not because existence is too "general, 
remote, or tenuous" to be conceived of in this way but rather because it is too 
"dense, concrete, and rich." Barrett (1958) paraphrases the passion of 
Kierkegaard as: 
I am-, and this fact that I exist is so compelling and enveloping a reality 
that it cannot be reproduced thinly in any of my mental concepts, 
though it is clearly the life-and-death fact without which all my 
concepts would be void. (p. 162) 
The classical meaning of philosophy is the love of wisdom. Philosophy 
in contemporary times could more aptly be called sophylogy which, if there 
were such a term, would indicate the way in which the love of wisdom has 
become the study of wisdom. The distinction between the love of wisdom 
and the study of wisdom is related correspondingly to the previous 
distinction between existential thought and abstract thought. It is quite 
possible to partake in the study of wisdom as if a concept separate from the 
inwardness of experiencing. To study wisdom is to treat wisdom as a thought 
system external to inner experiencing and yet capable of advising and making 
distinctions about experience. 
To seek, however, to know wisdom to the degree that one may say she 
loves wisdom, is to know wisdom from within the concrete experiencing of 
one's life. This kind of wisdom lives within the soul of an individual's 
consciousness. It is known through hard study, yet not solely in the book 
sense of study, rather more in the sense of living life in ways that enrich the 
study of books and studying books in ways that enrich the living of life. 
While the study of wisdom can be read from a paragraph in a book, the love 
of wisdom is known within one's bones. 
Wisdom is something different from enlightenment, it is different 
from reasoning. But wisdom is not science, wisdom is an elevation of 
the soul... it reasons little, nor does it proceed mathematically from 
concepts, through a series of syllogisms, in order to reach what it takes 
to be the truth ... but it speaks from the fullness of heart. (Hegel quoted 
in Kiing, 1978/1991, pp. 131-132) 
Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973) did not study philosophy so that he could 
know more but rather so that he could become more. His study took up the 
meaning of human experience and the purpose of life. Marcel used the 
phrase "creative fidelity" to name life lived in meaning and purpose. To find 
purpose in meaning it must be concretely felt, not abstractly thought. Fidelity 
that is creative means that the commitment is personal. When one creates, 
one puts into form her subjective interpretation. For it to be creative, one 
does not mimic Kant rather integrates that work into her self expression. 
There are many in this world presently expressing different kinds of 
information to one another. Never before has there been access to so many 
different ideas. Too easily existence reflects the propensity to recite ideas and 
information by heart that is not heart-felt. While efficient action may follow 
from memorized recitation, meaningful thoughts and actions do not evolve 
out of the memorization of ideas. Rather, thoughts and actions that hold 
meaning evolve out of the thoughtful struggle that accompanies the feelings 
of oneself in the world and the world in oneself. Doing what one is told to do 
is oftentimes quite different from living what one personally believes 
(Marcel, 1940/1964). 
How do I know what I believe in? Or in other words how do I make my 
existence mine? To what or whom am I referring when I search for the who 
who is me? Do I look for me in the mirror, in your eyes, in a clinical 
laboratory, on my knees? Gabriel Marcel did not set out looking for the I in 
any particular way. He set out with questions about meaning. In living these 
questions, he found that the I reflected back to oneself is not an insulated I but 
rather an on-going creation textured by relationships with other Is and with 
God. How does this creation come to be? 
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Traditional Foundations of Consciousness 
Philosophically the answer to the question about what the self can 
know of her being, the being of others, and the substance of the world has 
been addressed in terms of the subject-object distinction. The self is defined as 
the subject, the subject defined as the knower. The being of the other and all 
other aspects of the world are defined as the object and the object is defined as 
that which is known. 
The discover of the subject which eventually leads to the juxtaposition 
of the object is Rene Descartes (1596-1650). Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) 
extends Descartes' process of subjectivity by making the distinction between 
the phenomenal world (the world as perceived, conceived, imagined, 
interpreted, analyzed and theorized about by the human mind) and the 
noumenal world (a kind of ultimate reality, the thing-in-itself). According to 
Kant, the noumenal world is unknowable by the human mind. 
Kant argues that there is no such experience as knowing ultimate reality 
because once one "knows" an aspect of her world, it is no longer ultimate or 
pure, that is noumenal, but rather has become subjectified, that is 
phenomenal, through the experiencing of her senses and her correspondent 
categories of understanding (time, space, causality). Nothing certain can be 
said about the noumenal world except that it exists. It exists Kant believes 
due to the faculty of reason within consciousness that produces pure concepts 
(outside of the senses) such as God and justice. 
These noumenal concepts can never be known by the subject 
experientially, therefore, all proofs of their existence are doomed to fail. 
Rather the noumenon can only be believed noetically, through reason alone. 
Ultimate reality (God, soul, justice, and freedom) is not substantive, not of 
substance, so it overreaches the subject's capacity to know. How then does 
one know that the noumenal world exists? Is whether or not it exists strictly 
based on the choice to believe or disbelieve? How does the faculty of reason 
come to be that produces the concepts of the noumenal world? 
Kanf s answer to these questions is to say that there is no logical 
necessity for conceiving of the world in terms of God, justice, freedom . .. (the 
noumenal) in the way that there is a logical necessity to conceive the world in 
terms of time, space, causality (the phenomenal). Rather there is an ethical 
necessity to conceive of the noumenal because without it, many humans 
would lose their hope and enthusiasm for being in the world. If living "as if" 
the noumenal exists results in humans living lives richer and more just then 
Kant reasons that faith in the existence of the noumenal is an essential faith. 
If the noumenal is created as ethical necessity, who or what decides 
what pure concepts are important to live by? Why faith in God, freedom, and 
eternal justice, for example, rather than irrational will, violence, and 
sexuality? Kant answers that pure concepts are what they are because of the 
universal, abstract structure of the mind (Kant, 1787/1929). 
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Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) agrees with Kant that there 
is a universal structure to the mind that is constructive of reality but disagrees 
with Kant in Kanf s concept of mind structure as static and unchanging. The 
universal structures of the mind change historically from period to period, 
according to Hegel. Hegel describes this evolving consciousness in terms of a 
systematic philosophy of the mind. 
In this system, the evolving mind is both the foundation and the aim of 
reality. Mind (Geist) is reality, reality is God. All three (mind, reality, and 
God) are historically contextualized. Through introspection, reality 
progresses, regresses, then advances until the ultimate moment of Absolute 
Geist. Absolute Geist, according to Hegel, is initially expressed aesthetically, 
then progresses to the degree that it may be expressed religiously, and finally 
meets the perfect form of expression in the philosophical. Philosophy to 
Hegel was the most supreme form of knowing; through it, all of existence 
could be thought (Hegel, 1807/1967). 
In the philosophical works of these profound thinkers, there is the 
common belief that ontology can be explained through rational thought. 
Hegel, for example, dissolves the difference between epistemology and 
ontology when he writes that the real is the rational (mind/spirit), the 
rational is the real, meaning that existence and thought are identical. 
Kierkegaard opposed both the French and German rationalist traditions when 
he claims that existence can not be grasped, described, nor understood 
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through rational thought. I can not think my existence, Kierkegaard thought, 
I must live it (Kierkegaard, 1940/1962). Whatever may be explained in terms 
rationalist and definitive is not the struggling person but rather a subject 
insulated from the impact and flux of experience and therefore not a living 
being, not a self at all. 
Foundations of Existential Consciousness 
Philosophers such as Marcel, Buber, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty join 
Kierkegaard in protesting the predesignation of existence into categories and 
explanations. They hold that to categorize experience into rational idealistic 
classifications is to abstract the self from its concrete experience. When, for 
example, existence is classified in terms of subject /object categories, object and 
subject are necessarily objectified. 
From the idealist perspective subject and object are thought to be 
composed of essential preexistent categories. Depending on the way in which 
the particular philosopher defines what he takes to be imperative about the 
subject and the object, the interaction between knowing and knowledge is 
predetermined based on these expectations. What takes place in actual 
experience is irrelevant; the focus is on predetermination, on what 
necessarily will happen. 
Phenomenologists do not disagree about there being some order to 
consciousness through which experience is interpreted yet they understand 
the process as an interaction between the self and the world that is 
individually interpreted by the self who is experiencing and therefore not 
predictable. The self, phenomenologically, is a living being situated in the 
world, both affecting and being affected by other selves, places, material 
objects and also by memories, feelings, imaginings. Experience itself is not 
experienced in terms of the subject necessarily acting on the object in a 
particular way, the object necessarily imposing on the subject, rather there is 
constantly a relational interaction between the self and the particular 
situation, an interaction not predetermined. 
In any given moment, a myriad of possible experiences are potential. 
Within consciousness, one attends to or does not attend to a particular 
experience. The process through which consciousness attends to experience is 
not based on an internal subject/object formulization. To think this formula 
as the basis for selection is to define experience as rational and clearly 
organized when experience is just as potentially irrational as rational, 
confusing as clarifying and paradoxical as it is certain. 
In place of explaining experience in terms defined by preorganized 
formula, phenomenologists seek language which is descriptive of particular 
experiences in order to grasp what is happening in the moment and in 
existence as a whole. Idealism aims for meaning in the abstract; 
phenomenology for meaning in the concreteness of experience. "All 
philosophies based on abstraction have so transcended the natural order, and 
depersonalized man, that the religious life is made unintelligible and must be 
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explained away in terms of psychological urges or sociological forces" 
(Kingston, 1961, p. 61). 
Phenomenological language awaits the moment, the happening. It is a 
language of contingency attendant to the constant interactions of the self in 
the world. Marcel, in Du refus A Vinvocation (1940), writes: 
What brings me nearer to a being, what binds me effectively to him, is 
certainly not to know that he could verify and ratify an addition or a 
division that I could have done on my own. Much rather, it is 
to appreciate that he (like me) has undergone certain trials, that he is 
subject to the same vicissitudes, that he has had a childhood, that he has 
been loved, that other beings have depended on him and have set their 
hopes in him; it is also to realize that he is called to suffer, to wither, to 
die. (Marcel quoted in Kingston, 1961, p. 61) 
Instead of languaging imperatives about what must be happening, 
phenomenological language holds meanings descriptive of what is being 
experienced by the individual through her own interpretations. Prior 
assumptions are suspended. What is sought phenomenologically is a love of 
wisdom rather than a definitional rational certainty. 
Foundations of Creative Fidelity 
What is the manifestation of wisdom in terms of our created and 
continuing existence? Wisdom does not come strictly from reading other 
people and their words. It is a culmination of the ongoing inward synthesis 
of the self experiencing. It is not known through external imposition but 
through inwardness. As Plato said "the eyes are the windows to the soul" 
and therein wisdom is found. 
The rationale of reason instructs as if reality is logically and necessarily 
this way rather than that. There is another vision that is valid but not 
rational. Marcel called this vision the meta-problematic meaning those 
aspects of our lives that are not problems to be solved (they are unsolvable) 
but are mysteries to be encountered. We need to develop both our reason and 
our propensity to embrace mystery, according to Marcel, for it is the internal 
conversation that encompasses both the rational and the mysterious that 
takes us to our wisdom. 
Nietzsche (1844-1900) is remembered for proclaiming "God is dead." 
Marcel interprets this phrase of Nietzsche, as Kierkegaard and Tillich do, to 
mean that the conventionality of Christianity, a project of mass 
consciousness, has killed God. When God dies, the essence of being human 
through which hope, grace, and freedom are known is obscured. Hence the 
progress of despiritualized materialism reigns and human life becomes 
technologized. The world seems to reflect a sort of hyper-reality rather than a 
human reality and then we find ourselves choosing the arid life that closes 
the inwardness of existence out. According to Marcel, it is not necessary that 
we do so. In fact, Marcel says, if human life is to survive in its majesty and 
wonder, we must wake up to who we are (Marcel, 1955). 
One of the most difficult aspects of Marcel's work to grasp is the way in 
which he brings his ideas about the particular aspects of our personal life, that 
each human being is unique in and of herself, into conjunction with the 
awesome universal spiritual dimension of human life, that there is some 
essential ontological foundation that unites all human individuals. His 
philosophy merges the concrete and particular of one's everyday human 
dilemma with the eternal holy presence. Marcel asks what does it mean to be 
I and at the same time to be universally defined by you and the eternal? Here 
is the core of his complex, multifaceted, and challenging works (Marcel, 1950). 
Marcel's philosophy is at one time worldly and other-worldly. While 
studying him, one is asked to comprehend that which is pragmatic (the 
doings of existence) together with an ontological mystery (the being of 
existence). His work requires us to approach our understanding through our 
own concreteness, addressing basic questions and activities we are faced with 
daily, and at the same time to respond in our consciousness to the obscure 
wonder of the divine mystery. 
In that the way we are invited to be in the western world is through a 
dichotomized either/or. Marcel's work, indeed, is challenging. In Marcel, 
human life is described as secular and religious, thus, we must both choose 
willfully and surrender to grace. We are, he tells us, incarnated in physical 
body and are spiritual consciousness. We are alone, and yet, always together. 
Both either and or are crucial to grasping the fullness and meaning of human 
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life. That we have in general failed to include both in our consciousness has 
led to a truncated perspective, a perspective that ultimately prevents the full 
realization of human life. 
Marcel calls us to live a consciousness mediated by the spirit and the 
flesh. This mediated dialectic makes possible knowledge that has 
fundamentally to do with being, the experience of deeply loving another, God 
as humane, and ethical thought and action that impacts and addresses our 
lives (Marcel, 1952). 
When studying Marcel, one is brought face to face with the complexities 
that we tend to avoid through our traditional philosophical attempts to 
organize human life into systems of thought. There is within us a tendency 
to escape our very existence which leads us to find caverns of the mind to 
reside in that shield us from the vicissitudes of our human experience. For 
those of us interested in material tastes, we have many caverns of technology 
from which to choose to hide, laboratories where we study life as if it is a 
material, objective entity that can be "still-lifed," captured, and studied. If our 
intent is to avoid the complexities and pains of human life, any method of 
study, be the foundation mind or material, can be accommodated for the 
purpose of avoidance. 
When systems of avoidance are adopted, what is missed is a personal 
commitment to truth and knowledge. Belief about what is true becomes 
based not on personal knowledge and experience but on what is prescribed by 
religious or secular bureaucracy. This way of believing is unacceptable 
existentially for existential belief is phenomenological, based on the 
interpretation of experiencing by the individual. 
The ontological basis of existentialism is the individual experiencing 
experience and therefore experiencing is the foundation of existential belief. 
In that experiences and beliefs are inextricably related, beliefs are comprised 
not of abstract concepts but rather of concrete personal hopes, dreams, desires, 
and are therefore known viscerally. 
Since existentialism calls for beliefs unfolding out of experience, 
existentialism is sensitive to the how of the belief (the process of coming to 
believe) rather than the what. The essence of belief is grounded in the 
confrontation and struggle with life. Existentially, since the outcome of the 
struggle can not be prescribed, how are beliefs arrived at? 
For Marcel, there is purpose to the existential confrontation and 
struggle with concrete life so any beliefs that evolve from engaged concrete 
life are likewise purposeful. Much of Marcel's life was committed to 
searching for, uncovering, and constructing purpose and meaning. Both 
uncover and construct are used here because for Marcel meaning-making is a 
process of both uncovering and constructing. There is essence to be 
uncovered whether or not an individual does so. However, existentially, the 
meaningful essence is irrelevant unless the individual uncovers it. 
Marcel indicates that what brings meaning into the world, directly into 
human lives, is the individual being receptive to the deeper ontological, 
spiritual essence of existence and then living what she uncovers through her 
actions. The constructive aspect of purposeful life, Marcel believed, has to do 
with the choice to be receptive to and embracing of this meaningful essence 
or purpose and to live, to act, out of it. 
The choice to be sensitive to a deeper meaning is a critical choice in 
terms of living a life of creative fidelity. In being receptive to the nuances of 
life, we attend to experiences that inform us what we believe. If we deny our 
experiences, insulate ourselves from one another, our experiences do not 
permeate our consciousness. Then, our beliefs are based on prescribed 
preordained principles and thus are not part of our inward felt experiencing. 
These beliefs are not creative nor "fidelitous" in the existential sense. 
Marcel was committed to the notion that each individual life is unique 
in and of itself; therefore, the essential life could not be prescribed but must be 
uncovered by each in her own way. What this essential purpose is and how 
individuals come to know this in the existential particularized personal way 
were the questions that Marcel asked most of his life. His commitment was 
to an intellectual spiritual search for the ontological meaning and the ethics 
of living this meaning. Philosophers similarly committed are Buber, 
Kierkegaard, Jaspers, and other spiritual existentialists who struggle with the 
meaning of God in human life. 
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The Influence of Tosiah Rovce on Marcel 
It is not surprising that early in Marcel's studies, he turned to the ideas 
of American philosophers in furthering his understanding of the 
relationship between universal purpose as it relates to individuals in their 
lived lives. America as a nation, at least mythically, was a symbol of the 
struggle to live as individuals with liberty united as one nation — "one nation 
under God and with justice and liberty for all." In this sense the philosophy 
of America was formed out of a philosophical mindset that merged the 
European absolutist movement (that sought essential timeless concepts — 
absolute truths, absolute authority) with a revolutionary spirit that was a 
protest against authoritarian rule in support of individual sovereignty and 
freedom. 
Josiah Royce (1855-1916) was one of the philosophers from America 
who Marcel turned to. Royce was born in Grass Valley, California. He 
studied first at the University of California (Berkeley) and then at Johns 
Hopkins University, completing his doctorate in 1878. In addition he studied 
at Gottingen in Germany while reading extensively Schopenhauer, Schelling, 
Kant, and Hegel. William James invited Royce to come to Harvard to teach 
in 1882. Until his death, he was one of the mainstays of the philosophy 
department there. 
Marcel studied Royce and published a book entitled Rovce's metaphysics 
in the 1910s. The english edition was later published in 1956 at which time 
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Marcel wrote a preface remarking on why he studied Royce. Royce's thinking 
was representative of the philosophical struggle between absolute idealism 
and existential concerns and. in that lay his brilliance for. Marcel (Marcel, 
1910/1956). 
Fundamentally, Royce had his roots in middle european idealism in 
the traditions of Kant and Hegel. In his beliefs that there is an ultimate truth, 
Royce was like them but he extended their work in that he was committed to 
the concreteness of the individual's everyday experience. While Royce 
believed that there is some higher mind, some Absolute Knower, God that 
exists, Royce recognized that in our everyday consciousness we usually do not 
attend to this knowing. Though individuals get glimpses from time to time 
into this complete meaning, often they are blinded to the greater picture. 
Their blindness must not prevent them from having faith that there is a 
greater meaning. It is in living out of this faith that the individual becomes 
embodied in purpose and thus embodied in a life that is just and meaningful. 
For Royce, faith in the Absolute Knower, God, is the actualizer of Truth, for 
faith grounds the particular individual life in some greater unity of purpose. 
Crucial for Royce and his relationship to the work of Marcel is his 
understanding of faith as a choice rather than a given. Individuality is 
contingent on choice. According to Royce, the divine will is not imposed, 
rather the individual is free to choose either to live out of holy 
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understanding or to live out of some entirely different system of knowing. 
This existential aspect of Royce's work defines the manifestation of reality as 
individual choosing. 
Unity is not given to the ego. The ego must confer unity on itself. 
Nothing there exists in itself. The study of the variations, anomalies 
and illusions of self-consciousness are enough to show this. As soon as 
we have explained the chaotic confusion of our ego, or rather of our 
empirical 'egos/ what will remain with us is the conviction that we 
must possess or create for ourselves, despite this confusion, a principle 
which will enable us to recognize that portion of the world's life which 
must be, which will be, ours. (Marcel, 1910/1956, p. 42) 
In this quote from Royce's Metaphysics, Marcel explains Royce's emphasis on 
individuality as becoming existent through knowing that is unique and 
singular for the person. What becomes complex is understanding the basis of 
the foundations that order individual lives. Again the question has to do 
with how we come to know what it is that we believe. 
This would suggest that there are infinite choices, from the sublime to 
the ridiculous, the holy to the profane, from which any individual can choose 
to believe. A person might structure her life on a belief in absurdity (that 
nothing has meaning), consumerism (defined by the zeal to produce objects), 
asceticism (the no-thing of eastern thought), love (the union of care), 
creativity (imagination into form), God (living the divine will), 
destructiveness (violence toward life), greed (questing after more and more), 
fame (seeking status), the assertion of power, and ad infinitum. If there are 
infinite possibilities from which to make my finite choice, then how do I 
come to know this choice? 
One of the questions that an individual might come to in choosing the 
what of her belief is an inquiry into the purpose of life. On the ontological — 
does there exist an essential reality on which I base my life? On the ethical ~ 
is there a particular just way to live? If so, on what is this based? Or, is my 
purpose based on some aesthetic vision that attends to structuring experience 
within certain creative forms that enhance life with meaning and pleasure? 
For Royce, the human purpose is ontological in that it is based on the 
divine order that he believes encompasses human life. In the first half of his 
book Rovce's metaphysics. Marcel describes Royce's ontological explanation of 
how it is that God must exist. Marcel's explanation of Royce's ontological 
proof is complex and difficult to grasp. It is possible for one to get the 
impression that Marcel himself had difficulty understanding Royce's 
description of God, the Absolute Knower. 
The confusion has to do with Royce's attempt to be non-absolutist and 
therefore focused on the concrete individual experience of God and yet Royce 
structures his ideas for the necessary existence of God in an abstract non-
concrete way. For example, Royce wanted to resist thinking of God as the 
Absolute Cause for human experience, for he was committed to the concrete 
unfolding of the individual life. He was opposed to any concept of 
predestination. And yet Marcel argues that Royce's explanations often end in 
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a cause-effect fatalism that negates the individual experience, a message that 
"if God exists, there must be these truths about human existence." 
Though Royce attempted to define the Absolute Knower in terms 
directly related to human experience, Marcel felt that he never quite 
succeeded in this. In fact, where Royce ultimately ends up conceptually is in 
his notion that the world is the manifestation of the purpose and will of an 
Absolute Knower/God. 
In that Royce attempted to include the individual relationship to God as 
critical to the universal purpose being manifested, in actuality he consistently 
stuck to the induction "if God, then ..." Yet it is in his attempt to address the 
individual life (the relationship between the many and the One/God), that is 
in the questions he raised, that he enlightened Marcel in spiritually and 
intellectually enriching ways. 
Marcel refers to the influence of Royce's ideas about loyalty on his own 
concept of fidelity. What does Royce mean when he emphasizes loyalty to 
purpose? Marcel interprets Royce to mean that loyalty has to do with coming 
to meet God through a committed consciousness. Though Royce emphasizes 
commitment, his work does not indicate the individual way toward a 
commitment to know God. If the commitment is not existentially arrived at, 
then it is externally enforced or coerced or instructed. Marcel asks Royce, how 
does the infinite speak in our finite lives? Does the all-encompassing 
Absolute Knower do more to compromise the individuality of beings than to 
guarantee it, Marcel asks? 
We could turn to a lecture Royce gave on the later problems of idealism 
where he said: 
If it is the truth of life, i.e., if the truth is a living and not a bloodless 
realm of abstract categories, then the truth must involve issues, 
struggles, conquests, and conquests over aspects of life that, when 
viewed in their abstraction, are distinctly evil and irrational. (Royce, 
1919, p. 256) 
This is the existential voice of Royce, portraying his commitment to the 
process and warning against defining the struggle as undesirable. The only 
way to prevent error, irrationality, and evil is for truth to be fixed, a truth 
which is born into and to which all adhere. Loyalty to the divine purpose, 
however, is not loyalty to a fixed truth, rather it was Royce's belief that each 
individual must come to her understanding of what truth is through her 
own experience. This points up again the complexity of Royce's thought. 
(Marcel felt that he had failed ultimately to support this existential segment of 
his work). 
Royce does believe that there is an infinite Truth and yet human beings 
are not necessarily born into knowing this truth. Truth is realized through a 
certain experiencing that reflects loyalty to the principle of faith. In other 
words, the individual does not know Truth but must have faith that Truth is, 
making possible for herself experiences through which Truth will be 
revealed. In that an individual does not know until she knows, there must 
be room in human communities for error, irrationality, and evil, according to 
Royce (Royce, 1919). 
If humans come to know Truth through the experiencing of their 
experience, that is through the interpretation of their lived existence, then 
struggle, error, and confusion are necessary to coming to know. If there was 
not struggle, then Truth would be known prior to experience. 
Acceptance of error and efforts to correct the ignorance that takes a 
person to error are emblematic of communities of care and learning. 
Ignorance rather than evil is what takes people to wrongdoing, according to 
Royce; therefore, redemption is an educational and therefore communal task. 
When a person errs, communally, a deed is constructed for the individual 
that will redeem her for her misdoing and at the same time improve the 
community, making it a better place than it was before the wrong was 
committed. 
This is the voice of Royce that spoke to Marcel's existential and ethical 
pulse. There is struggle, Marcel agreed, and there must be. His passion about 
Royce's ideas led him to inquire more deeply into meanings about spiritual 
communities that embrace individuality, loyalty, and redemption, 
communities in which religiosity is affirmed as struggle. This inquiry into 
spiritual communality led Marcel to some of the foundational thoughts 
underlying his concepts of creative fidelity. On the one hand Royce 
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acknowledges the individual struggle; on the other hand he believes that a 
divine goal of redemption and spiritual community preexists the individual. 
How can one recognize this spiritual community? How can one find 
oneself in such a community? Marcel felt that Royce did not answer these 
questions. He believed that though Royce was committed to the concrete 
individual life, quoting Royce's idea "individuality is neither a thing nor an 
abstract concept. It is an embodied purpose. More exactly it is a new type of 
interest in the world and in God" (Marcel, 1910/1956, pp. 101-102), that Royce 
was caught in an absolute idealist trap that explained human life as 
beginning, becoming, and being with God defined not through human 
experience but accepted because of a preordained notion of God. 
Marcel suggests that perhaps Royce remained enslaved by a logical 
monism. "Royce does not go beyond the metaphysically meaningless idea 
that every finite experience is in the absolute experience and that all is 
contained and completed in God" (Marcel, 1910/1956, p. 170). Though Royce 
encourages individual choice, he also thinks in terms of the choice (absolute 
will) in a sense choosing the individual. For further insights into the means 
through which the individual purpose is revealed to or constructed by the 
individual, Marcel turned to William Hocking. 
The Influence of William Hocking 
William Hocking (1873-1966) inspired Marcel's work in a profound way. 
Hocking was born in Cleveland, Ohio, and like Royce, was studied in 
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european idealism. Most particularly, Hocking was interested in the 
philosophy of religion, an interest which led him to Harvard where he was 
educated by Josiah Royce and William James. After completing an 
undergraduate and graduate degree at Harvard, he spent most of his teaching 
career there until he retired in 1943. 
Hocking's book The Meaning of God in Human Experience (1912) was a 
revelation to Marcel. In his autobiographical essay Marcel writes: "Hocking 
remains for me an unsurpassed example of what a philosopher can be, in the 
fullest sense of the word, in a topsy-turvy world like ours" (Marcel, 1969, p. 
55). In fact so impressed was Marcel by Hocking's work that he dedicated his 
1927 Metaphysical Tournal to him. There was such an important intellectual 
and personal relationship between Marcel and Hocking that it is interesting to 
read Hocking for clues to Marcel's search. 
The first part of Hocking's book is fundamentally phenomenological. 
In it he writes of the relationship between ideas and feelings. Feelings are 
crucial because they lead the individual to ideas about what is important, 
meaningful, appealing. Initially the feeling signifies that something is 
happening that is significant and yet the meaning is not yet grasped. Feelings 
culminate in certain knowings or ideas. Living the feelings is like living the 
questions until understanding evolves. If the way to understanding has been 
through feeling, then the understandings are reflective of human 
experiencing. In being committed to these understandings that evolve from 
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one's feelings, a person finds ownership of her existence. These concepts of 
understanding, commitment, and deep-felt meaning are foundational aspects 
for Marcel of the concept creative fidelity. 
In the middle section of Hocking's work, he abandons his 
phenomenological voice, vacillating between a voice that is idealistic (that 
God exists is an absolute truth) to a voice that is philosophically scientific 
(there is evidence for the existence of God). He seems to abandon his belief in 
the importance of feeling-ideas and takes on the task of proving that there 
must be God in human experience. Absent from this section is a feeling of 
the presence of God in human life, rather Hocking exhibits a cerebral 
approach to attempt to prove God's existence. 
There is a similar relationship here between Hocking's stated 
commitment to knowledge that is born out of felt experience versus static 
thoughts and Royce's stated commitment to the individual concrete life 
rather than to an a priori absolute. Yet in both of their works they become 
entangled in traditions of thought removed from commitments to the "felt 
life." Hocking appears to be confused in his effort to prove God. He writes in 
a reductive Newtonian mentality void of passionate feeling and 
commitment, the importance of which he had previously established in his 
work. The reading of Hocking's argument about God is somewhat 
intellectually paralyzing and confused. 
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Hocking in the last section of the book returns again to his 
phenomenological voice, emphasizing the process through which the 
individual comes to meaning in her life. He explores the phenomenological 
method as analogous to the process of worship in the life of the mystic. It is 
apparent in this latter section why Hocking was important to Marcel, for 
Hocking exhibits here his commitment to and interest in exploring the 
concrete feeling experience that is available to the individual. Through 
describing the phenomenon of mystical worship, Hocking is in essence 
describing the process that is applicable to any experience that is experienced 
phenomenologically. 
The suspension of presumption is encouraged by Hocking in order that 
the individual may with less bias and prejudice be receptive to experiencing. 
He describes experience as a dialectic between the intellect and intuition. 
In the typical mystic temperament we expect to find a certain openness 
of spirit, such as readily accepts a present inspiration as its law. The 
encasements of mental attitude in such persons are never fast-set: 
the limberness of their inner substance promises well for continuance 
of growth. At his worst, the mystic is impulsive and childish; at his best 
he retains something of childhood, its tenderness, its freshness of 
impression, its unsatiated wonder, its generosity: he has that simplicity 
and teachableness which are found in the very young and the very 
great. (Hocking, 1912, pp. 400-401) 
The openness of spirit referred to here is similar to the spirit of 
phenomenological epoche. 
This "certain openness of spirit" refers to the critical relationship 
between ideas and feelings. The "present inspiration" is the consciousness of 
feelings that culminate in spiritual understandings. Feelings are essential to 
this process of coming to know for they are a conduit from a person's most 
inward existence to a wider universal knowing. "Feeling does not markedly 
accompany a thought except in so far as that thought touches the springs of 
my own musculature: feeling is the idea doing work in me" (Hocking, 1912, 
p. 116). When ideas (understanding) retain a living connection to feelings, 
they remain pertinent to existence. When this connection is severed, ideas 
become detached from the source of life. The individual becomes closed off 
from knowing existentially her relationship to spiritual meaning. 
What is makes no difference. That which produces difference is 
consciousness of what is. Whether the object of knowledge is God, a person, 
concepts, material objects, one arrives at meaning of the object through what 
Hocking calls one's "apperceptive mass." This apperceptive mass is what 
determines for a person the feeling-worth of the world. It consists of 
"instincts in part, organic capacities for enjoyment, experiences also, and all 
sorts of associated fancies and memories and ideas." Hocking goes on to say 
that the apperceptive mass "is nothing other than idea; idea being but 
experience itself in all its life and infinitude prepared for this very work of 
meeting new experience with justice" (Hocking, 1912, p. 128). This definition 
of idea is most definitely the feeling-idea. 
Hocking's concept of "meeting new experience with justice" defines 
justice as an openness of spirit, a receptivity, to what is before one. While 
every individual brings to new experience her ideas from prior experiences, 
the evolution of these ideas is crucial to determining whether experience is 
met with justice. If during experiencing, interpretation is imposed by an 
other on the person actually experiencing, then the person experiencing will 
be conscious of the interpretation of the other but not of her own personal 
experiencing. Further experience she has will then be interpreted through 
ideas of the other, interpretations not her own. This process of interpreting 
experience produces what Hocking calls unjust experience. Contrary to this, 
when a person experiences (interprets) the feeling-worth of experience 
through her apperceptive mass, the mind becomes more free, more 
inventive, and open to relevant connections that are possible between the 
moment and the individual's being. 
The feeling-value of the object of our knowing has to do with how 
involved we are with our ideas about the object. Every new idea that one 
comes to through feeling as well as non-felt experience is added to what 
Hocking calls the idea-world of the person. If the ideas woven into the fabric 
of our evolving idea-world are disconnected from feeling, then the fabric is 
more like a mechanized thought system rather than a textured reflection of 
the existence of the person as a knowing, believing, feeling being. Hocking 
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speaks of meeting experience with justice (or experience well-met) as 
concomitant with love. 
Experience-well-met. . . which entering into the bone and blood of the 
Idea (for the most part unreachable in speech) builds human quality and 
human worth. Love itself, then, if we are right, is not a thing apart 
from knowledge. That which we love is not indeed learning, or logic-
skill, but some reality-thought at work upon an actual experience, 
creating there the very material of beauty and value....Love and 
sympathy we often think of as feeling, in direct contrast to idea. It is 
clear however that they both are cognizances of another, do in some 
way make the leap between my own soul and the soul of some one not-
myself, intend to put me in veritable rapport with what thought is 
passing there, the very tour de force of objectivity. ... Interest in 
objectivity, which we have found at the root of all idea-making, is love 
itself directed to reality... . Love and sympathy are the activity of the 
idea. And in their exercise, the idea is enlarged. The lover widens his 
experience as the non-lover cannot. He adds to the mass of his idea-
world, and acquires thereby enhanced power to appreciate all things. 
(Hocking, 1912, pp. 135-136) 
Love is essential to the process of experiencing if the knowledge that evolves 
from the experience is to hold meaning. 
It is because of their love for the Absolute that Hocking turned to the 
mystics in his search to understand the meaning of God in human 
experience. Because of this love, the mystic is willing to devote her attention 
to meeting God in the silence and openness of the moment. In devotion to 
God, the mystic disassociates from (mental) thoughts, thoughts that result in 
alienation from visceral feelings. Feelings embodied are necessary for 
receptivity to spiritual being. It is through feelings of love, according to 
Hocking, that we willfully suspend our prejudgments and the social 
consensus about the object of our love, receiving the object wholeheartedly 
and with more acute attentiveness to who or what is before us. 
Hocking is saying that to know meaningfully, there must be desire to 
know. This love for knowledge is reflected in the will. Is it the will alone 
which makes possible the mystic's knowledge of the spiritual realm? It is 
here that we return again to questions about whether what is real is 
uncovered through grace or constructed through the determination of will. 
Does the mystic's will construct objects of faith or is the absolute there waiting 
for the individual to will to know it? Hocking defines will more as being 
receptive to what is before one rather than constructing what is before one. 
Hocking believes this receptivity or will to know is crucial to faith, for it 
is this openness to the idea of the sacred that makes possible the revelation of 
experience as sacred. Sacred experience does not come to one empirically nor 
intellectually rather the sacred is met when there is faith that the sacred exists. 
"Faith is not only difficult for reason; it is distinctly diffident toward reason. 
Its origin, then, and its firmness must be due to some other power, 
presumably to will" (Hocking, 1912, p. 144). The ancient ontological 
argument for God's existence was "I have an idea of God; therefore, God 
exists." Hocking argues that there must be more than a mere idea of God. He 
prefers to state, "I have an idea of God, therefore, I have an experience of 
God" (Hocking, 1912, p. 309). 
It is my idea that there is God which makes the experience I have 
possible and yet the actuality of the experience also has to do with there being 
something to experience. It is true that without the I (the will), there is no 
experience to experience; it is also true without something to experience, 
there is no experience for the I. A person's will opens her to a particular 
realm of experience, inviting the meaning of that realm of experience into 
her inwardness and existence. 
In the realm of sacred experience, the ineffable within (the self) is 
receptive to the ineffable without (God) and a relationship is formed between 
the person and God. Worship then is a willful intense thinking, according to 
Hocking, that has to do with thoughtful yielding to the divine rather than 
with sensations or reason. In worship the universality of thought about the 
divine is overcome and "God is appropriated uniquely to the individual self" 
(Hocking, 1912, p. 342). In the act of worship all habits of mind must be 
transcended so that the individual may meet God; therefore, to describe it is 
to seek language beyond these habits of the mind. It is difficult to say what it 
is, rather one can describe feelings that indicate that it is. 
Why is this mystical process of knowing and being important, according 
to Hocking? In the spiritual sense, the process is important in that through it 
God is experienced by individuals. Because the meaning of God, according to 
Hocking, becomes present through a person's individual experience of God, 
the inner subjective dimension of the mystical process is necessary. 
It is this subjective dimension of mystical knowing which is important 
to understand in the existential epistemological sense, for it affirms the 
relevance of feelings. When feelings are affirmed, what is also affirmed is 
that for which an individual cares. When a person attends to what she cares 
about, meaning is felt. In this sense, the mystical process is exhibitive of 
meaning making. 
Further, the mystical process is a way to inventive knowledge and 
understanding. In that habits of mind (beliefs) are suspended, the individual 
is more widely and deeply receptive to the novelty of the moment, making 
possible insights otherwise obscured and barriered. 
Finally, Hocking emphasizes the mystical process as important in terms 
of how it may lead to ethical qualities. Because of the mystic's spirit of 
openness, she is unfettered by conventional judgments, is not bound by 
definitive ideas about experience, and therefore lives in a mood of 
surrendered receptivity. During worship the mystic is not thinking through 
categories and preordained conclusions rather comes to experience with an 
openness of heart receptive to the majesty of the spirit. The experience of 
meeting the spirit is not analyzed into parts but rather is viscerally 
experienced and woven into the whole of the person's apperceptive 
consciousness or idea-world. It is this receptivity of consciousness that 
Hocking believes important to an ethics of compassion, a world in which 
humans receive one another more full-heartedly. 
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Thus in all of the above-mentioned ways, the mystical process exhibits a 
way towards the experience of God, oneself, insight, and compassion for one 
another. Hocking in a sense is prescribing this process as one concrete way in 
which people come to understandings that when conjoined may be creative 
of a insightful, ethical, and meaningful community. To come to one another 
in a vein of openness and acceptance as the mystics come to the sacred 
moment could set the context for relationships of less rigidity and more 
possibility, that is relationships less psychologically predictable. 
If the mystical way exemplifies a way of coming to the world that 
centers on subjective meaning and the sacred, that makes way for novelty, 
and that requires a mood of compassionate non-judgmental inclusivity, then 
the mystical consciousness integrated into our more secular consciousness is 
a way to have the experience of God in our daily, worldly lives. Near the end 
of Hocking's book, he begins to reflect on the life of the prophet, defining the 
prophet as a mystic who lives in the world rather than the monastic mystic 
who for all intents and purposes lives "outside" of the world. 
Hocking echoes here the notion of the spiritual community found in 
Royce's work. As previously mentioned, Marcel argued that Royce assumes 
the existence of spiritual community without informing how this 
community comes to be. Hocking, however, in his work on the meaning that 
is created by the union of ideas with feelings and by exemplifying the mystical 
experience as a way in which the idea-feelings are lived out, provides insights 
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into the phenomenological way in which an individual may approach her 
world spiritually and thus create communions of meaning. 
Hocking writes prophetically about the meaning and purpose of the 
integrity that exists in spiritual communion: 
It means . . . that we maintain our discontent, returning again and again 
to the demand that our existence shall find itself justified in our own 
eyes. The first practical principle of religion is to hold without 
weakening the right of every individual life to know its own worth. 
We must not let reality go, this reality which has produced us, until it 
satisfies us: it must yield us the idea which unites what we most deeply 
desire with what is. This is the prayer of Jacob; and in a fundamental 
sense it is the first prayer of every human being. We are right in 
wishing to see first and be loyal afterward. (Hocking, 1912, 
p. 436) 
Hocking is emphasizing here the ontological perspective that there is a reality 
that precedes a person's existential life. This reality is multi-faceted so makes 
possible different experiencing. Hocking thinks that this reality can be willed 
by the individual to be supportive and encouraging of the worth of her being. 
The individual must demand this of life wholeheartedly. When this 
demand is fulfilled, there is spiritual integrity, for her world then supports, 
encourages, allows, and reflects the unfolding of sacred existence. 
Initially this sounds like a romanticized ontology, as if there is an easy 
route to a sacred self/world relationship. Hardly does Hocking intend to 
romanticize this relationship. To demand of the world that it support the 
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particular individual life requires that a person strive towards the cultivation 
of a certain self. 
It means .. . that we understand clearly to what self this right belongs, 
and cultivate that self. This right to see does not belong to our complex 
and strident personality which goes about, thinking by omnipotent 
effort to earn its happiness and its certainty. It belongs only to that in us 
which is simple and sincere. The sincere is that which is moved by 
necessity not by effort...the genuine will is the will which goes forth 
from effortless attention, that is to say, from love — and that is to say, 
from sight. We have the right to see first and then be loyal afterward 
only because unless we see we cannot be loyal, nor in any sense sincere 
or moral. (Hocking, 1912, pp. 436-437) 
It is important, Hocking believes, that the individual pause away from 
willful, worldly pursuits to see her self and the world in spiritual rather than 
material terms. 
With this more inward seeing, what is meaningful and important to 
believe in will be realized. This voluntary passivity of the will, according to 
Hocking, in which concerns about achievement and acquisition are de-
emphasized leads to an involuntary passivity where necessity (a reality 
emphasizing individual sacred worth) shows itself. 
Hocking throughout his work describes this dialectical relationship 
between the will that wills passivity and the opening this makes possible for 
the spiritual dimension of existence to present itself. The dialectic is between 
a voluntary passivity that leads to an involuntary happening where sacred 
dimensions of existence are revealed. Hocking emphasizes that the 
individual must see, that is experience, a certain ontological moment first in 
order to be loyal to the truth of that moment afterwards. Yet in order "to see," 
he suggests that individual will must be towards a more simple than 
ambitious life so that the deeper meanings become present. 
In other words, we must prepare to see before we can see. To be 
committed to this preparation, what is required is faith, a faith that there is 
"something" important to experience and that it is desirable. Faith makes 
possible a certain kind of experiencing which culminates in a loyalty to that 
revealed through the "seeing" of experience. The fundamental law of 
religious life to Hocking is this right to be loyal only to what one has 
experienced. 
Woven into Hocking's own beliefs is his perspective that the world is so 
created that a simple view of the world is possible and not only possible but 
necessary in order for the individual to have a life of integrity. 
He says that it is the simple even more than the subjective that we must 
appeal to. He believes that the a priori aspect of both the subjective and the 
objective is simple and that the "anticipated attainment" of the individual 
life that unfolds out of this simplicity is the most desirable kind of concrete 
life. In commanding simplicity the person is able to see reality in the 
"primitive terms of self, universe, and the present moment (where 
everything begins from the beginning)" (Hocking, 1912, p. 438). 
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Hocking describes prayer as important in coming to a simple and 
complete vision of the whole. 
I use the word 'pray/ because, in the end, there is no other word which 
conveys that attitude of will in which effort is so combined with non-
effort, and self-assertion with consciousness of absolute dependence. 
Nor do I know why this word should be translated into anything more 
scholastic. The insight we require is both a right and a gift, the justest 
gift in all experience; we dare not be too proud to comply with its 
evident conditions. We must know that in doing these things, we are 
already using a degree of mystic insight: we are relying upon an 
attachment to the whole which is too deep in us to be lost or overcome; 
we are striving to 'enter into ourselves/ to recognize this attachment for 
what it is, the love of the God of that alienated world. This is prayer. 
And the answer to prayer is whatever of simplicity, of 
naturalness, of original appreciation, is brought into our view of things 
by this act of obedience of the mind to its absolute object. In proportion 
as our prayer is honest, we shall find ourselves less thinking, and more 
seeing; and we can turn again to meet experience with so much better 
poise and understanding. (Hocking, 1912, p. 439) 
This recalls Plato's notion of anamnesis or knowing again what has been 
forgotten in the work and rush of the everyday and in the activities of 
ambitious strivings. What is recollected in prayer, in devotion to simplicity, 
is "the whole which is too deep in us to be lost or overcome." 
After receiving the prophetic insights from one's inward receptivity to 
the spiritual whole (or the One), the person ought turn back to the world, in 
Hocking's belief, for the purpose of contributing to the enrichment of 
humanity. The prophet judges her truth in terms of its bearing on her 
everyday experience. If the truth does not harmonize with daily lived 
experience, the prophet must abandon the truth. The certainty or the 
uncertainty of truth is assured only after the spiritual truth is lived in the 
midst of earthly experience. 
The truth of the world is necessary to give certainty to the truth of God. 
'It is the possibility of comprehending these experiences/ says Delacroix, 
'of living them, of utilizing them in action, which here serves as a 
touchstone of their truth. Intuition is of no value save in an ensemble 
with which it accords.' (Hocking, 1912, p. 449) 
Hocking says that he agrees with Delacroix and yet he points out that since 
what he has derived is that "the certainty of the world is derived from the 
certainty of God in the first place, the world can hardly withhold its consent" 
(Hocking, 1912, p. 449). 
The world is known as the world of this God and God as the God of this 
world. Again, here is the dialectical relationship between faith, will, and sight 
(knowing). It is a confusing dialectic because it ultimately leads to a circular 
idea of reality rather than a linear understanding. It is difficult to grasp in 
linear fashion (this follows from that) what Hocking is saying about the self 
and the world and the relationship of meaning and significance that ensues. 
Because faith is inextricably related to the experience of what is, according to 
Hocking, as the experience of what is is inextricably related to faith that it is 
and because will is an integral part of both faith and experience, there is not a 
systematic formula that explains coming to know the real. Rather, what 
Hocking presents is more of a concept that might be most clearly described as 
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a gestalt whereby faith, will, and knowing through seeing are experienced 
simultaneously. 
What Hocking's work contributes to Marcel's existential passion is 
Hocking's underlying theme that the universal idea of worth is not sufficient 
to live by. One must be brought into vital connection with the worth of her 
own existence through her particular experiencing. The individual must 
demand of the world that it meet her. 
In order to live in prophetic spiritual communities, Hocking believes 
that individuals must be reflexive, retreating from the objective desires of the 
empirical life into contemplation about the essence of life. In contemplation, 
the emphasis shifts from the object to the subject who is pursuing the object. 
Self-consciousness is awakened. In this recollection, the deeper meaning and 
purpose of one's existence is insighted along with an understanding of one's 
connection and purpose to the broader world of which one is a part. 
It is in believing that the meaning of our lives can be brought into 
consciousness and then into valid expression in the world that our lives 
become purposeful. This self possibility, that our lives will have purpose, 
gives to our existence historic relevance. Through the alternation between 
reflection on the timeless, eternal values of life (on love, faith, hope, 
compassion) and then a reflection on how experience of these eternal truths 
is related to temporal experience, the mystic becomes prophet, and the 
everyday is rendered with sacred meaning. 
Foundations of Embodied Consciousness 
Gabriel Marcel agrees with Hocking as well as with Royce that the 
meaning of human existence can not be separated from the presence of God 
in human experience or from at the very least some ultimate essence. What 
Marcel disagrees with is their minimization of the complex and important 
nature of being embodied human. In that Royce focuses primarily on the 
idea of God, the deficiency Marcel discovers in Royce's work is that it tends 
too much towards multi-theoretical abstraction. Hocking focuses primarily 
on the descriptive process of experiencing God. His work for Marcel moves 
closer than Royce's work to addressing the particularity of being a human 
individual. Yet, one senses that Marcel demands more concreteness than 
even Hocking's work suggests. 
Hocking emphasizes the ontological importance of spiritual meaning 
and that a person must have faith in meaning to feel and exist in meaning. It 
is possible to imagine Marcel saying yes to this and yet cautioning that even 
emphasizing the process of feeling as Hocking does may still lead to abstract 
theorizing about feeling. A person may language the importance of feeling 
purpose, meaning, beliefs, and still not in actuality experience her feelings. 
The work of Hocking seems to have become for Marcel a foundation from 
which to delve even more tangibly into human meaning as it is lived 
through experience. What is this more thorough, concrete realm that Marcel 
wishes to study philosophically? 
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As mentioned, Marcel holds profound respect for Hocking's work. 
Likewise, Hocking recognizes and respects Marcel's commitment to the 
experiencing of being human as it is interpreted by each individual. Hocking, 
when commenting on Marcel's philosophical position, stresses the self as 
Marcel's "native terrain." Being, in the philosophy of Marcel, becomes an 
experiential perception. Hocking says about Marcel, "Ask Marcel how being is 
to be defined, and you get no answer. Ask how it is to be described, and you 
do a bit better. Ask how it is to be experienced, and Marcel becomes eloquent" 
(cited in Lechner, 1974, p. 461). 
Understanding the meaning of the word experience as Marcel intends it 
is essential to grasping his philosophical commitments. Hocking indicates 
that the experience of being in Marcel's terms "is not a datum-pressure or a 
factual dull thud but a passionate-filled presence. It is a hearth-fire, and at the 
same time part of the experience is that it is not just a local blaze. It is in 
everyone" (cited in Lechner, 1974, p. 461). 
A passionate-filled presence...is the experience of being . . . present in 
everyone. The critical word is presence. Before individuals can be receptive 
to the knowing of the spiritual realm of which Hocking and Royce write, 
Marcel believes that they must be rooted in the body and the world. This 
location, rootedness, he calls presence. This presence is rooted in the body 
and in the spirit. For Royce, the promise of human life is in the eternal. For 
Marcel, the promise of the essence of meaning is found through the presence 
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of the body in relationship to the eternal Royce emphasizes. The 
transcendent eternal (the mental idea) is only relevant to human life if it is 
embodied in the physical emotional reality of the individual, that is in the 
hope, love, and fidelity that is being experienced in concrete life. 
Marcel holds that experience is not authentic unless it includes both the 
physical (embodiment) and the spiritual (transcendent) dimension of human 
existence and essence. Experience considered solely in terms of the physical is 
meaningless; experience considered solely spiritually is an abstraction of 
human life. 
Marcel throughout his work objects to highly organized thought 
systems because he perceives systematized thought to conclude in some 
absolute ideal or vision about the goals of human life. In the process of these 
conclusive ideals, the reality and destiny of the concrete individual life is 
discounted. Idealistic truths and those of scientific empiricism may take us to 
certain understandings that may intellectually, spiritually, physically enhance 
or deplete our lives. However the dimension of our lives where we cry, 
bleed, think about complexities and make love can not be summed up by a 
philosophical system cognitively organized and explained as it is in idealism 
and scientific empiricism. 
Given his objection to systematic thought, it is interesting to note that 
early in Marcel's life, he was attracted to thinking of human life in terms of 
these abstract ideals. He explains this, in his autobiographical notes, as a 
consequence of his formative years. Marcel was an only child. His mother 
died when he was quite young, leaving her sister to raise him. The strict 
moral scruples of his aunt according to Marcel and his father's position as a 
committed governmental official shaped his view of the world as hygienic, a 
context in which germs and dirt were suspect. He sought as a result to turn 
away from the concrete inward visceral nature of experience and rather 
preferred to immerse his consciousness in "clean" organized systems of 
predictable thought. 
Marcel was intellectually committed to abstract idealism up until World 
War I. Though abstract thinking had until this time provided for him a 
shelter from the "wounding contacts of everyday life" (Marcel, 1956a, p. 104), 
abstraction never actually was for Marcel an acceptable view. The works of 
Henri Bergson (1859-1941) and William James (1842-1910) became 
instrumental during the time of the first World War along with the works of 
Hocking and Royce in guiding Marcel toward a philosophy that spoke to his 
interest in concrete life and the process of living it. 
Marcel actually studied under Bergson at the College de France. Marcel 
expressed to Paul Ricoeur, once Marcel's student, in conversations with 
Ricoeur thirty years after teaching him, that he will never recall without 
emotion the experience of studying with Bergson. About going to Bergson's 
classes, Marcel said: 
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Every time one went there, it was somehow with a beating heart and 
with a kind of hope of hearing a revelation . . . Yes, the feeling really 
was that Bergson was in the process of discovering something, that he 
was in the process of revealing to us certain deeper and more secret 
aspects of our own reality. (Marcel, 1973, p. 219) 
Key concepts that Bergson focused on that interested Marcel were 
intuition and duration. Intuition for Bergson is a process of direct knowing 
that may occur when someone is met by the immediacy of life as in 
experiences of immense joy, sadness, or commiseration, and thus has no time 
for immersion in conceptual thought. In such instances and for a brief time, 
individuals, according to Bergson, know their inwardness and that of others 
in a much more intimate manner than a person studying human experience 
and relationship may know (Bergson, 1906/1984). 
Intuition is a combination of instinct, which grasps and reacts to the 
fluid nature of life, and of intelligence, which constructs truths. In that 
intuition is a combination of these processes, it transcends both separate 
processes. It is not the reactiveness of instinct nor the conceptualizing of the 
intellect, yet is a process that uniquely combines them in a unique force of life 
which Bergson calls not only intuition but elan vital. Because individuals are 
a manifestation of this force, Bergson says that it is impossible for individuals 
to study it as if it is separate and apart. 
Duration, or attention to existence in time, is the other Bergsonian 
theme that was important to Marcel. Bergson believes that the attempt to 
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understand the self by analyzing it in terms of static concepts betrays the 
dynamic, changing character of the self. The individual is not predetermined 
by life processes rather is free to create the future out of what she has 
experienced and learned from the past. This free action is based on the 
wisdom of the inner life, acquired through experiences, rather than on the 
imposition of intellectual concepts. Marcel was a passionate student of this 
aspect of Bergson's work that addressed some of the complexities of living in 
time. 
William James, similar to Bergson, believes human life unfolds in ways 
that are determined by visceral immediate experiencing rather than 
intellectual constructs. James does not favor knowledge for knowledge's sake. 
Knowledge, he holds, must offer some relevant meaning to individual's 
lived experiences. In The varieties of religious experience (1901/1961) James 
writes: 
If we look on man's whole mental life as it exists ... we have to confess 
that the part of it of which rationalism can give an account is relatively 
superficial. It is the part that has the prestige undoubtedly, for it has the 
loquacity, it can challenge you for proofs, and chop logic, and put you 
down with words. But it will fail to convince or convert you all the 
same, if your dumb intuitions are opposed to its conclusions. If you 
have intuitions at all, they come from a deeper level of your nature 
than the loquacious level which rationalism inhibits. Your whole 
subconscious life, your impulses, your faiths, your needs, your 
divinations, have prepared the premises, of which your consciousness 
now feels the weight of the result; and something in you absolutely 
knows that that result must be truer than any logic-chopping 
rationalistic talk, however clever, that may contradict it. (p. 74) 
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The philosophy of James places a priority on experience and feeling as 
opposed to rational constructions. James believes that rational constructs are 
convincing for individuals only when their prior inarticulated feelings about 
reality agree with the articulated rational ideas presented. Experience and 
feeling are necessarily prior to concepts and beliefs. 
The philosophy of James does not end here in an "if it feels good, it is 
good relativism" but rather views the ultimate measure of the truth of an 
experience to be its empirical result. What effect does it produce in the lives 
of those experiencing the experience or those affected by it? Foundational 
values about what is desirable and just in terms of the outcome of experience 
determine the truth of the experience. 
Finally, James like Bergson, believes in the evolution of knowledge and 
"truth" as it evolves through experiencing rather than knowledge that is 
static and preset. Because experience is constantly evolving, no point of view 
can ever be the last one. Truth is living, not dead. Marcel deeply appreciated 
this vital aspect of the philosophy of James. Marcel said about James "that he 
appears to have felt in the highest degree the need ... to struggle relentlessly 
against the peril to which all thought is exposed: that of becoming rancid, like 
butter, or overripe, like fruit" (Marcel, 1963, p. 2). James, like his student 
Hocking and like Bergson, was committed to the notion that individual lives 
unfold not in terms of preordained truths but in terms of the free will and 
essential spiritual passion within the individual. 
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James, Bergson, Hocking, and Royce all stimulated and reinforced in 
Marcel questions about meaning. By 1920, he had joined these thinkers who 
believed that "the fundamental feature of conscious existence is its trafficking 
in meanings" (Cooper, 1990, p. 52). After all, Marcel comes to realize that 
when it is all said and done the meaning of the reality and destiny of the 
concrete life is what is important, not the explanations or ideals founded in 
abstract truths. 
Experiencing not in the positivistic sense but rather within contexts in 
which existential moments are unfolding are contexts of meaning. 
Contextually this experiencing is simultaneously spiritual, physical, and 
concrete. Marcel raises this question: 
Was there not an arduous way which might give access to a higher 
empiricism and to the satisfaction of that need of the individual and 
concrete which I felt in myself? In other words, would not experience 
be for me not so much a springboard as a promised land? (Marcel, 1956a, 
pp. 105-106) 
It would appear that Marcel refers to empiricism as higher because he is 
describing experience that both involves the incarnate embodied concrete 
experience and the transcendent, spiritual domain. How does this come to be 
experienced? 
What is illuminated here is the idea that rootedness in the body does 
not have to do with simply experiencing sensations. It is the meaning of the 
sensations that is relevant and this Marcel believes, the meaning, refers to the 
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deeper more ontological considerations of what it is to be human. In other 
words, being embodied in Marcelian terms not only roots a person in the 
body and world but also opens a person up to transcendent understandings. 
In the higher empiricism of embodiment and transcendence, or existence and 
being, the sense-datum of experience is relevant only when it is referred to 
some deeper ontological understanding of what it is to-be. 
CHAPTER n 
THE MEANING OF CREATIVE HDELITY 
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CHAPTER II 
THE MEANING OF CREATIVE FIDELITY 
On the threshold of the catacombs which may soon swallow us up, it 
should be remembered that it is basically the same power of creative 
fidelity concentrated in more favorable times in architecture, music and 
poetry, which tomorrow will strengthen the fierce resolution of those 
who reject the consummation of themselves or others of man's denial 
of man, or to formulate this in a more profound way, the denial of the 
more than human by the less than human. (Marcel, 1964, p. 10) 
Originally written by Marcel during the rise of Hitler and the Nazi 
subjugation of Europe, Marcel names creative fidelity as a way of being that 
rejects the denial and consummation of humanity. Marcel believes that there 
is a particular way of thinking and acting in the modern age that denies the 
spiritual and humane dimensions of human experience and thus diminishes 
humankind. Our fascination and compulsion, according to Marcel, with the 
objectification and abstraction of human life (philosophical thought that 
ignores actual existential issues, and technology that decimates) has to do 
with our desire to avoid personal and emotional encounters with our 
immediate worlds. When experience is objectified, individuals are uprooted 
from their primordial participation in the world as well as numbed to the 
transcendent, closing themselves from participation in meaning, wonder, 
and justice. 
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One of the reasons that Marcel believes that human beings find 
themselves in what he calls a broken world, the title of a play he wrote in 
1932, is that they have lost their ontological moorings. In the play the 
protagonist Christiane says to her friend Denise: 
Don't you feel sometimes that we are living ... if you can call it living 
... in a broken world? Yes, broken like a broken watch. The 
mainspring has stopped working. Just look at it, nothing has changed. 
Everything is in place. But put the watch to your ear, and you don't 
hear any ticking. You know what I'm talking about, the world, what we 
call the world, the world of human creatures ... it seems to me it 
must have had a heart at one time, but today you would say the heart 
had stopped beating. (Marcel, 1932, p. 36) 
An example of living in this world is the way in which we often perceive 
sense experience primarily in terms of the sensation itself or thought in terms 
of abstract concepts themselves without reflecting on the profound 
ontological meaning. Marcel calls this kind of experiencing first level 
reflection. 
First level reflection is the kind of thinking necessary for solving 
problems. Information is organized into concepts, classifications, definitions 
and analyzed for an answer. To reflect in this manner, an individual must 
set herself apart from the problem that needs attention. In this mood, one is a 
spectator of life rather than a participant. 'This is the world where sense 
experience is a message to be decoded and where my body is only an 
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instrument. This is the world of the 'spirit of abstraction' " (cited in Lechner, 
1974, p. 462). 
How is this spirit of abstraction manifested? In the mental realm there 
are different systems of thought both academic and non-academic that mimic 
this abstraction in that the thinking is objectified and impersonal. The 
knowledge that evolves is that easily memorized and yet not felt. In the 
realm of matter, technology is the sphere in which the spirit of abstraction is 
manifested in the material world. The vitality of the plastic arts, music, 
drama, religion, literature, and philosophy are often deadened when 
incorporated into a mindset that values technological expertise over the 
depth of meaning and expression that comes through being immersed in 
projects of consciousness rather than projects of technological skilled 
precision. Examples of this are the obscured vitality of music that may occur 
when music is electronically synthesized (there is not the sense of fingers on 
piano keys) or the way in which religious thought is profaned through 
evangelical televised religion. 
Through the technological or abstracted life, existence becomes make-
believe. Abstraction, whether lived out in the mental and/or the material 
realm, keeps people from encountering their lived situations. 
The actual primary relation a person has with the world, however, is 
not as a spectator watching or a thinker to an object but rather is as a person 
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participating. Human beings are not, Marcel says, watching a show. The 
lived body is not separable even in thought from the lived experience. As 
Marcel succinctly put it about himself "I am my body" (Marcel, 1965, p. 12). 
Marcel calls for a move away from the fragmented, empty world of 
objectification and abstraction toward a fuller, personal, and meaningful 
experience of being in the world. Before seeking to understand what Marcel 
means by being in the world in personal and meaningful ways, it seems 
appropriate to inquire into why Marcel wishes this for humans. What is the 
purpose of living in creative fidelity? 
The Purpose of Creative Fidelity 
Is the purpose of meaningful life, according to Marcel, for God and/or 
each other or to some other end? Marcel believes that human experience is 
for God and for each other simultaneously. To be for God is to be for one 
another and vice versa. 
For what purpose? Is this purpose salvation in heaven or social justice 
on earth? In that Marcel focused on the body as central to philosophical 
understanding, Marcel is a philosopher concerned with earthly life. Ricouer 
actually attributes the idea of the body as philosophically significant to the 
work of Marcel. 
In his attention to the body, Ricouer points out that Marcel laid the 
foundation for what Merleau-Ponty and others would later call 
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phenomenology of perception which liberated epistemology and ontology 
from the bonds of classical a priori principles. When philosophical inquiry 
includes the body, the philosophy of experience becomes based on the 
concreteness of daily life. In a conversation Ricouer has with Marcel, Ricouer 
says: 
You are the one who has brought back to the level of feeling itself this 
'absolute presence.' You have taken the body, rather than language, as 
the primary focus on existence. Perhaps we should not forget this 
today when French philosophy is suffering from a kind of fascination 
with the problems of language. In joining a criticism of sensation as 
message to your criticism of the body as instrument, you opened the 
way to a philosophy of the body-subject, and gave philosophy the means 
for thinking embodiment. (Marcel, 1973, p. 222) 
Marcel objects to definitions of experience that take sensation to be a message 
passed from a transmitter to a receiver, a something sent and that something 
received. 
"The traditional empiricism Marcel rejects is especially that of Locke 
and Hume, in which the primary meaning of experience, the foundation of 
all knowing, is individual sense data" (Marcel, 1973, p. xxi). This position 
creates a model of understanding that makes human life into an objectifiable, 
mechanized entity. 
Marcel agrees with the traditional empiricists that sensation is 
foundational to experience and yet his definition of sensation differs from 
that of the empiricists. Marcel's understanding of sensation is based on his 
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idea that experience is an act of participation between a human and her 
world. She is not acted on in a way that can be standardized and defined prior 
to the experience but is always herself making meaning out of the sensational 
impact of the experience. She senses the world, yes, yet not only by way of the 
physiobiological but also in terms of feeling, imagining, and thinking, all 
processes through which meaning is made. 
In the 'experiential thinking' Marcel advocates and represents, the most 
intense effort of attention must be directed to experience, but certainly 
this effort must not be squandered on what he would regard 
as the highly special, largely automatic, noetically neutral, and 
personally indifferent form of experience represented in pure sense 
data. The philosophically important sense of experience is that in 
which it is taken as a global encounter with situations in which one is 
personally involved (emphasis added) and in which one's destiny is 
somehow at stake, an encounter which itself founds meaning, and 
which requires a special ability and effort to engage in fully. (Marcel, 
1973, p. xxi) 
Marcel is committed to describing sensation in terms of feeling, 
meaning, and personal participation rather than in terms of defining 
sensation prior to the actual experience, as the idealists seem to do, and rather 
than thinking that sensation can be observed as tangible data, as the 
empiricists conclude. Both of these latter ways of defining sensation negate 
the importance of the felt-body and therefore negate existential meaning that 
can only evolve out of the person feeling her experience. 
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If the destined purpose according to Marcel of creative fidelity is 
salvation in heaven with God, Marcel would be a Christian transcendental 
philosopher. The body would seemingly be de-emphasized and denigrated by 
Marcel as it was in the Gospels. Experience would be relevant only in terms 
of heaven. The emphasis would be on professed belief (faith) rather than on 
action. Drink the wine, eat the bread, profess being a follower of Jesus as 
Messiah (Christ) and you shall live in eternal bliss. De-emphasized would be 
the human struggle on earth. The complexities that arise between humans 
seeking social justice would be ignored in the name of heavenly salvation. 
In that Marcel emphasized consistently his commitment to concrete 
human experience as it is lived out in relationship, in that Marcel 
emphasized embodiment, freedom, love, clearly Marcel intends the purpose 
of creative fidelity for life on earth. What remains perplexing; however, has 
to do with Marcel's conversion to Catholicism in 1929. 
Marcel's commitment is to concrete daily life and to intersubjective 
relationship understood in terms of freedom, responsibility and compassion. 
It is through receptivity and availability to one another in relationships of 
justice that Marcel believes human life is lived in full and humane ways. 
Christianity, however, that is New Testament Christianity, emphasizes 
individual salvation for the purpose of life after death rather than fraternal 
communion during earthly life. 
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Commitment to concrete life is present in all of Marcel's works before 
and after his conversion to Catholicism. Marcel was raised without religion 
and yet even as a young child, he had inclinations towards spiritual insight. 
Early on, for example, Marcel is aware that the presence of an other is 
sometimes felt when the other is not physically present. He feels the spirit of 
his deceased mother throughout his life. 
Because Marcel was always aware of the sacred dimension of human 
experience, it is curious that he does not remain a spiritual humanist. Why 
does he convert to Christianity? Marcel does not offer an answer to this 
question. He says that it is difficult to say exactly how his Christian faith fits 
into his thinking (Schilpp & Hahn, 1984, p. 200). What Marcel does say is that 
at some time in his philosophical thinking, he began to be drawn to 
Christianity because of the profound reality he believed to be foundational to 
this faith. Apparently his conversion to Catholicism has to do with his 
perception that it is the fullest form of Christianity (Marcel, 1973). 
That Marcel speaks of a profound reality in Christianity still does not 
satisfactorily answer the question about why his conversion because Marcel 
seems to have always believed in a profound reality underlying human 
existence. Perhaps Marcel's conversion has something to do with Jesus 
becoming a symbol for Marcel of an incarnated embodied being bridging the 
phenomenal experiential world to the spiritual transcendent world. Marcel 
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in his search to understand human existence is always seeking ways to bridge 
existential and spiritual dimensions of human experience. In this sense 
perhaps the incarnated earthy Jesus appeals to Marcel. 
And yet this explanation still begets confusion. Jesus of the Gospels 
ignores the existential incarnated dimension of human experience and 
instead preaches for the purpose of salvation after life. Jesus of the Gospels is 
not a loving man trusting in the compassion and love of fellow human 
beings. What is important to this Jesus is that people believe in him as the 
son of God and follow his teachings. Typical of Jesus' message found 
throughout the Gospels is in John (Chapter 3): 
For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that 
whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting 
life. For God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world; but 
that the world through him might be saved. He that believeth in him 
is not condemned: but he that believeth not is condemned already, 
because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of 
God. (3:16-18) 
Compassion for unbelievers is condemned and proscribed. Whoever 
believes will be saved. Whoever does not believe will be damned, no matter 
how moral a life. Morality and humanity are not considered. What is 
emphasized is a "Manichaean" world view in which Christians are of God, 
good, and saved, and non-Christians damned (Kaufmann, 1976). 
72 
In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus instructs, "Judge not, that ye be not 
judged" (Matthew, 7: 1). And yet, in some sense the entire sermon is a 
judgment against those who do not follow "the way." Jesus ends the sermon 
by saying that those who follow his message are wise and will be rewarded in 
heaven. Those who do not follow him he describes as fools who will be 
punished. In that Jesus teaches that God will judge and punish, the 
compassionate message "judge not" is diminished. There is no need for 
humans to judge one another, for there is a promise that God will take care of 
that. 
Who is the loving existential Jesus to whom Marcel is drawn? In the 
Gospels, Jesus is more like the grand inquisitor of Dostoevsky's The Brothers 
Karamazov than the Jesus in Dostoevsky's story who embodies love, 
freedom, and the hope of grace. To whom is Dostoevsky referring when he 
creates his Jesus? It is interesting that in the works of people such as 
Dostoevsky, Bonhoeffer, Martin Luther King, Jr., Paul Tillich, Dorothee 
Soelle, the Jesus foundational to their works is world-focused, courageous, 
encouraging of freedom, loving. This Jesus is a humanitarian representative 
of God. He brings God to earthly life rather than takes people away to heaven. 
In what source is this Jesus, remembered and revered by many with 
humanitarian concerns, found? Is this a Jesus of the imagination solely or 
did he actually exist and the writers of the Scriptures misinterpreted his acts 
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and intentions? Regardless of the answer, Jesus of love, responsibility, and 
freedom has existed in the imagination of many throughout the history of 
Christianity. 
In that Marcel's focus is life on earth rather than life after death, the 
spirit of Jesus foundational to the works of Dostoevsky and others is also 
foundational to Marcel's work. Jesus as an existentialist rather than as 
salvational Christ symbolizes the spirit of Marcel's work. Love, freedom, 
grace, forgiveness, and redemption are all important themes to Marcel. He is 
interested in the earthly undertones of these themes. To be religious without 
taking into consideration existential earthly concerns raises the same 
objections for Marcel that idealism raises in its evasion of existential 
actualities. 
Marcel's work is not about absolute fidelity, it is creative fidelity. 
Marcel's references, for example, to redemption are not references to heaven, 
rather to redemption between individuals in relationship. Further, the few 
times that Marcel does write of immortality it is not in terms of an afterlife 
but rather in terms of the spirit of the individual who has died remaining 
with the loved one living. Love lived out of creative fidelity so deeply 
touches our lives that the love ultimately becomes immortal spiritual life. 
There are a few exceptions, when a different Marcel is expressed, a 
Marcel who sounds more like a scriptural Christian, but these moments in 
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his work are rare. An example of such an exception is found in Man Against 
Mass Society (1952) when Marcel writes about salvation: 
It is only the rainbow of reconciliation that can bring salvation to us -
though it may, of course, be salvation elsewhere: salvation far beyond 
our earthly limits, far beyond the unavoidable yet only apparent 
bankruptcy of our earthly deaths: in eternity, (p. 192) 
Because this "voice" of Marcel's is rare, it is not exhibitive of the foundations 
of creative fidelity. 
In the bulk of Marcel's work he emphasizes that "we must not get lost 
in abstractions. There is no hiding-place up there, warns Marcel, echoing 
Gustav Thibon ~ the way to heaven is to dig down deep where you are" 
(Cain, 1963, p. 81). 'To dig down deep where you are" is the ethical 
foundation of creative fidelity. The actuality of what human beings 
experience is what is sacred to Marcel. 
To set ideals up for human existence that are impossible to fulfill (ideals 
that will be met in heaven rather than on earth) diminishes the majesty of 
being human and sets up at best irrelevant and at worst unjust expectations, 
according to Marcel. If the purpose of human life is for an ideal unattainable. 
then the experience of being human becomes one of shame, frustration, 
repression, and denial. For example, if the purpose of life is to transcend 
emotional and physical desires, then the purpose has to do with something 
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other than being human. Human beings desire. To make purpose 
transcendent of this actuality encourages self-deceit and constant frustration. 
To study Marcel is to come to a different understanding of spiritual 
purpose than purpose that denies human experiential existence. For Marcel 
spiritual purpose, if it is spiritual at all, must be in accord with human life 
rather than antagonist towards human experiencing. To Marcel human life 
is sanctified. He commented once that the study of sanctity would make a 
good introduction to the study of being (Marcel, 1955). 
To think of life as sanctified as Marcel does is not to romanticize human 
life but rather to honor it. That life is honorable is fundamental to existential 
phenomenology. The meaning of life comes not from manipulating 
experience and wishing human complexities away but from embracing life as 
it is experienced. Further, justice does not evolve out of pretending that 
human beings are who they are not. Proposed as just ways of being together 
are in fact just only if they are phenomenological, that is, related to how it is 
that humans experience. The making of justice begins and ends with felt-
experience. 
To throw the actuality of human life away in the name of abstract 
philosophical and religious ideals is deplorable to Marcel. His entire life's 
work is committed to opposing this spirit of abstraction found in religious 
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and philosophical idealism and positivism, seeking justice through 
relationships of creative fidelity (Marcel, 1956a). 
The Role of Receptivity in Tust Relationship 
It is necessary to explore Marcel's meanings of creative fidelity in order 
to more fully comprehend the texture of just relationship. Fundamental to 
this understanding is Marcel's concept of receptivity also referred to as 
disposability and spiritual availability in his works. It is considered by some 
to be Marcel's major contribution to the philosophy of ethics, a concept largely 
ignored by previous philosophers. 
The concept of availability played no previous role in the history of 
philosophy. Until Marcel designated it as a special quality, a peculiar 
human virtue, nothing like availability had ever been included among 
the various human virtues in the whole history of ethics. To this 
extent it constitutes a genuine discovery by Marcel, who was the first to 
recognize the fundamental significance of the concept and to elaborate 
on it. (Bollnow, 1969, p. 182) 
Marcel defines human life as being-in-the-world. To arrive at existentially 
relevant epistemological understandings, ontological insights, and ethical 
soundness, the relationship between being and world must be at the forefront 
of thought. The emphasis on relationship assumes that there is receptivity 
between the person and her context. 
Distorted incorrect ways of knowing, being, and acting are guaranteed, 
according to Marcel, when thinking considers being as set off from the world 
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and thus unaffected, closed-off to the momentary experiences of being in the 
world. First level reflection, as mentioned, is the thought that separates being 
from world. The world is represented in thought as a reality from which 
individuals must detach themselves in order to grasp reality in a patterned 
reliable form, and then through the will, to shape it into a complete 
possession. 
Marcel concedes that it is appropriate in light of certain intentions to 
think in terms of the world as object set apart from subject. For example, 
when scientists attempt to find cures for certain diseases, it is appropriate 
through first level reflection to isolate abnormal cells from the body and 
study them in a laboratory. And yet it is not possible to come to 
understanding about existential being through this same kind of isolationist 
thinking. 
To come to existential insight requires a different kind of consciousness, 
one that Marcel called second level reflection. Rather than analyzing parts, 
this way of thinking synthesizes the different ongoing moments of 
interactive experience a human being encounters. It is understood, 
phenomenologically, that in the actuality of experience, separation between a 
human being and the world she is participating in does not exist. The process 
of second level reflection is an attempt to find descriptive language for the 
felt-meaning of the experiencing. 
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Participation is not objectifiable rather is experienced as "immediate 
certainty in the feeling of one's body" in relationship to the world. When one 
participates in experience, subject/object poles are transcended, for at the same 
time that it is one's body experiencing, in this participation one's body is also 
permeated by the presence of the world, of the other. This mysterious 
relationship between the internal and the external is beyond the scope of 
psychology. This relationship is a "fact of feeling" rather than a fact of theory 
(Prini, 1969). 
As an aside, it is interesting to consider that quantum physicists (Briggs 
& Peat, 1984) today would refute first level reflection as effective even for the 
study of disease. Quantum physicists have been in the process over the last 
ten years of radically transforming scientific comprehension through their 
findings that affirm the interrelationship and inseparableness of all life 
forms. To study forms isolated from one another may be interesting but 
leads, according to this new physics, to gross misunderstandings. 
The work of quantum physicists was begun during the lifetime of 
Marcel and yet some of the more complete understandings have evolved 
since his death in 1973. That science is affirming what Marcel took to be true 
philosophically in terms of receptivity makes Marcel a prophetic 
philosophical companion to such physicists as David Bohm, Ilya Prigogine, 
and Rupert Sheldrake. 
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Receptivity is seminal to any understanding that describes reality as 
relational. It is important to understand that the underlying meaning of 
receptivity for Marcel is different from what happens to wax when it 
"receives" the imprint of a seal. The receptivity Marcel refers to has to do 
with giving, with self-giving, as when a host "receives" friends. 'This kind of 
'reception' is entirely different from that of a vessel which is filled with an 
alien substance; it is a participation in a reality, in a plenitude, and a 
communication of oneself" (Marcel, 1956a, p. 99). 
Relationship between God and human, human and human, beings and 
their situation, reality, never can be strictly defined because of their 
evolutionary qualities. Marcel describes second level reflection as a process 
that attempts to grasp relational receptivity by synthesizing what it is that is 
felt in the midst of the happening. Perhaps inappropriate in this 
philosophical context, and yet, inspiring a felt-meaning, of the spirit of 
receptivity as found in Marcel's works is the following poetic work from Irish 
fairy stories by James Stephens (1988): 
The Finest Music 
Once, as they rested on a chase, a debate arose 
among the Fianna-Finn as to what was the finest 
music in the world. 
"Tell us that," said Fionn, turning to Oisin. 
"The cuckoo calling from the tree that is highest 
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in the hedge/' cried his merry son. 
"A good sound," said Fionn. "And you, Oscar," he 
asked, "what is to your mind the finest of music?" 
"The top of music is the ring of a spear on a 
shield," cried the stout lad. 
"It is a good sound," said Fionn. 
And the other champions told their delight: 
the belling of a stag across water, the baying 
of a tuneful pack heard in the distance, the song 
of a lark, the laughter of a gleeful girl, or the 
whisper of a moved one. 
"They are good sounds all," said Fionn. 
"Tell us, chief," one ventured, "what do you think?" 
"The music of what happens," said great Fionn, 
"that is the finest music in the world." 
(quoted in Janeczko, 1988, p. ix) 
The music of what happens . . . when I drink my orange juice this 
morning, when I tell you this afternoon that I have never loved you as much 
as I do now, when tomorrow morning I tell you that I do not like you at all. 
The music of what happens . .. five planes shot down over Iraq, 3,000 bodies 
burned today at the camp, babies dying of starvation in Somalia. If Marcel 
were to interpret Stephens' poem for meaning, would he agree that all of the 
above moments are "the music of what happens?" 
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The "music of what happens" for Marcel would inevitably have to do 
with being human. Being in the Marcelian sense has to do with receptivity to 
the sacred and existential dimensions of human experience. In that the first 
example has to do with sustenance, it has to do with being; in that the second 
with love, it is of being; that the third honestly embraces the flux of existential 
feeling, it has to do with being. The "music of what happens" for Marcel 
would never be a pretense of nor a denial or degradation of being. In that the 
latter three examples, Iraq, concentration camps, and children starving, are 
due to the degradation of human life and human values, they would not be 
considered by Marcel as the music of what happens but rather the silencing of 
this music. 
Relationships of justice are contexts of creativity where being is received 
and where the degradation of being is disallowed. Relationship founded on 
existential principles is described as creative because the form of the 
relationship is constantly unfolding based on who one another are in any 
given moment and on what is happening between. When relationship is 
creative, both persons are expressing their lives to one another continuously. 
The individuals are enriched or damaged or changed or sustained by one 
another at the same time that the relationship is deepening or becoming 
diminished or becoming more textured. The outcome of experiencing 
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relationship is never predictable when it is founded on the experience of 
being meeting being (Marcel, 1964). 
Courage, Freedom, and Truth in Creative Fidelity 
Receptivity is important because it encourages being. This 
encouragement leads to experiences of feelings, of vulnerability, of the 
possibility that one will be influenced by others. When being is encouraged, 
experience is not limited by fear. When experience is lived courageously 
rather than hindered by fear, human life becomes a complex of difficult 
choices. When a person makes herself receptive to experience with an other, 
she takes phenomenal risk that she will be hurt or existentially transformed 
and yet she also makes it a possibility that she will be known by others, loved 
profoundly, and educated. 
To take this risk in accord with creative fidelity requires courage. This 
courage is fortified by the belief that human life is sacred and in that sense 
that it is important to be fully engaged in life. Meaning is not created out of 
making money, holding certain positions of status, or owning material 
objects rather is created out of relationships of courage, honesty, and care. 
This courage to receive and be in life as a participating presence is at the 
crux of creative fidelity. Implied in this courage of participation is the courage 
to embrace change. Change is inevitable if one is participating in ongoing 
experiencing, for experiencing deeply instructs in ways that challenge existing 
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assumptions. Nietzsche captures the spirit of this courage — "the courage" 
not "of one's convictions . . . but for an attack upon one's convictions" (cited 
in Davis, 1989, p. 339). 
This courage comes from a certain hope, an absolute confidence Marcel 
had, that life is created for the purpose of spiritual and aesthetic meaning. In 
order for each person to understand what this hope holds for her, she must 
trust life enough to enter into a constant dialogue with others and with God, 
continuously seeking understanding about her particular being in the context 
of her particular world. 
Hope for Marcel is not deterministic. It is not a hope that everything 
will turn out in a discernible way, rather it is a trust that there is an 
ontological basis to being that can not be grasped as long as our consciousness 
is limited by cause-effect thinking or abstract rationalizations and/or 
consumed with the world of objects. Hope draws its strength from love. 
The capacity to hope diminishes in proportion as the soul becomes 
increasingly chained to the categories of its experience, and as it is given 
over more completely and more desperately to the world of the 
problematical. ... In contrast to the captive soul, the soul which is at 
the disposal of others is consecrated and inwardly dedicated; 
it is protected against suicide and despair, which are interrelated and 
alike, because it knows that it is not its own, and the most legitimate use 
it can make of its freedom is precisely to recognize that it does not 
belong to itself; this recognition is the starting point of its activity and 
creativeness. (Marcel, 1956a, p. 43) 
The more non-receptive a person is, the less capacity in her for hope. 
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In hope lies a refusal to predict the future, a refusal to hold fast to 
certainties, and a commitment to be receptive to the evolving of life in one 
another. It is beyond both fear and desire and is a leap into the transcendent 
dimension of love, a dimension where love does not cling nor demand nor 
resist but simply endures. 
"I hope in you for us" is a poetic expression of Marcel's, expressing his 
belief that the freedom to be is dependent on relationships of receptive 
justice. Justice is the form in which the human being actualizes itself. Marcel 
believes that the solidarity of all humans is ineradicable and that the spiritual 
destinies of humans is intertwined, one with the other. Without hope in one 
another, life is primarily logistical drudgery and void of the possibility of 
existential meaning. 
Without receptivity between persons, they are no different than actors 
on a stage, playing roles that are pre-scripted. Predictable are the limitations 
and boundaries of their pretense of love and relationship. Marcel portrays 
this pretense between his different characters in plays such as The Broken 
World (1932), The Rebellious Heart (1918), and A Man of God (1925). They 
hear their spoken lines but the words are those of strangers speaking past each 
other. Hidden and locked away for the duration of this staged event are their 
loves, their souls. It is this Marcel calls the sin against life. This way of non-
being masquerades as being and creates interminable pain between and 
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within human beings. Oftentimes, there is confused internal emotion 
following these hollow attempts at meeting. Martin Buber in his I and Thou 
writes that all real living is meeting. Without receptivity, there can be 
nothing real happening, nothing, that is, that has to do with the 
particularness of real human experience. 
One of the reasons that Marcel writes plays is to confront the audience 
with the vapidity of contemporary life. Too often human beings are blind to 
knowing themselves concretely. Philosophical language can attempt to 
describe existential emptiness and yet the only way to actually portray the 
voids and deceits of human experience is to let human lives speak, in the 
literal sense, for themselves. Drama is a context in which the life itself 
speaks. Marcel's characters are not fantastical but are persons in everyday 
dilemmas of confusion and difficulty, at times opening themselves to 
moments of grace and depth of understanding. 
Marcel's intent was that the characters, being immersed in ordinary and 
yet profound kinds of struggles, would reflect to the persons of the audience 
aspects of their own lives, aspects about which they were previously 
oblivious. His plays are an attempt to say "this is your life/ what are you 
going to do about it?" It was a major disappointment to Marcel that his plays 
were not more widely received. It had been his hope that his plays would 
contribute to some sort of existential awakening in which human beings 
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would contact their own secret agonies as well as their buried hopes. When 
human beings hide from their suffering, they also close themselves off to the 
grace of and faith in spiritual insight and wisdom. 
Marcel's plays are reflectors, brilliant and piercing, of the harsh reality of 
evasion of spiritual justice and aesthetic meaning in contemporary life. In 
this sense his plays are not of the escape-into-entertainment form, rather, 
quite to the contrary, are avenues into the interiority of the human soul. In 
that being ourselves has to do with knowing ourselves soulfully and vice 
versa, time put aside for delving into Marcel's plays is qualitatively 
meaningful for the existential spirit. 
"We all face the alternative of either being what we really are or of 
getting lost in the web of our own fictions and misunderstandings with 
others" (Prini, 1969, p. 216). The freedom to be, according to Marcel, is not 
whimsy. To know one's being requires contemplation, silence, love, and 
attention to the sacred dimension. These qualities in their sum equal 
courage. 
Ordinarily the concept of freedom conjures up on the one hand, fear of 
anarchy, and on the other hand, notions of a kind of spiritedness where the 
lines of individual freedom are blurred and all of experience is trivialized. In 
both of these instances, freedom is solely individualized, unattended by the 
solemn responsibilities of relationship. Marcel's definitions of freedom fall 
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on neither side of these extremes. His inquiries into freedom are about 
human complexities, possibilities, and above all responsibilities to one 
another. 
For Marcel, freedom is related to truth, but not to truth as a simple 
choice. He gives the example from his own life of calling a publisher to 
withdraw a text he had submitted because he come to realize that publishing 
it would harm a certain person. This is a response for him in accord with all 
that he believes and takes himself to be. Any other response would have 
been a betrayal of himself and freedom is never authentic if it takes an 
individual to self-betrayal. 
Marcel defines the truth underlying freedom in terms both universal 
and personal. Universal truth is truth that is unalterable. It is held to be 
unconditional by a single person and does not change through experience. In 
his own life, Marcel gives examples of two of his universal truths — that 
racism is wrong and that religious intolerance is wrong. To be free means to 
uphold these truths in all situations and to fight vehemently against any 
situation that subtly or explicitly reinforces racism or religious intolerance. 
Marcel indicates that either a person is born knowing universal truth, 
or learns it through relationships with persons in her life, or through the 
grace of spiritual insight. Once universal truth is held, it is not modifiable. 
This is complex to consider because if one learns a universal truth through 
88 
relationship or through spiritual grace, then in fact the truth is arrived at 
through experiencing. How does one know that there will not be an 
experience that occurs in the future to alter the present particular 
commitment to the truth? 
Marcel's response to this question is that though a person may come to 
truth through experience that enlightens her to what she was before ignorant 
about, once she knows the universal truth, she knows it interminably. 
Universal truth is not alterable because it is based on values that are not 
alterable. It will always be true, according to Marcel, that human life is sacred. 
Therefore, it is always truth that every human being is to be treated with 
dignity and respect. Because universal truth may never be based on a value 
that degrades and dehumanizes, words spoken as if universally true and yet 
which lead to the "desacralization" of life are not truths but rather are evils 
deceptively masquerading as truth. For example, while a Ku Klux Klan 
member may preach her truth as if it is carved in stone, absolute, 
unmodifiable, her professed truth is the opposite of what Marcel means by 
truth. 
Personal truth for Marcel includes universal truths that are stable 
because these truths are based on unalterable values; they also include 
individual existential truths based on values altered through experiencing. 
For example, a person may believe in a certain kind of religious piety as the 
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pastor Claude Lemoyne does in Marcel's play A Man of God (1925/1965a) and 
then through personal experience come to the realization that his pious life is 
more reflective of his desire to escape his human situation rather than to be a 
man of commitment. When Claude realizes this, he says: 
You live for years with a certain idea of yourself, and you think you are 
drawing strength from that idea. Then suddenly you realize you're 
living in a fool's paradise. . . . When I look into the past, the things I 
used to say and think have become meaningless. ... I ought to 
recognize them as mine and feel at home with them. But I don't. I can 
make nothing of them. (p. 81) 
I haven't even the courage to read in my own 
heart, (p. 82) 
I'm spiritually bankrupt. I've been living on assets 
that didn't belong to me. (p. 96) 
I ought first to have led a man's life. (p. 97) 
Claude is a pastor, a man of God, and yet he is living by "ideals" that keep 
him less than emotionally and meaningfully involved in his own life. His 
relationship with his wife has been decaying over the years and yet problems 
have been denied. When she begins to address the problems with him, his 
life of meaninglessness comes into focus. 
What Claude's wife wanted in him was a man who felt, who believed 
based on his daily experience, who struggled with complex questions of belief 
and commitment. What she experienced in him was a man who followed 
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certain universal truths assigned to the pious man and yet they were truths 
that were not his. About his love for her, she accuses him: 
There was a certain reserve of force in you and you spent it on me as 
you would have spent it on a woman of the streets. But that wasn't 
love, you know very well, any more than your love for my soul was. 
The woman in me you never even suspected of being there, and 
certainly didn't satisfy. (Marcel, 1925/1965a, p. 85) 
Claude was a man not of freedom but a man constrained by obligation. 
It is when Claude begins to address the hollowness of his life that his 
piety is thrown into question. Ironically, it is when he understands how he 
has avoided freedom through masquerading as "a man of God" that he lives 
closer towards being such a man of God. It is only when he starts questioning 
his commitments to piety that he makes possible a life of creative fidelity. 
Personal truth becomes the sphere in which Claude is free to question his 
values, to self inquire and begin to live his existential questions. 
Whether the truth is universal and unchanging or personal and 
alterable, freedom is a person's living response to truth in that moment, in 
that context. Without the freedom to question, to discover, and to commit to 
what a person values, her integrity is at stake. In Tragic Wisdom and Beyond 
(1973), Marcel writes: 
To persist in killing the sense of truth in a man is to attack directly his 
respect for himself. A morally healthy person is horrified by lying 
because he regards it as a defilement. Even if I know my lie will not be 
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found out, I refuse to lie because I care about preserving my inner 
integrity, (p. 83) 
This truth of which Marcel writes is truth that both affects and is 
affected by the concrete living reality of a person's existence. A life of un-
freedom necessarily is a denial of the existential truth of one's experiencing. 
Marcel defines freedom in terms of negation as "the absence of any form of 
self alienation" and in terms positive as "I act freely if the motives of my act 
are in line with what I can legitimately regard as the structural features of my 
personality" (Marcel, 1973, p. 86). 
Two major forces in contemporary life that Marcel believes threaten 
truth are the spirit of abstraction that encourages systematic theoretical 
thinking detached from concrete experience and techniques of degradation 
that technological development has made possible, techniques that objectify 
and thus dehumanize the experience of being human. Marcel makes the 
point that since Nietzsche, the reality of inwardness has been thrown into 
doubt. It has become more and more doubtful that any individual can 
identify a certain core or essential self. With the fragmentation of the self, an 
indirect invitation is extended to every form of mental and technological 
intrusion by society (Marcel, 1973). 
In both systematic thought and dehumanizing experience, the person 
finds herself discouraged and in some instances numbed to her own 
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perception, insight, and wisdom. In a sense, her attention is stolen from the 
task of making meaning and making justice and is given over to the activity 
of being a functionary in some smooth-running system, be it academic, social, 
or economic. Instead of giving of her life, she is given a role, a function to 
perform. 
To resist this degradation of existence, being is in truth, according to 
Marcel, when an individual has the courage to attend lucidly to any given 
situation. If in actuality, the situation is dehumanizing, the free response is 
to act in ways that create a more humane situation. A person is free only to 
the extent that she allows herself to become involved and engaged in a 
confrontation and struggle against a situation that demeans, alienates, and 
objectifies human life. And yet Marcel does not wish to simplify the 
courageous act towards freedom. 
Always Marcel is intent on highlighting the limitations that beset 
human life that make clear-cut and just responses not easily obtainable. For 
example, he writes of a family man who is a worker in a totalitarian system 
who is degraded by the job and whose work it is to dehumanize others. He is 
fundamentally opposed to the tasks set before him and yet is committed to 
supporting his family. 
The way this basic man resolves the dilemma to preserve his integrity is 
to keep his job and yet act in ways that show respect for the lives he contacts. 
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When he is asked to torture, he comforts. When he is asked to imprison, he 
frees. In the exercise of this freedom, there is enormous strain and risk. He 
cannot justify quitting and not feeding his family and yet he also cannot 
justify supporting his family at the expense of lives he has destroyed. He is 
caught in a "labyrinth of justice." Daily he lives with the task of seeking to be 
responsible with his freedom. 
As may be recalled, Marcel learns a great deal from the works of both 
Royce and Hocking about coming to truth and yet in the final analysis feels 
that there are aspects of their work still dangerously abstract in terms of truth. 
If Marcel's philosophical notes and speeches were all that existed, then his 
ideas would be very close to a combination of the works of Royce and 
Hocking. 
Marcel in other words believes as Royce and Hocking that the following 
are epistemologically correct in terms of truth: 1) In order to know truth, a 
human being must first have a faith that there is truth, for faith enables her 
to be open to insights into truth. 2) The most significant ultimate truth is 
spiritual and involves humans in their special relationship to God. 3) There 
must be faith not only that there is truth but that the basis of truth is 
metaphysical — ontological and spiritual. 4) Ontological truth can not be 
separated from the concrete experience of being human with one another. 5) 
When what is believed to be true manifests in ways experientially that 
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perpetuate injustice or some form of destructiveness, then the truth becomes 
recognized as a false truth and is discarded. 6) Redemption has to do with 
admitting error in assuming truth where there is not truth and taking action 
to remedy the wrong committed. New truth is sought. (Hocking, 1912; 
Royce, 1919). 
In the above philosophical ideas, Marcel is in agreement with Royce 
and Hocking. What saves Marcel's work from what he criticizes in theirs, 
that neither Royce nor Hocking make it clear how human beings struggling 
with concrete everyday dilemmas actually come to truth as they do not 
address the complexities that arise when concrete life is actually experienced, 
is that Marcel presents existential dilemmas through the lives in his plays. 
Marcel's plays provide a context for Marcel to give breath to life in a way not 
possible through pure theory. 
Marcel's Theater of Interioritv 
Marcel's plays are vital, alive interactions between ordinary human 
beings. In the development of his ideas, Marcel is in an inward dialectic that 
includes the actual lives of the characters in his plays and his philosophical 
ideas. His ideas are foundational to the lives of the characters and are 
enriched, altered, or neglected by what develops through the relationships the 
characters have with one another. His concepts inform his characters, his 
characters alter his concepts. It is this dialectical dimension to Marcel's work 
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that makes his work not only committed (fidelitous) to the human struggle 
but ongoing and therefore dynamic (creative) in terms of the struggle. One 
can imagine that Marcel both creates and is created by his characters. 
Unlike Royce and Hocking, Marcel does not only emphasize 
philosophically the importance of praxis (that the relationship between 
theory and practice is fundamental to living truth), he also shows praxis by 
creating moments in his plays in which complex questions of truth are being 
lived out. Marcel exhibits, through the characters in his plays, his belief that 
human beings must be willing to extend openness towards one another and 
be willing to address fundamental concerns and dilemmas of life, if truth is to 
be more than conceptual. 
The historical time in which Marcel's plays would have been being 
widely performed and produced was the time that followed one of the most 
brutal, perplexing and devastating periods in European history — the years of 
the Holocaust when millions were put to death, by other human beings 
"doing their job." Theoretically, industrious civilizations applaud people 
when they do their jobs. Conceptually the connection is made between doing 
ones job and being a responsible person. Yet in the context of the Holocaust, 
doing ones job meant being a cold-hearted murderer. 
It could be argued that one of the reasons Marcel's plays were not more 
popular in the 1940s, 1950s and through today is that Marcel's plays force 
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human beings to confront the complexities of situations such as those in the 
war in which doing ones job means being vicious, cruel, and in every sense 
inhumane. It was too difficult following the war, humans would reason, to 
be confronted with ethical questions, that is, theory-into-practice questions. 
When a horrific human event is consciously confronted, each individual 
who addresses the event is forced in some manner to feel the potential 
within for both being devastated and for devastating others. 
Marcel highlights in his plays the ethical gulf that can exist between 
logistical, practical and simplistic theories of what humans are to do and the 
atrocious consequences that can result when humans attend to these theories 
and ignore the actual situations of the human beings beside them that would 
make altering the theories appropriate. In Marcel's plays, the actualities of 
human lives are not evaded. He addresses such aspects of our lives, for 
example, as the fragility of human perspective ~ that what one considers just 
in one context may be unethical in another; he addresses our deep-seated 
need to belong that can lead to choices that are at great cost to our souls. 
Marcel addresses the difficulties that ensue when human beings are desirous 
of living in profoundly loving ways towards one another and yet are situated 
in legalistic and logistical worlds. 
It is not difficult to convince humans to agree theoretically that life is 
complex and that the complexities when ignored may lead to vicious 
97 
mistreatment of human beings. A nod of the head is all it takes for someone 
to agree theoretically with complexities. What is avoided; however, by most 
human beings is feeling situations of pain and complexity. To actually feel 
that one herself is trapped in dilemmas of right and wrong is uncomfortable. 
In feeling these dilemmas, one may also come face to face with the insight 
that she is not "doing so well" with her choices. 
Human beings resist self confrontation. Marcel's characters violate the 
barriers we set up to avoid confrontation with our lives, for the characters 
mirror back to us our own weaknesses. One can imagine that when 
audiences are confronted by Marcel's plays that there is an atmosphere of 
nervous tension, of shifting in chairs, of wanting the play to end, now. 
In his plays, Marcel dissolves dualities between the good characters and 
the bad characters. Often a character appears to be "good" (pious or moral or 
responsible) and yet is revealed in actuality to be hiding behind a mask of 
goodness. Claude, the pastor in A Man of God, as discussed above, is such a 
person hiding. These characters of Marcel's who mask good are actually 
hiding their terror at meeting themselves. In actuality, characters are often 
manipulative of situations and others in order to keep existential life at bay. 
In his plays, Marcel presents what he considers to be inevitable 
complexities in relationship. He exhibits that there are many different ways to 
"read" human acts. Truth becomes a slippery concept to grab hold of in some 
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of his plays. For example, in his play Ariadne (1936), Ariadne's husband 
Jerome has an affair with a woman Violetta. At times Ariadne seems open-
minded, understanding, and accepting of Jerome and Violetta's relationship. 
At other times, she is suspected of being kind to them in an attempt to cause 
feelings of shame and guilt within them about their choices. Is it her wish, 
ultimately, to create such disgust within themselves and towards one another 
that they voluntarily dissolve their lover relationship? (Marcel, 1936) 
Near the end of the play, a series of events brings Ariadne, Violetta, and 
Jerome together to seek to unweave the tangled web of their relationships. 
Ariadne: Listen, Jerome. There's something I must say to you now, in 
front of Violetta - it's better in front of her .... It may surprise and upset 
you but that can't be helped. We can't go on like this, any of us. I used 
to believe there were harmless, even helpful lies. . . . Now I'm not sure . 
.. or anyhow I can't.. . Upstairs just now, while you two were alone, 
I prayed to - oh, I don't know what to call them - the Invisible Powers, to 
give me strength. I need it so much, for I'm certain this is the turning 
point of our lives. But I don't know if they heard me. I feel so 
terribly weak - quite, quite defenseless . .. and, oh, there's no kindness 
in your eyes. 
Jerome: But whaf s happened? You're talking as if you were guilty. 
Ariadne: Perhaps I am. Almost certainly I am. Back in Paris in April, I 
knew you were lovers. ... I wasn't at all angry, not at all, with either of 
you. As soon as I saw Violetta, I loved her. I'd felt drawn to her even 
before we met, and before I knew what she meant to you. I realized at 
once how miserable she was about what she felt to be disloyalty to me, 
and I had to try to comfort her.... I don't think that was wrong of me, 
was it? 
Jerome: So your friendship ... 
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Ariadne: But where I was perhaps wrong was in making Violetta hide 
from you what had passed between her and me.. .. You see, I honestly 
believed that once you heard that I knew about you two, things would 
become impossible. I thought pride would make you break with her, 
and with me too, perhaps. Was I wrong? (Marcel, 1936, pp. 219-220) 
At this point in the dialogue between Ariadne, Jerome, and Violetta, which is 
actually more of a monologue of Ariadne's, Ariadne appears honest, humble 
(she is willing to admit moments that she chose poorly in terms of how she 
handled Jerome and Violetta's relationship), and she appears compassionate 
towards both Violetta and Jerome (wishing from the start to discourage 
Violetta's guilt and to protect the relationship between Jerome and Violetta). 
Honesty, humility, and compassion are usually qualities admirable in a 
person and yet the twist that Marcel throws in has to do with the actuality 
that Ariadne is not just a friend of Jerome's and Violetta's. She is Jerome's 
wife. Why is Ariadne so willing to share her husband with another without 
any apparent anger? Was Ariadne actually internally separated from Jerome 
and therefore so emotionally uninvolved that the marriage did not matter? 
If so, why did she stay in a "false" marriage? 
These same questions are those Violetta seems to be raising when she 
says: 
Violetta: [bitterly] I think what you imagined to be a gesture of most 
generous renunciation was merely a pretext for intruding where you 
had no right to be - no right at all. 
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Jerome: Violetta! 
Violetta: You had every right to condemn our love, to forbid it, to 
exclude it; but you had no right, by deceit, by making me admire you, by 
fascinating me, to insinuate yourself into its very heart, as if you 
wanted to ... to taste at second-hand a fruit you could never have 
yourself. 
Jerome: [appalled] Violetta! That's horrible! 
Ariadne: [firmly] We're here to discover the truth, whatever it may be. 
Violetta must say what she really thinks, however much it hurts me. 
Violetta: Perhaps I'm being unfair, I may have misjudged you 
abominably. I know, I admit it. But I can't be sure. And you can't 
make me sure, can you? Can you? 
Ariadne: No, it's not in my power. 
Violetta: You can't imagine the effect you had on me that first evening 
you came. I almost worshipped you. But gradually I found my 
adoration for you coming between Jerome and me. And yet I couldn't 
explain to him because of my promise to you. And he felt something 
was going on, and he was bewildered and grew angry with me - and 
with you too. So the situation between us became impossible. 
Something had to happen. And it did - Jerome asked me to marry 
him. And you - though you seemed to accept it and wanted to help -
you said the one thing which could make me refuse him and hate the 
idea. And then I thought you'd worked it all out; the one sure way to 
separate me from Jerome. And you would still appear a heroine and a 
saint both to yourself and to me. You couldn't give that up! And 
when you said I must remember you'd forgiven me - oh, if you could 
only know how that tormented me.. . . Your forgiveness was like a 
knife turning in my heart. ... So I decided never to see him again. 
(Marcel, 1936, pp. 220-221) 
What is the audience to feel about Ariadne, about Violetta, about Jerome? 
Is Ariadne hiding behind a mask of goodness, behind a "holy complex" so as 
not to confront her own existential pain? Or is Ariadne truly a spiritual and 
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wise person who believes that love between two people can not be fought and 
that love is the kind of "truth" that she must support even if the love 
between others is hurtful to her? This latter impression, that Ariadne is a 
kind and compassionate person in ways unique to her, is supported 
throughout the play by comments of Jerome to Violetta about his wife - that 
she is from another world, that she hears the messages of a different more 
spiritually impassioned world. 
Marcel intends Ariadne as a challenge to the audience. Throughout 
Marcel's works, he gives the impression that he is suspicious of individuals 
who seemingly transcend earthly emotions prior to any struggle with their 
emotions. It is too easy to be uninvolved, avoiding the tangible difficulties of 
life, and to falsely use spiritual transcendent values as the reason for one's 
noble actions. Marcel wants to challenge this kind of nobility. 
A Passion For the Existential Struggle 
Clearly, Marcel believes in a spiritual foundation of love, faith, hope 
out of which persons make decisions about how to act and yet he presupposes 
that the process to acting out of spiritual truths is one of struggle and 
contemplation. If the choice is made to be spiritually pure and less 
emotionally involved and if this choice is arrived at without deliberation and 
struggle, Marcel is suspicious that an individual is dodging her life (Marcel, 
1965). 
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There is a tendency in human beings to seek simple explanations for 
human choices. Faith in the goodness of humanity provides a lens that 
interprets acts in spiritually righteous terms. Conversely, when it is doubted 
that human beings have spiritual cores, acts may be interpreted in a less 
spiritual and more cynical vein. For example, it may be said about a person 
that she acts in charitable ways in order to manipulate her social status. 
Marcel dissolves this either/or tendency towards, on the one hand, absolute 
faith in humanity and, on the other, total doubt that there is goodness. 
Marcel believes that the sanctity of human life is preserved not by 
simplistic interpretations that separate the good persons from the bad. In 
Marcel's eyes, there are no such divisions. The sanctity of human life has to 
do with the idea that all human beings are faced with experiences that force 
them to confront the multi-dimensions of themselves. Marcel's perspective 
holds that a spiritual soul-full-ness is fundamental to life. And yet, at times 
the tensions of the temporal, ever-changing patterns of human experience 
find individuals caught in a labyrinth of superficial desire or covered in 
deceit, blind to the deeper meanings of their existence. 
Marcel wishes to discourage anyone from holding the idea that she is 
exempt from fault and human struggle. When humans think, feel, and act 
based on the notion that they are exempted from the vicissitudes of life, 
abstract concepts are created and actions performed that are without heart, 
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without concrete meaning and purpose. Instead of surrendering to the 
terrors and difficulties of being in ways that lead to avoiding one's encounter 
with life, Marcel encourages human beings to admit confusion, to admit that 
both within themselves and surrounding them are contradictions. Marcel 
encourages puzzlement with life (Marcel, 1962). 
When Marcel is not writing plays, he writes philosophical notes to 
himself, notes which in many instances are later published. In these notes, 
he presents concrete situations, that he or others have confronted, in order to 
weave relevant experience into his philosophical ideas. That Marcel presents 
concrete situations in his philosophical works as well as in his plays further 
separates Marcel's work from his criticism of Royce and Hocking, that their 
work needs more concreteness. 
There is one particular situation that Marcel writes into several of his 
philosophical journals which raises a question fundamental to the 
complexities of creative fidelity. A person D— is in need of the presence of a 
friend close to her. This friend promises on the phone that she will go see D~ 
tomorrow. This commitment is based on the present moment, a moment 
when the friend is desiring to give D~ pleasure and based on the fact that 
there is no other distraction presently. 
However, Marcel raises the possibility that tomorrow the friend, at the 
time when she is to fulfill her commitment, no longer has the desire to see 
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D— and instead is attracted by something that she had no idea of when she 
made her  commitment  to  D—. What  i s  she  to  do?  Marce l  wr i tes  in  Being  and  
Having (1965): 
How can I justify this dictatorship which I claim to exercise over my 
future actions, in the name of some present state? Where does this 
authority come from, and what lays claim to it? ... To look more closely, 
is not my present itself making an arbitrary claim to a sort of 
eternity of right. But in that case falsehood is established at the very 
heart of my life. For this pretended 'eternity of right7, no corresponding 
continuity of fact can be found; and it seems that I am brought up 
against the following disconcerting alternatives. At the moment of my 
commitment, I either — 1) arbitrarily assume a constancy in my feelings, 
which it is not really in my power to establish or 2) I accept in advance 
that I shall have to carry out, at a given moment, an action which will 
in no way reflect my state of mind when I do carry it out. [In the first 
case I am lying to myself, in the second I consent in advance to lie to 
someone else], (p. 50) 
Marcel in his description of this dilemma presents the axis around 
which all relationships turn — what are we to do about commitment, a 
concept taught as if to do with humans whose feelings don't change, whose 
thoughts are static? Because humans are forever experiencing and because 
continuous experiencing has to do with feelings and thoughts 
simultaneously evolving, what meanings can our commitments 
authentically hold? Whether or not persons acknowledge the dilemma of 
commitment, and if acknowledged, how they live out the questions 
contained within the dilemma, are primary processes that shape the context 
of a relationship. 
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Because questions of commitment are so crucial to life, inquiring into 
Marcel's work for more of an answer to this dilemma than the presentation 
of a question is desirable. And yet, because of Marcel's phenomenological, 
non-positivistic nature, he never provides a clear answer, only sign posts 
along the way to guide individuals to their own conclusions. 
On the one hand, he writes: 
Is not any promise whatever rooted in a state of mind which is entirely 
of the moment, and whose permanence nothing can guarantee? When 
I look at it like this, the very nature of fidelity seems to me 
suddenly covered by a thick veil; I can no longer understand what 
meaning the term 'commitmenf has ever had for me. And now I call 
to mind once more the memory of all the disappointments, all the 
hatreds of myself and others which were the ordinary results of too 
hasty promises. Were they mere accidents? Or must we see them, on 
the contrary, as the natural effects of a most inexcusable presumption? 
At what price are they to be avoided? If we are to remain tied by our 
inward bond, must we not learn to shut our eyes to the contorted 
but fateful life-process which only a feeble sight will fail to discern 
beneath the accumulations of habit? To swear fidelity - whatever the 
object to which the vow is taken - what is it really but committing 
myself to ignore the deepest part of my being, to learn the art of duping 
myself constantly with tricks that I play upon myself, for my own 
deception? Indeed, can a commitment exist that is not a betrayal? 
(Marcel, 1965, p. 51) 
This is Marcel's work at its most existential. One can not help but imagine 
what a different world we would live in relationally if we took questions 
about the concept of commitment itself seriously. In instances of pre-marital 
counseling, considered mandatory by some priests before they will marry a 
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couple, it would be valuable if throughout the counseling, questions were 
raised in the above Marcelian vein. 
Sadly, too often the church is ignorant about what human beings 
actually face in relationship. This ignorance may cause individuals later in 
the relationship to condemn themselves or one another for struggles they 
encounter when in fact the struggles are born not out of any defect of 
character but rather out of being human. One of Marcel's most spiritual 
contributions to philosophical thought is his commitment to address actual 
tensions and situations that one who is human confronts. 
To his question about any commitment being a betrayal, Marcel 
continues: 
But there is no betrayal which is not a repudiation of fidelity. Is there, 
then, such a thing as a basic fidelity, a primal bond, which I break every 
time I make a vow which in the least degree concerns what I vaguely 
call my soul? . . . This primal bond can only be what some people have 
taught me to call fidelity to myself. . . Myself: not my being but my 
becoming; not what I am today but what I shall perhaps be tomorrow. 
Here the mystery thickens. How can I be faithful, or again how can I be 
unfaithful to the Me whom today cannot know, and only the future 
will reveal? (Marcel, 1965, pp. 51-52) 
What Marcel is asking about here is if there is an aspect to being that is non-
alterable, not changed phenomenologically by experience. If so this may be 
the only aspect out of which one can make a commitment beyond the 
moment. 
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Is there a primal bond, a soul, that exists within and is transcendent of 
experience? Marcel says that yes, there is this universal existential truth, that 
there is soul. And yet this unvarying principle, soul, does not mean that 
human beings can rest assured once they identify soul that all dilemmas will 
be solved clearly and simply. Not at all. For Marcel the naming of soul is at 
the beginning of the individual's sense of her quest. Once one knows that 
there is soul, how is she to live regarding it? Only through struggling, 
questioning, that is through becoming. 
Fidelity to the soul is perfected out of one's commitment to seek 
knowing God and to seek knowing one another. In this sense, the primary 
fidelity is to patience and humility with one another. In the mix and midst of 
all the difficulties encountered between us, truth unfolds. This truth evolves 
through living in the dark and the light of relationship. It is not discovered 
from a position of being exempted from struggle, a position that leads to 
ridiculing and condemning others. The destiny of Marcel's concrete 
philosophy has to do with the conjunction of two ideas, with "the labyrinth 
of existence and the rays of hope that cross it" (Marcel, 1973, p. 255), that is 
with struggle, faith, and grace. 
Marcel applauds the "homo viator," the individual journeying, the 
individual underway, to destinations unknown. For the soul to remain vital, 
one must be always on the way. Whether we are spiritually available or 
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unavailable determines whether we live out of inner freedom and grace or 
conversely whether we live as an "agglomeration of smooth-running 
functions" (Marcel, 1952). At the closing of his book Homo Viator (1962): 
Oh, spirit of metamorphosis! When we try to obliterate the frontier of 
clouds which separates us from the other world guide our unpracticed 
movements! And, when the given hour shall strike, arouse us, eager as 
the traveller who straps on his rucksack while beyond the misty 
window-pane the earliest rays of dawn are faintly visible! (p. 270) 
When hope in the deeper, more spiritual and meaningful dimension of life 
is lost, so is a sense of being and therefore a sense of love. 
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CHAPTER IE 
CULTURAL HISTORICAL ROOTS OF EXISTENTIAL INHDELITY 
The truth of creative fidelity, as discussed in the preceding chapter, has 
to do with Marcel's belief that there is an ontological spiritual nucleus within 
every individual as well as a continuously evolving consciousness. 
Consciousness is both set (ontological) and evolving (continuously 
experiencing). Because every individual is situated in the flow of time and in 
the flux of continuous experience, there is always an aspect of consciousness 
constantly changing. One encounters the world, interpreting it through her 
ontological foundation and through her ongoing individual experiencing. 
World means here the diversity and communal values, beliefs, 
commitments, moods, desires, needs, purposes of the individuals who make 
up a person's world. 
Arrived at in the previous chapter was an understanding that the 
primary fidelity Marcel hopes for humans is that individuals be present in 
patience, humility, and truth with one another through both the stabilities 
and instabilities of shared and individual existence. That we are failing at 
living lives of patience, humility, and truth with one another could be argued 
from the standpoint of the "voices" of contemporary tragedies. 
I l l  
Contemporary problems are symbolic of a void in trust and support 
between humans. Suicides, drug and alcohol addictions, obsessive television 
watching, destructive relationships are just some of the symptoms of our 
failings at meaningful, just relationships. It seems that our primary 
commitment is not to the multi-dimensional experience that comes from 
sharing life side by side but rather to perspectives that take control-over the 
vicissitudes of relationship and avoidance of feelings to be desirable. 
Existentially, human beings are in a crisis of truth. Truth is a complex 
term describing a quality present between human beings. As discussed, 
existential truth is truth based on the dialectic between the set ontological and 
the "moving" texture of experiencing. It is a continuously evolving truth 
that unfolds through the relationships humans have to one another, to ideas, 
to God. 
Perhaps in an effort to escape the pain inherent in a life lived beside 
other human lives, we attempt to deny the effects of shared relationship. To 
appear invulnerable to one another seems to be preferable. One of the ways 
we attempt to make ourselves immune to the difficulties of relationships is 
by seeking language to misrepresent the experience and abstract ourselves 
from it. 
The Language of Prediction and>Abstraction 
Marcel considers the misrepresentation of language to be driven by the 
spirit of abstraction. Abstract language sterilizes the vitality of experiencing, 
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missing the texture of what it is to be human. It is Marcel's position that 
experience turns on itself, is existential, unique, and individualized. Thus 
there is no precedent for any one experience and efforts to predict the 
outcome and boundaries of experience are usually frustrated by the 
presentness of the experience itself. 
The experience of relationship which is most meaningful is felt 
inwardly and subjectively. When an effort is made to objectify experience or 
to make it conform to a particular logic, it loses its quality of mystery, 
uniqueness, and any possibility of moving toward the aesthetic. 
Our contemporary obsession with prediction of outcome or prescription 
for process has led us to deny both our religious and philosophical traditions 
and to confuse our individual perceptions. Contemporary western culture 
has become intrigued by the concept of purity while at the same time being 
drawn toward the corruption of its traditional meaning. Traditionally, purity 
had to do with the Greek attentiveness to the wholeness of the human being, 
a wholeness that encompassed, for example, reason (logos) and passion (eros). 
The concept of purity has been altered to serve our industrial 
technologized interests, interests addressed as if unrelated to the aesthetic 
sensual dimension. Purity in these techno-industrialized terms is a concept 
de-eroticized and defined in terms of efficiency, productivity, and social 
convention. That this sterilized purity pervades human consciousness is 
apparent at the very least in terms of how individuals are "taught" about 
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their sexuality. Sexuality is often addressed as an uncontrollable desire 
somehow inside, somehow outside the individual and at the same time 
alien. This alien desire needs to be controlled lest it take over the life of the 
individual, destroying inhibitions and common sense. Sex is taught to be 
feared, not understood as relationship, but denied, as chaos. Hence, our 
sexuality, the very core of our being, is represented to us as our enemy and 
the potential for our destruction. 
It can not be denied that our sexuality is a powerful influence on our 
lives. Sexuality between individuals can range from creative and caring to 
volatile and destructive. Both of these can be affirmed by our experience and 
therefore both qualities must by treated with sensitivity and respect. 
Sexuality, however, instructed as if outside the human self, alien and strange, 
is misleading and erroneous. Existentially, sexuality is woven into the 
tapestry of being human. A denial of sexuality as fundamental to our nature 
leads to the negation of the very foundation of the human experience. 
When goals for humanity do not take into consideration the diverse 
quality of individuals within and between communities and do not take into 
consideration that individuals have needs, desires, and feelings, goals 
without existential meaning entrap us and become citadels of the soul. Too 
often when heterosexuality, masculinity, athleticism, or symmetry are the 
template for either correctness or goal, we must forego, negate, deny or 
surrender the very fundamentals of what it is to be unique, critical, and 
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interesting in the experiential sense. Therefore Marcel and others warn 
against prescribed and corporate lifestyle which extinguishes the fire of the 
individual's translation of her life to the world. 
A poignant example of the negation of a person's experience can be 
viewed on the tombstone of Sgt. Leonard Matlovich. Matlovich was 
discharged from the Air Force in the mid-1970s because he was gay. He 
fought the discharge, received $160,000 for back pay, and in the fight, became a 
gay-rights activist. The words of his epitaph read: "When I was in the 
military they gave me a medal for killing two men and a discharge for loving 
one" (Morris, 1993). 
The Metaphor of Disembodiment 
Disembodiment is a metaphor used to describe the feeling of an 
individual encouraged to "abandon" some fundamental part of her being in 
order to adhere to social codes of Tightness. It is important to note that 
disembodiment is used in the social, cultural sense to describe the experience 
of coming to the world inauthentically and is often used by Marcel, Merleau-
Ponty, and others to underscore the damage inflicted on the individual by the 
requirements of sameness and conformity. As Marcel wrote, existence is 
indubitable. To exist is to be embodied. Every living human being is body. 
Marcel's position is that the existence of the body is irrefutable. He 
holds that the body exists to all of our senses and therefore must be accepted 
as a fundamental segment of the phenomenological consciousness. When he 
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writes "I am my body/' he asserts an existential wholeness opposed to the 
philosophical tradition of the critical dualism. The body is not separate from 
mind and soul nor can the body be reduced to anything else. It is here where 
Marcel lays claim to the concrete core of human existence. 
Marcel values the phrase "Es denkt in mir" (in you is found you). He 
finds it to be more descriptive of existence than "cogito ergo sum." The latter 
is too often interpreted in pure rational and subjectivist terms. Though 
Marcel believes Descartes intended for the focus to be on "I am," scholars 
most often focus on and interpret Descartes' meanings in terms of cogito, "I 
think." 'In you is found you" to Marcel does not mean solely "in you are 
your thoughts" but rather means "in you are your thoughts which are 
incarnated in your body which is situated in the world." Encapsulated in this 
phrase "es denkt in mir" are meanings of embodiment, of feelings, 
memories, imaginings, the senses (Marcel, 1965). 
Little have humans explored the existential meanings of phrases such 
as "es denkt in mir" because so much of intellectual discussion has been 
taken up with the idea that the important themes have to do with the 
abstracted eternal mind rather than with the body/mind/soul. The dualist 
perspective that there is mind separate from body is thoroughly integrated 
into our consciousness. Feminist scholars, liberation theologians, and 
existential phenomenologists, like Marcel, who fundamentally take life to be 
sacred in its mental, spiritual, emotional, and physical aspects have sought to 
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dissolve the dichotomous tradition which underlies patriarchal 
consciousness and the critical dualism. In this view this dichotomy is the 
origin of many evils in the world — ranging from violent death and 
destruction to broken marriages and dreams. It is at this point where the 
disintegration of the understanding of the total human begins, and results in 
withdrawal, fear, and social paranoia. 
Human beings through the centuries of abstracted patriarchy have been 
led to follow laws and rules that enforce the mind/body dichotomy. In these 
terms life is segmented according to categories mental, spiritual, physical. 
What we are left with is confusion about our fragmented existence and no 
way to either understand or value the quality of our life. 
Marcel's work is directed toward both encouraging and inviting each 
individual life to speak the terms of her concrete realities and further to 
inspire confidence to receive the truths of others. Embedded in this 
commitment is the necessity to understand the meaning of body in the world 
and to provide insight and security for individuals to speak and to hear. 
The core meaning of body, phenomenologically, is that body describes 
the inescapable actuality that each individual is situated in the world, in her 
own body and separated in some ways from the feelings and experiences of 
others. Each individual is situated in a context that is solely hers and at the 
same time is always in relationship to others. Writer Delmore Schwartz 
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describes this with levity: "Existentialism means that no one else can take a 
bath for you" (Schwartz, 1948, p. 7). 
The Particularity of Individual Experiencing 
No two people can have the same experience, can share the same 
history, can sense the same sensual moments. Language offers us the only 
possibility of experience shared, yet language becomes paradoxical in that 
what is shared is language and not experience. 
We are separated by the boundaries of our bodies. We are brought 
together by our shared hopes, dreams, desires, and loves. Within every 
individual body are the records, memories, notes of where she has been, what 
she has endured, what she has celebrated, been disappointed by. One of the 
reasons that it is impossible for another to actually choose for an individual is 
no one knows what an individual knows about her life. 
Sitting on a New York subway one morning at 10:00 A.M. is an elderly 
lady, an overweight boy teenager, a guy with a guitar, a Spanish-American 
woman with several overstuffed grocery bags, a child grasping the hand of 
who looks to be his elegant mother, a girl on crutches, a very thin African-
American man. These are the aspects that can be described of what is seen. 
Also seen are certain body gestures, postures — the clinging nature of the 
child's hand against his mother's; the eyes, bloodshot in the case of the 
teenage boy; the left over scars of acne map the Spanish-American woman. 
Expressions, wrinkles, and miscellaneous details like the broken guitar string 
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indicate that each of these individuals is situated in worlds of chaos, 
questions, temptations, challenges. 
What the hidden aspects of their lives are is a mystery and yet these 
undescribable dimensions are critical to each of their phenomenological 
realities. Important, phenomenologically, is the aspects un-seen about each of 
these individual lives, the aspects that can only be wondered. Imagine just 
for a moment the life of the African-American man. What are the places like 
that he has lived in, what were his experiences in school, with his family? 
Has this individual ever had anyone attempt to listen to him talk about what 
it feels like, in a certain moment, being him? Is he ever held or touched by 
another in an affectionate and caring way? Does he work? Where will he go 
today? How will he interpret his experiences? In the depth of those life-
touched eyes, what has he seen? In the most profound depths of his gut, 
what has he felt? 
What would it be like to be, for a moment, inside the consciousness of 
any one of those passengers on the subway? Would it fortify my own 
perceptions, further confuse them? Would there be a language housed inside 
one or all of these beings utterly foreign? How would it feel to be able to feel 
another, to know what her most existential moments have been? 
There is something undeniably vulnerable about being receptive to the 
feeling expressions of another. What makes it so difficult to allow this kind 
of receptivity of feeling? Perhaps it is receptivity that makes us so poignantly 
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aware of our own vulnerability. Perhaps feared is the volume that gets 
turned up on our own palpable and inescapable pain when we hear the hurts 
of another. Perhaps feared is that another will affect us in such a way that our 
foundations, or perceived equilibrium, will be shaken. 
In moments of a kind of visceral sharing, assumptions in consciousness 
about one another do often break down. Simplistic definitions become 
irrelevant and erroneous. Life wrapped in a tidy box in our minds becomes 
unwrapped. If we try to hold fast to prior assumptions held before this 
moment of shared communion, there is a feeling of chaos. There is a deeper 
truth, less definitional, less easily articulated trying to make itself known. 
These deeper truths evolve in contexts in which individuals are willing 
to be vulnerable to one another, listening to and sharing feelings. 
Vulnerability is essential to the process of seeking deeper truths between us. 
Also essential is an intention to be patient through the spaces following 
shared vulnerability when the truths between us are changing, when the new 
truths have not yet been synthesized into logos. 
It is difficult to be patient with not-knowing, with confusion. It is 
difficult to wait out times of feeling like there is not the slightest idea of what 
it is that is happening. For more profound and aesthetic understandings of 
one another to evolve, previous definitions of one another that no longer fit 
need to be aborted. This letting-go takes time and opens up voids in 
knowing. 
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It is as if the rational definitional dimension of consciousness must be 
coaxed to let go of previous understandings. Between holding fast to 
previous definitions and the synthesis of new interpretations, there is non-
definitional space. Through a willingness to live through these moments 
and hours of not-knowing, more aesthetic and profound understandings of 
one another are being synthesized in order to be integrated into 
consciousness. 
The Social Phenomenon of Consciousness 
In which contexts of our lives do we experience a mutual vulnerability 
between ourselves, contexts in which our individual interpretations are 
openly shared? When there is not a sense of being situated in contexts that 
are receptive to our individual meanings, we are inwardly alienated and 
isolated from one another. 
When an individual feels her interpretations are unacceptable, for 
whatever reason she believes this to be the case, her public dialogue is not the 
only dialogue affected. Her private dialogue may also dissolve. When this 
happens, she becomes dissociated from her felt interpretations of her own 
experiencing, no longer having a sense of what it is she does value, or what it 
is she does believe, or how it is she does feel. 
Social phenomenologists, including thinkers such as Wilhelm Reich, 
Erich Fromm, Thomas Szasz, R. D. Laing, in each of their particular 
sociological, psychological, philosophical voices, emphasize the central role 
121 
relationship plays in the development and evolution of the individual's 
lived experience. Because the individual is born into a world inhabited by 
other humans and because the brain is an entity that must adapt to the world 
"in which it is situated," it is difficult to draw any solid, immutable lines 
between the consciousness of one and the collective consciousness of her 
different worlds. 
I know me through the eyes of the world in reflection. The world 
knows itself in me. A circular relationship ... no clear lines of demarcation. 
Character and culture go hand in hand. What appears in the infant is created 
by the surrounding culture and in turn reproduces that culture (Reich, 1950). 
The individual is embodied in a world context. There is no 
embodiment outside of context. The edges, textures, foundations of any 
given context inextricably shape, form, and affect the selves who are in that 
world. Arno Gruen, a contemporary psychologist from the social 
phenomenological school of thought, writes about the impact of the world 
one is born into on her inner dialogue. 
In his work The Insanity of Normality (1992), Gruen describes 
schizophrenia and psychopathology as two responses indicative of a culture 
misattentive to the human condition. Through hours spent listening to 
people talk about their alienation, pain, and suffering, Gruen comes to see 
destructiveness and evil in ways different from what he interprets Freud to 
mean. 
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Gruen refutes Freud's idea that human beings have an innate 
predisposition toward violent and destructive behavior. This idea Gruen 
takes to be a rationalization of evil that explains destructiveness between 
human beings as natural. 
What is natural, according to Gruen, is not an innate tendency toward 
destructiveness, toward visiting pain and harshness on others, but rather 
Gruen thinks that what is innate is the adaptive tendency of the brain that 
enables humans to join and belong to cultural contexts. When the world 
children are born into gives credence to the "something that I have" (the 
world of possessions, of status) rather than to the "something that I am" (the 
world of inwardness and existence), a barren world unfavorable for reflection 
and genuine feeling is created. 
"Our civilization . .. has made us anxious and ashamed if we feel 
vulnerable. The language of 'reality7 promises us relief from the 'burden' of 
our needs, making us ready to stop trusting our own perceptions" (Gruen, 
1992, p. xii). Gruen argues that out of this perspective that devalues the 
young individual's perception, self-hatred is created within humans. This 
self-hatred, which Gruen believes is the root of evil, originates from the self-
betrayal that begins in childhood when children surrender their autonomy in 
order to be "loved" by parents, teachers, adults, siblings, and friends who are 
perceived to have power over them. Gruen defines autonomy as: 
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A condition of integration in which the possibility of living in harmony 
with one's own needs and feelings is realized. What is meant here are 
not those feelings and needs artificially produced by the consumer 
society but those originating in the joy produced by a mother's love for 
the aliveness of her child or in the sorrow stemming from the lack of 
this love. Children's genuine reactions to the truth of their situation 
form the sole source of their autonomous development. Only when 
they do not have to deny their perceptions or feelings will they remain 
in contact with the inner and outer experiences that stimulate growth 
and be able to connect both kinds of experiences. (Gruen, 1992, pp. 26-27) 
Children begin to deny their own perceptions, to lose consciousness of 
themselves, when they are guided to focus on appearances and pretenses 
concerning situations, that is on what others say is going on, rather than on 
what the children feel to be actually happening. 'The foundation of our 
wholeness lies in what our feelings and our heart tell us" (Gruen, 1992, p. xii). 
When the inner world of genuine feelings of an individual finds no 
acceptance nor compatibility with other human beings, either schizophrenia 
or psychopathy may result. What begins is a process, according to Gruen, in 
which individuals become separated from the actualities of the world (in 
schizophrenia) or from the feelings (in psychopathy). Confusion about what 
is ensues as well as confusion about who can be trusted. 
In schizophrenia, a human being lives totally within her own "reality." 
The perceptions and actions of others are mistrusted and in some cases 
completely shut out from one's own consciousness. The individual 
expressing herself this way is psychologically rebelling against a world that 
she believes to be unfair, destructive, absolutely hypocritical, and without 
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meaning. Gruen points out that through this consciousness, love is defined 
as an experience to be attained only by someone willing to surrender her 
truths to the hypocrisy of the surrounding world. Because the person 
suffering schizophrenia distrusts love, she relinquishes being loved. 
Schizophrenia separates an individual from the world because she believes 
there to be "no place" for her pain and vulnerability in the actual world. In 
this sense, experiencing schizophrenia is an admission of pain and fragility. 
Conversely, according to Gruen, the psychopathic response is a denial of 
one's inwardness, pain, and struggle. The choice is made to be adaptive to the 
world rather than to isolate oneself, as in schizophrenia, from the hypocrisies. 
In order to fit into the world, one obeys and conforms not in the ordinary 
sense, however, but in the pathological sense to the requests and opinions of 
those around them. 
Through one's conformant psychopathic behaviors, Gruen points out 
that the message one intends is: "Look! I am doing what you want, and 
therefore you must love me" (Gruen, 1992, p. 154). The child who is given 
the choice to manipulate for love above all else learns early in her life not to 
attend to authentic feelings but rather to act in ways to achieve what she 
wants. 
Psychopathology is a condition that occurs when a person commits to 
conformity and in the extreme sense disregards the consequences to herself or 
others. One conforms to the particular social code and avoids inwardness and 
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feeling in an attempt to gain acceptance and ultimately power over others 
willing to be submissive. It is an escape from the tumultuousness of the 
feeling side of life. Gruen writes throughout his work of people who 
exemplify having made these choices, such as many of the German 
perpetrators of the holocaust. 
"They could beat a person to death, and they were absolutely normal 
while they were doing it - that I can't understand" (Gruen, 1992, p. xiii), says a 
Pole who was at one time in the concentration camps. The nonchalant 
appearance of some of the German perpetrators has to do with the 
phenomenon, according to Gruen, of their complete dissociation from their 
own feelings. 
What makes the psychopathic response so terrifying is that it may 
masquerade as sanity yet simultaneously visit extreme destruction on human 
beings and nature. These individuals can seem the most rational, organized, 
and compassionate human beings because their commitment is to act in ways 
that blend with their context, and yet, while smiling, be extremely harmful in 
both subtle and overt ways. Their commitment is to appearances, not to 
genuine feelings within themselves or to empathy for anyone else. 
Individuals, such as the German perpetrators, may feign emotion and 
not actually feel. The reason that they can kill and appear unaffected is 
because they are unaffected emotionally, Gruen says. These persons deny the 
inwardness of the self a right to exist. 
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One way or another, they will always be intent on silencing the inner 
voice in themselves and others. They resemble George Orwell's Grand 
Inquisitor in 1984, who cannot tolerate the inner doubts of his victims. 
Their actions are less of a problem for him; it is the inner self that he 
must kill in them as well as in himself. 
This undiagnosed insanity is more of a threat to humankind today than 
ever before because the means of destruction in the hands of the power 
hungry have never been greater. Illness of this kind 
differs from schizophrenia in one crucial aspect: schizophrenics 
struggle with themselves in an effort to come to terms with an 
intolerable world, whereas the power hungry, who are considered sane, 
struggle to subdue other people in order to feel secure themselves. 
(Gruen, 1992, p. 141) 
Gruen cautions that insane actions are often carried out in the name of 
"realism," justified as "the way things are." It takes someone with an intense 
hunger for the vitality of life to resist getting caught in the conformity of a 
world driven by control over feelings. 
The Forgotten World of Feelings 
When humans are dissociated from the inner world of their feelings, 
they are separated from their sense of what is right and good and humane in 
their relationships. Justice, Gruen agrees with Marcel, is not possible unless 
humans become attuned to the inwardness of their experiences and express 
these truths in the context of their personal and social relationships. 
Marcel is suspicious of personal relationships and societal systems that 
promote existential disequilibrium by discouraging the growth and 
development of the integrity of the individual. He calls these totalitarian 
systems and perceives the result of these systems to be the dehumanization of 
individuals by disembodying them from the organic nature of their feelings, 
beliefs, and imaginings. By negating the embodiment of life within the 
individual expressed through her desires and volition, a psychotic condition 
arises in which deep basic needs are overlooked. "Boredom, sexual 
immorality, and drunkenness are, as it were, irrefutable symptoms of a deep-
seated lesion" (Marcel, 1955, p. 16). Lost within these totalitarian systems is an 
inner certitude regarding one's feelings of inwardness. 
When feeling is de-emphasized and devalued, aspects of the spiritual 
dimension of human existence dissolve and are forgotten. Marcel and 
Hocking agree that the spiritual dimension is only known through felt 
experience. The spiritual can not be known as objective, factual matter. It is 
felt as a certain kind of meaning, not measurable in mathematical terms, nor 
definable through logistical formulas. In a book written about the 
metaphysics of feeling entitled The Felt Meaning of the World (1986), author 
Quentin Smith writes of the perception of feeling in a way similar to the ideas 
Marcel holds: 
If feelings are understood in terms of themselves, from the perspective 
inherent in feelings themselves, they do not appear as inferior versions 
of reason that are in the service of the latter, but as a phenomena with a 
positive nature of their own. They relate, not to rational meanings but 
to felt meanings, to the ways in which things are important. They are 
appreciations of things for being important, (p. 18) 
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The absence of the spirit in so many religious sects, movements, and 
institutions seems to have to do with the invalidation of individual felt 
experience. The daily experiences of human beings that have to do with 
everything from the basics of eating to feeling loved and to loving are often 
considered and responded to not in terms of the feelings they elicit in the 
individual but rather as predictable definable experiences sometimes 
mandated and prescribed in the name of religious, and other, legalistic 
dogmas of right and wrong. Individuals use "formulas of right" to mandate 
lives, referencing God or the founding fathers or other authoritative 
"symbols of hegemony" as justification. 
Religious dogma, for example, is proclaimed to be a projection of the 
way of God. In many instances, the proclaimed way of God is a way abstracted 
from the concrete concerns and desires a human has in her life, yet these 
religious rules are constructed as ideals through which the individual is to 
measure her human worth. As previously discussed, when the measure for 
worthiness is an abstract notion, not one connected to the poignant and 
sometimes painful struggle a person has with concerns and desires, human 
vitality is diminished. When the heartfelt soulful concerns and feelings are 
drowned out by the laws of dos and don'ts. something dies spiritually in the 
human heart. 
Marcel's plays, as noted, are stories of everyday happenings between 
people. In this sense, they are slice-of-life plays, providing a glimpse into the 
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mundane dimension of existence. What makes them also plays about 
consciousness, about interiority, are the characters in Marcel's plays who 
speak the unspeakable, the characters who name what it is that is hidden, 
who name the what that contributes to the relationships being convoluted or 
weird or confusing or hurtful. These are the characters who express authentic 
feeling about themselves in relationship to the others in their lives. 
Christine speaks about the broken world to her friend Denise in The 
Broken World (1932) [quoted in second chapter] as does Osmonde, the 
daughter of Claude, the pastor, and Edmee, his wife, in A Man of God (1925). 
When Osmonde is old enough to protest, she begins to raise some serious 
questions about the commitments of her parents' lives. What does it all 
mean, she wishes to grasp. 
Osmonde: Oh, I know you think of life as a gift from God, as a glorious 
opportunity. When you say the word 'life' your voice has a special ring 
in it. Whereas to me it seems silly and meaningless.... Marriage . .. 
children ... Is that what you mean? ... Look at our friends here -
Henrietta Bellanger, Jeanne Schild. . . . They are married, they have 
children. Well, I can see nothing particularly admirable, nothing to 
envy in their lives, nothing that even interests me. . . . Their lives are 
narrow and difficult. ... Do let me explain. I don't know whether 
they're happy or not. But, assuming that they are, all it means is that 
they have husbands who are tolerably faithful to them. .. . Children 
who don't give too much trouble and only get ill three or four times a 
year. No, it's not good enough. I can't see the point of lives like 
those, and if mine is to be cast in the same mould.. .. Perhaps those 
women's lives are all exactly the same, like copies of a newspaper 
printed by the million, like tracts. 
Claude: We must conform to the laws of life, make them our own, and 
then finally want them for their own sake. 
130 
Osmonde: Thaf s only words, because whether you want them or not -
Claude: Ifs not only words, ifs a great truth. We must receive in order 
to give. 
Osmonde: Receive what? Give what? And if it simply means passing 
on something to others who will pass it on in their turn, what's the 
good of it all? Why rush blindly in the dark? ... People like me need to 
lean on someone else's faith. Up till now yours has kept me going, your 
faith. But when one is too miserable, that's not enough. 
(pp. 61-62) 
The initial "cry in the wilderness" like this of Osmonde or that of Christine 
and others who ignite the lives situated in Marcel's plays is a cry often heard 
through the voice of the child (the same kind of conversation as is present 
here between Osmonde and her father takes place between the child Jean and 
his stepmother Rose in the play The Rebellious Heart (1918)), or the cry is 
heard through the voice of a woman. 
That children and women speak the unspeakable is an understandable 
Marcelian choice when considering child and woman as archetypes. The 
archetype of child has traditionally been symbolic of free expression, 
spontaneous action, and vulnerability. This archetype as innocent, free, and 
vulnerable is becoming anachronistic as our children become jaded by the 
madness in our culture as is the archetype becoming anachronistic that is 
typically associated with woman. 
Before women found themselves competing with men for power over 
situations and people, the archetype of woman was symbolic of nurturing, 
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gentleness, and vulnerability. Traditionally, both children and women 
archetypally have been symbols of the inner world of feelings. As many 
social critics have postulated, perhaps one of the reasons that children have 
been so often abused by angry adults and women by angry men has to do with 
a patriarchal mindset that devalues feelings and loathes vulnerability, a 
mindset held by people, both male and female, who abuse, through their 
pretense of invulnerability. 
The Texture of Invulnerability 
When humans pretend to be beyond the human struggle, in seemingly 
permanent moods of invulnerability, they are participating in the demolition 
of passion, their own and others. Marilyn French, in her book Beyond Power 
(1985) writes in ways that echo some of Marcel's concerns. Her rather lengthy 
tome is an anthropological, psycho-social, historical, philosophical study of 
what happens when human beings become committed to control over 
existential experience rather than to receptivity to one another in lives of 
sharing, care, and struggle. 
French believes that right meaning is found not in concepts that 
consider life most perfect when it seeks to be transcendent of the actualities of 
the human quest but rather in concepts that address the light/dark, good/bad, 
lucid/confusing aspects of human experience. Transcendent concepts that 
avoid human ambiguities encourage humans to force and exert power and 
control over the vitality of life. "Searching for meaning in what is 
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superhuman, men have ignored their humanity, the only possible ground 
for human meaning" (French, 1985, p. 535). 
Presently human beings are in a crisis of non-creative infidelity. Largely 
responsible for this crisis is the way in which humans have been, for reasons 
already discussed and for reasons that will be explored, miseducated about the 
challenges and complexities of the human condition, and in so many 
instances, the way in which humans have been neglected emotionally. 
The emotional feeling dimension has traditionally been devalued in 
western culture or sentimentalized. The belief that feelings are central to the 
intentions and desires of humans in fields such as phenomenological 
psychology, existential phenomenology, and the arts, is being reinforced and 
more progressively understood in fields such as neurophilosophy, quantum 
physics, and liberation theologies. Coming to be is a more widespread 
recognition of feelings as the central core around which the spheres of our 
lives educationally, personally, and industriously turn. 
When individuals are encouraged to act as if what is happening in their 
lives fits definitional molds, they are being encouraged in too many instances 
to be liars to themselves and to one another. If a person recognizes this and 
chooses not to lie, she may say "there is no such thing as truth so what do my 
thoughts and feelings mean anyway? I have no truth." This too is an 
evasion. 
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In the world that exists between any two people in any given situation, 
there are truths that they can speak to one another that can provide more of a 
sense of honesty, a feeling of presence, and of shared sanity. Intimated here is 
not that there are conclusive, definitional words that humans can speak to 
one another. Rather this language of relational truths is vast, at times poetic, 
scientific, spiritual, convoluted, confused. This truth is as multifaceted as the 
consciousness of the individual describing her particular experience. 
The language spoken between may define the truth shared as one of 
understanding or confusion or sadness or joy. What is spoken may lead to 
celebration or despair or further confusion or more lucid understanding. 
There is absolutely nothing predictable nor "canned" about this truth. The 
only thing that can be conclusively said about it is that it does exist and that it 
is not a truth that one can come to nor understand without being willing to 
know authentic feeling. 
As discussions about truth too often lead to false static notions, 
discussions about the "process" of feelings are subject to the same dulling 
abstract and meaningless misnomers. Feelings, just as truth, are taught as 
static formulas. "If this happens, X is appropriate to feel, not Y." Too often 
humans are not encouraged to know the visceral bodily sense of authentic 
feeling that leads to the most personal ways of experiencing one's experience. 
The popular psychology books and weekend seminars that have 
proliferated recently are a testimony to the technological way in which we 
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desire to view even our interior lives. Often learned by the many people who 
read these books and attend these seminars is a new language which 
masquerades as feeling but that is without the passion of human beings who 
actually experience their experiences with their own feelings. For example, 
"that is my isolation" is a phrase from one of these seminars; "the inner 
child, the rebellious child" are taught as words to speak to explain feelings. 
These metaphors can be helpful in terms of validating and encouraging 
inwardness and existence, yet too often they are memorized as chemistry 
equations are memorized, water = H2O, further reinforcing that there is no 
such thing as existential inwardness. 
Perhaps we are quite confused about the world of feeling, 
misunderstanding it as a dimension of experience that can be taught through 
formulas. Taught are models assumed applicable to human experience. 
Generalized understandings are brought to experiences of love, work, 
sexuality, sickness, being a parent, a friend, a professor. The tendency is to 
explain ourselves to ourselves in these generalizable categories and to meet 
others through these prefabricated lenses. What is missed is the existential 
pulse of a person's life when limited to this technology of understanding. 
Part of the isolation that human beings are presently experiencing both 
within and between one another evolves out of this widespread and 
longstanding tradition that has miseducated about human experiencing. The 
way human truths have too often been instructed has in large part been based 
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on political purpose rather than based on the possibility of aesthetic, spiritual, 
and ethical meaning between people. Why humans have structured so many 
aspects of the social and cultural order in terms of power relationships or in 
terms of controlling relationship requires further exploration. 
Teaching truth in political terms leads to understanding relationship in 
terms of legal and institution metaphors. 'Tarty of the first party, party of the 
second party," for example, are legal terms used to describe two human beings 
going through a divorce. LD is used to name a person who is having learning 
difficulties. The acronym, no doubt, is impersonal. So are the terms that so 
many acronyms represent. Learning disability (LD), attention deficit disorder 
(ADD) are terms mechanical, cold, matter-of-fact. This use of language is 
unsuccessful at reflecting that human beings are in vital struggle, in the first 
instance with broken dreams, in the latter with the challenge of learning. 
Walker Percy in his book The Message in the Bottle (1954), agrees with 
Marcel that the spirit of the modern age is a spirit of abstraction: 
Science cannot utter a single word about an individual molecule, thing, 
or creature in so far as it is an individual but only in so far as it is like 
other individuals, (p. 22) 
The spirit of the age can not address one single word to him as an 
individual self but can address him only as he resembles other selves. 
Man did not lose his self in the modern age but rather became 
incommunicado, being able neither to speak for himself nor to be 
spoken to. (p. 26) 
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Our language is a language that objectifies human experience because 
our perception of the world is an objectivist perception. The world is out 
there to be had. The emphasis is on having experience rather than being. 
People have one another, jobs, marriages, children, ideas, experiences, 
material objects. What is encouraged in the language is the pursuit, 
ownership, and control of the world rather than a receptive, reflective, 
contemplative life through which being is revealed. 
Perhaps listening and being heard is dependent on recovering a 
language outside of the scientific and the politically driven realms. As a 
reaction to the coldness of the language of science and politics, an interest in 
poetic language and consciousness has been a concern of Percy, a concern 
shared by philosophers such as Marcel and Heidegger. 
Poetic language, that is language that is not bound by the laws of syntax 
and grammar and not bound by the task of reflecting a logical explanation of 
reality, is the form that comes the closest to languaging human meaning, 
both the profane and sacred. In poetry there is rhythm, discord, harmony. 
Words become like the notes of music. The spaces between hold silence for 
reflection and feeling to occur. 
Marcel did not write poetry per se though his philosophical language is 
certainly more poetic than analytical in form. Marcel did write music. He 
believed that words were useful in terms of reflecting about the meaning of 
life and that through dialogue words set the context for the deeper mystery to 
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be revealed, though he believed words unable to be the actual means through 
which this ontological mystery of being reveals itself. 
In dialogue, pauses, places for questioning, and moments in which 
wonder and awe may be met are important. In music, the sound and silence 
creates an aesthetic medium in which meaning is revealed. In his youth, 
music provided for Marcel the presence and assurance of the sacred in 
human life. He listened in awe to Bach, Schumann, Mozart, Beethoven. 
And he himself composed music. 
Marcel writes of the metaphysics of music as described in Arthur 
Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Representation (1818/1958) as 
inspiring and instructive for him. Schopenhauer calls music the most 
powerful of all of the arts in its representation of will and feeling. Music 
gives a true and complete picture of the world with its shades of joy, grief, 
love, hatred, terror, hope. Within the universal language of music what is 
presented is the spiritual feeling life. 
Marcel agrees with Schopenhauer that music presents the universal 
mystery, the transcendent. Without this spiritual dimension revealed in 
music, human lives lack a level of humanness, dignity, and depth. Each 
particular individual hears the universal meaning in the music by way of her 
inwardness and depth. 
Today, our language, formulaic rather than poetically descriptive, our 
music, sounding as computers screaming, indicates our reluctance and 
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resistance to mutual receptivity of one another's inwardness. In the 
relationships we progressively construct that objectify what is personal, 
institutionalize what is profound, legalize what is existential, some poignant 
questions surface. 
Where can an individual take and to whom can she share her pain, her 
rage, her fear? How are we to find lives existentially responsive to the 
profundity of our needs? Are we tragically bound to choosing between 
suicide, drug and alcohol addiction, psycho-pharmaceuticals, emotional 
vapidity, or deceit to oneself and one another? Have legalized definitions 
taken human consciousness to a point of no return for meanings of the soul? 
Is it our nature to denigrate the sacred integrity of the mind and the body? 
The Recovery of a More Embodied Consciousness 
Much of what has been discussed in this chapter about the limits we 
impose on our feelings and on our descriptions of personal truth seemingly 
has to do with our inordinate desire for control-over. We continuously 
forego leading lives of spiritual, aesthetic, and sensuous meanings for lives 
that are committed to control over the flux of relationship in particular and 
experience in general. Why is control so important to human beings? The 
choice to control is sometimes conscious, sometimes a sort of automatic, non-
conscious response. It is in any event pervasive. 
In the last ten years, feminist scholars, phenomenologists, cultural 
anthropologists have dedicated much effort to understanding why culture 
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has evolved in such a way that values control and domination over 
relational values of vulnerability, compassion, and care. Prior to the last 
decade, during most periods of western study, different thinkers have in 
some sense addressed this question by postulating theories about human 
nature. Depending on whether the thinker was politically inclined, 
mythically driven, psychologically geared, religiously concerned, 
naturalistically committed, his and in limited cases her theories would reflect 
these biases. What was common to most of the theories, however, was the 
acceptance of a circular argument. 
This circular argument proposes that control is the highest good because 
it is the value fundamental to patriarchy and western civilization is a 
civilization of patriarchy. Most of the theories provide explanations for why 
it is "natural" for humans to seek domination and control over one another 
and therefore why it is natural that civilization is patriarchal. 
A fundamental question until recently was left out of this circular 
argument. Why do humans so readily accept that control is fundamental to 
human nature? Once the question is raised, a common response is to refer to 
historical examples of a human or humans controlling others as evidence 
supporting the idea that if humans have always been controlled or 
controlling, then it must be "natural." Yet, what this evidence indicates is not 
control as natural and fundamental to existence but rather that patriarchy has 
existed throughout western civilization. 
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During and since World War n, human beings have exhibited the 
increasingly horrendous and terrifying power of the human/technological 
ability to control in such a way that decimates human, animal, and plant life. 
Simultaneously, humans exhibit a willingness to succumb to moral and 
spiritual anomie. As technology evolves, these problems worsen. Is this way 
of life really natural. Is humanity doomed to this fate? 
Until feminist and other scholars evolved who are devoted to the task 
of attempting to stretch consciousness beyond the hegemony of patriarchy, it 
did seem natural that some humans necessarily destroy and control other 
humans. Implicit has been the assumption that patriarchy is because 
patriarchy is. More than not, it has been accepted as an organization of 
human life that reflects human nature. 
In the cultural evolution of "primitive" to "civilized" human, the 
assumption is that there has always been a preoccupation with conquering, 
killing, and dominating. In her book The Chalice and the Blade (1987), Riane 
Eisler reconstructs the past, bringing new archeological findings together with 
the feminist perspective. The new findings are a result of progressive 
technology in use since World War n, such as radiocarbon dating methods, 
that have increased archeologisf s grasp of the past. As dating has become a 
function of verifiable techniques, for example, "one could no longer get away 
with saying that if an artifact was more artistically or technologically 
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developed, it must date to a later and thus presumably more civilized time" 
(Eisler, 1988, p. 10). 
Through this progression in dating technology coupled with a shift in 
the questions being raised that undermine previously accepted givens of 
patriarchy, scholars are altering what is known of human origins. Cave 
sanctuaries, figurines, burials, and rites from as far back as 20,000 years ago 
point to a belief system held in ancient times that revere the source of 
human, animal, and plant life as the Mother Goddess. 
Our early ancestors recognized that we and our natural environment 
are integrally linked parts of the great mystery of life and death and that 
all nature must therefore be treated with respect. This consciousness -
later emphasized in Goddess figurines either surrounded by natural 
symbols such as animals, water, and trees or themselves partly animal -
evidently was central to our lost psychic heritage. Also central to that 
lost heritage is the apparent awe and wonder at the great miracle of our 
human condition: the miracle of birth incarnated in woman's body. 
Judging from these early psychic records, this was a central theme 
of prehistoric Western systems of belief. (Eisler, 1988, p. 3) 
Eisler holds that the reason that prehistoric civilizations have been 
assumed to have been male-centered and male-dominated is that the lens 
through which scholars have been researching assumes ancient systems to 
have been centered around hunting rather than around fertility and 
communities of nurturing. When female as well as male scholars began to 
question the assumption of pervasive male dominance, cave paintings began 
to be seen in a new light. Previous patterns on the cave walls taken to be 
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males hunting became seen as forms that are actually women dancing. 
Painted objects before taken to be weapons for hunting became seen as stems, 
branches, and roots of trees. 
A new perspective on the origins and the evolution of both religion 
and civilization began to surface: 
The Neolithic agrarian economy (9000 - 8000 B.C.E.) was the basis for the 
development of civilization leading over thousands of years into our 
own time. And almost universally, those places where the first great 
breakthroughs in material and social technology were made had one 
feature in common: the worship of the Goddess. (Eisler, 1988, p. 9) 
Art from the Neolithic period is devoid of ruler-ruled, master-slave imagery 
characteristic of dominator societies. 
Archeological research over the last forty years has contributed 
knowledge that civilization is older and more widespread than previously 
thought and news that the ideology of the earliest civilizations was 
gynocentric. In fact, Eisler writes, in all the places where the first major 
breakthroughs in social and material technology were made, God was a 
woman. 
The central religious image was a woman giving birth and not, as in 
our time, a man dying on a cross. It would not be unreasonable to infer 
that life and the love of life - rather than death and the fear of death -
were dominant in society as well as art. (Eisler, 1988, pp. 20-21) 
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It is strange that civilization has evolved into a people who denigrate the 
body and further demean the female when all of life originates in the womb 
of woman. This is indicative of how removed we have become from the 
recognition of human life as sacred and how perhaps terrified we are by those 
aspects of ourselves that are by nature awesome. 
While we have evolved technologically, spiritually there has been 
something of a de-evolution. Unlike our denial of the spiritual at the altar of 
the profane, in the Neolithic civilization, there was no separation between 
the secular and the sacred. 
To say the people who worshipped the Goddess were deeply religious 
would be to understate, and largely miss, the point.... As religious 
historians point out, in prehistoric and, to a large extent, well into 
historic times, religion was life, and life was religion. (Eisler, 1988, p. 23) 
In large part, what still prevails in the perspective of many is a view 
that male dominance, along with private property and slavery, are all by­
products of these early Neolithic agrarian people. Eisler points out the 
actualities brought about by recent research indicate that there was no ranking 
along a patriarchal masculine-feminine scale in these agrarian civilizations. 
"In these societies we see no signs of the sexual inequality we have all been 
taught is only liuman nature' " (Eisler, 1988, p. 14). 
Previous research reflects that scholars assumed it is "human nature" 
for one group to try to dominate and control the thoughts, feelings, and 
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actions of other groups. Because of this assumption, when artifacts have been 
uncovered that undeniably pointed to an extended age of the Goddess, what 
was assumed is that these earlier civilizations were matriarchal, that is 
dominated by women, rather than patriarchal, the idea being that some group 
must have been in charge. 
That previous civilizations were matriarchal is often given as a reason 
for why patriarchy evolved. As a backlash against being dominated, men, it is 
reasoned, organized physical and mental forces to usurp power from women 
(French, 1985). When it became more and more evident that the findings did 
not support the conclusion that females had previously dominated, many 
scholars returned to the previously held conclusions that males must have 
dominated even during the age of the Goddess. 
According to Eisler, the evidence neither supports the view that males 
dominated nor that females dominated. 
To begin with, the archeological data we now have indicate that in its 
general structure prepatriarchal society was, by any contemporary 
standard, remarkably equalitarian. In the second place, although in 
these societies descent appears to have been traced through the mother, 
and women as priestesses and heads of clans seemed to have played 
leading roles in all aspects of life, there is little indication that the 
position of men in this social system was in any sense comparable to the 
subordination and suppression of women characteristic of the male-
dominant system that replaced it. (Eisler, 1987, pp. 24-25) 
While the feminine principle was celebrated in Neolithic art as the miracle of 
life, males played principle roles as priests alongside the priestesses. 
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Predominant is evidence that suggests that there was a partnership 
between men and women rather than the domination of one sex over 
another. The power given to the females as the heads of families and clans 
was equated not with domination, oppression, and fear but rather with 
responsibility and love. What is made possible by these recent findings is an 
alternative way to view human organization, as a "partnership society in 
which neither half of humanity is ranked over the other and diversity is not 
equated with inferiority or superiority" (Eisler, 1987, p. 28). 
The early European Minoan civilization of the island of Crete was 
peaceful, aesthetic, and democratic. It is studied as representative of the last 
prepatriarchal western culture. The metals initially discovered from this 
civilization through excavations have been previously thought to have been 
weapons. However, through recent research, these metals are now thought 
to have been used as ornaments and religious symbols. What this indicates, 
according to Eisler, is that technologies, up until 3200 years ago when the 
civilization of Crete fell, were used for the purpose of supporting and 
enhancing the quality of life. 
The time when technology began to be used for the purpose of taking 
life rather than enriching life was the time of the invasions of the nomad 
warriors. It was through the nomadic clans who moved into established 
civilizations to disrupt and take them over that metals began being used for 
the purpose of destruction. 
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The shift from a partnership to a culture of domination was relatively 
sudden. Eisler explains this sudden shift in terms of the chaos theory of 
change. Unpredictable change happens when "long-established states of 
systems equilibrium and near equilibrium can with relative rapidity shift to a 
far from equilibrium, or chaotic, state" (Eisler, 1987, p. 49). 
In the nomadic barbaric invasions, not only were people massacred, 
people were also enslaved as property. Houses, places of worship, pieces of art 
were destroyed. As this widespread destruction was taking place, new social 
and ideological definitions began to evolve. 
A fundamental shift in consciousness occurred. The view of position 
and place in culture as purposeful in order to support and nurture life gives 
way to a definition of power for the purpose of dominating and destroying. 
Now everywhere the men with the greatest power to destroy - the 
physically strongest, most insensitive, most brutal - rise to the top, as 
everywhere the social structure becomes more hierarchic and 
authoritarian. Women - who as a group are physically smaller and 
weaker than men, and who are most closely identified with the 
old view of power symbolized by the life-giving and sustaining chalice -
are now gradually reduced to the status they are to hold hereafter: male-
controlled technologies of production and reproduction. (Eisler, 1987, 
p. 53) 
The Goddess loses centrality, being relegated to the status of the wife or 
mother of the male gods of war and thunder. Simultaneously, the 
partnership culture of Minoan Crete gives way to a culture of domination 
brought by the barbarian warriors. By 1100 B.C.E. civilizations that had before 
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been focused on the nurturance of life have become civilizations of 
destruction. The focus in these latter civilizations is war, constraint, and 
death rather than peace, creativity, and life. 
Groups of people began to be set against other groups of people. Men 
were set against women and against other men. There was no haven, no safe 
place left in the ancient world. 
For this was now a world where, having violently deprived the 
Goddess and the female half of humanity of all power, gods and men of 
war ruled. It was a world in which the blade, and not the chalice, would 
henceforth be supreme, a world in which peace and harmony would be 
found only in the myths and legends of a long lost past. (Eisler, 1987, 
p. 58) 
Not only were social relationships drastically altered and settlements 
demolished, but also spiritual understandings were transformed. From the 
worship of the Goddess and priests and priestesses, devotion was shifted 
toward a monotheistic male God. 
As these outer changes were transpiring, an inward change of 
consciousness was being forced and instilled. This inward change was 
necessary in order to insure that the perspective that viewed culture in terms 
of partnerships between humans was altered to a perspective holding that it is 
right, good, and holy for certain men to dominate and rule. 
Eisler points out that a certain social consciousness is perpetuated by 
both biological factors (the replication of DNA) as well as through social 
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factors that coerce people to adopt and persist with particular beliefs. The 
insidious aspect of this dynamic is that people are taught to think of the 
dominant belief system as a given, as preordained by God or by some scientific 
fact of human nature. What actually perpetuates patriarchy, however, is not 
God nor human nature but the constructed belief that it is natural and 
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desirable for certain human beings to dominate and control others. To 
subjugate some to the will of others requires that societies tell stories that 
justify relationships of inequality and oppressive servitude. 
The Garden of Eden is a profound example, Eisler points of, of how 
stories have been told in order to indoctrinate people into a way of seeing 
woman (Eve) as evil and nature (serpent) as threatening and therefore 
appropriately needing to be controlled by man. From the perspective of the 
Goddess era, the relationship between Eve and the serpent holds very 
different meanings from the accepted patriarchal interpretation. 
From the former perspective, the serpent is a symbol of wisdom, of 
insight, an adviser to the Goddess. It was natural for women to "listen" to 
serpents as it was necessary for women to eat from sacred trees in order to 
acquire knowledge, divine wisdom, and life. For the male God Jehovah to 
prevent this sacred communication and consumption would be both 
unnatural and sacrilegious (Eisler, 1987). 
In order to instill a different set of values and beliefs, Eisler writes, the 
forming of patriarchy and its perpetuation have been dependent on telling 
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the Garden of Eden story in terms of Eve and her "disobedience." Eve's 
relationship to nature, to the serpent and the tree, was converted from a 
relationship of nature (natural) into an interpretation of the relationship as 
defiant and evil. 
Nature and woman through this patriarchal version become symbolic 
of the origins of human imperfections and failings. 
If the men on top were to maintain their positions of dominance, there 
was one aspect of the earlier culture that could not be absorbed. The 
aspect or, more properly, complex of aspects was the sexually and 
socially equalitarian and peaceful core of the earlier partnership model 
of society. (Eisler, 1987, p. 90) 
It became important for men to strip women of their decision-making 
powers. It become important to strip the Goddess and the priestesses of any 
spiritual authority. Women were removed from positions of power and 
responsibility as technology was being transformed from being techniques for 
the purpose of sustaining and supporting all life to techniques for the purpose 
of serving solely the needs of those in positions of control. 
A new world was in order, a world order requiring that living entities 
be ranked in terms of power, value, respectfulness. The hierarchical ranks 
MAN - WOMAN - CHILD - ANIMALS - PLANTS were justified using the 
name of God, or of scientific thought that spoke of these rankings as natural, 
or that based this hierarchy on some other believed authority. Since the 
domination system has taken root, humans no longer look to one another to 
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look out for one another, nor do humans trust that problems will be worked 
out together. Instead of living in communities of aesthetic and spiritual 
meanings, humans came to live in a "dog-eat-dog" world, defining life as an 
endless fight for survival. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE HOPE OF LOVE IN THE BARREN LANDSCAPE OF 
CONTEMPORARY LIFE 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE HOPE OF LOVE IN THE BARREN LANDSCAPE OF 
CONTEMPORARY LIFE 
When inwardness recognizes world-historical existence as the true 
subject of reflection and the place where it must risk its life, and when 
existence thereby becomes infused with all the values thought has 
projected in its long cultural development, the dialectical process is 
'complete' in principle because subject has attained a self-conscious 
awareness that the dynamic which has shaped its previous 
development must now explicitly direct its future activity. (Davis, 1989, 
pp. 341-342) 
We are living in the wastelands of a civilization founded on the 
domination model of relationship. This domination system is one in which 
minorities who both perceive themselves as more powerful than others and 
are perceived as so have made decisions for all of us, often times with little 
input from the lives of those affected by the decisions that are made. For all 
of the rhetoric of good intent that has been written and spoken in support of 
this domination system, repression rather than liberation prevails sexually, 
aesthetically, emotionally; devastation rather than creative sustenance 
continues as we live in the realities of poverty, homelessness, the continuing 
decimation of nature; and in general the quality of fear rather than courage 
dominates. 
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What is difficult to consider is where the root of the problems lie. Is it 
solely the domination system that has brought us to this point in our 
civilization? Would reverting to a partnership social order in which no 
group of people is ranked over the other and diversity is not equated with 
inferiority or superiority resolve our problems? If a "partnership society" is 
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preferable and such a shift even remotely possible, what kinds of changes 
would be necessary? What would this process of change entail? 
Is a total change in the order of the social structure necessary or even 
possible, or are changes within existing structured patterns sufficient? 
Within the domination system, for example, if the "persons in power" 
educate toward love and compassion, would not a different cultural 
experience evolve than one in which hate, hostility, and resentment result? 
Yet, isn't it arguable that even if the intent of individuals is to support one 
another in communities of love and compassion, that if power-over others is 
the foundation of a society as it is in our domination system as described by 
Eisler, than necessarily valued will be a kind of strength that is aggressive, 
non-emotional, and controlling? 
Within a domination system what is learned is both founded on and 
reinforcing of the belief that we are somehow incapable of working out 
within our communities what needs to be worked out. We seem convinced 
that we are incompetent if we depend on relationships to bring us to good 
choice so, therefore, we must depend on the authority of rule and mandate. 
154 
Perhaps we have believed in and acted as if this latter is true, that ethical 
result depends on legalistic cause, so much so that it has in fact become true. 
Is There a Way Beyond Domination and Control? 
Perhaps in our time we do act as if we are automatons incapable of 
ethically responding to one another unless threatened, coerced, 
excommunicated from belonging. It is the premise of this paper, however, 
that it is not the necessary destiny of an individual's life to be controlled and 
coerced or controlling and coercive. We are, in fact, capable of making just 
and creative decisions for ourselves when we live in contexts with one 
another in which democratic, humane, spiritual, and aesthetic 
understandings and meanings are encouraged. 
In contexts of meaning, the forms out of which we live with one 
another evolve organically out of our daily relationships. Within these 
contexts of meaning we are allowed and educated to come to our own 
individual understandings of what justice, spiritual strength, aesthetic 
expression, physical well-being means in order to live in relationships of love 
and compassion with one another. As Rilke wrote, "in the depths all 
becomes law" (Rilke, 1934, p. 38). These contexts require a shift in how 
consciousness is understood, a shift from the idea of consciousness as a 
substantive entity to consciousness as related dialectically to our experiencing. 
Because individual consciousness is inextricably interdependent on the 
contexts in which it is situated, the solutions to our social crises depend on 
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each of us demanding and creating contexts for one another that are 
supportive and just. Hocking's influence on Marcel's ideas about creative 
fidelity evolved out of Hocking's belief that it is the right of the individual to 
demand of her world that it justify her existence. In other words, our daily 
experiences ought, according to both Hocking and Marcel, make possible the 
realization of our existences in terms physically supportive (no one allowed 
to suffer with hunger, violently mistreated, etc.), spiritually nurturing, 
intellectually relevant, and emotionally affirming. 
To know what it means for one's existence to be justified is not an easy 
ontological process nor a process in which one ever arrives at a final solution. 
To know what the justification of one's being-in-the-world means entails an 
ongoing rigorous intellectual process, not in the academic sense of 
intellectualizing, but rather in the phenomenological intellectual sense of 
simultaneously absorbing, reflecting, and interpreting experiencing. The 
individual's interpretations are understood as dialectically inclusive of the 
effects of others and the effects of one's own past experiencing "stored" as the 
emotional content of memory. 
Knowing what justifies existence is never a once and for all decision 
nor can it ever be purely solipsistic. Consciousness about what justifies 
existence in any given moment is arrived at through an ongoing process 
having to do with how an individual has come to know herself (the passing 
of time) in relationship to how she is ever presently coming to know herself. 
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This coming to know, both in terms of past and present, is in ways always 
related to the particularized effects of the beliefs and meanings of others in 
our contexts. That we are profoundly influenced by one another is 
phenomenologically inescapable. 
Over the past 3000 years, there has been a seeming desire to know and 
define our experiencing in terms static and unchanging. However, because 
we are subjects existing amidst constant internal and external 
phenomenological changes, to define existence as if an experience rather than 
in terms of ongoing experiencing is misleading and leads to gross 
misunderstandings about ourselves and one another. 
Phenomenologically, every individual is an evolving physical, 
intellectual, and emotional being who gathers meaning through incessant 
interpretations of the different contexts she is experiencing. As 
uncomfortable as we may be with the flux of life both within and outside of 
ourselves, it is indisputable that we live in change. The individual subject 
defined as a stagnant entity may hold in discussions that language experience 
in disembodied terms, yet since experiencing is never in actuality 
disembodied, what is discussed in these instances is a delusion. In actuality, 
embodiment is unavoidable as is change and death, two inextricable aspects of 
being embodied. 
In that existence is continuously evolving for every individual, a 
feeling that existence is being justified is dependent on contexts of 
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relationship that instruct, validate, and justify the multi-dimensions of the 
on-going phenomenon of experiencing. In this last part of this chapter, I will 
seek to describe these contexts of relationship. 
Future Shock is Here 
In our time, it seems difficult to believe and a pretense if believed that 
what we have done and lived, what we are doing and how we are living 
within our social contexts is encouraging the totality of the physical, mental, 
and spiritual human individual. Unless committed to an obstinate denial, it 
seems ludicrous to speak in public circles of success and evolutionary 
progress. A small percentage of us are "doing well" in any sense. The rest of 
us feel hungry and without intellectual foundation, or spiritually 
ungrounded, or lonely, emotionally abandoned, and overall afraid to admit 
that any of these deplorable conditions exist. 
Though a large percentage of Americans when polled express 
discontent with the way in which this country is proceeding, there 
simultaneously seems to be a commitment to the idea that America is the 
land where dreams do come true. While there is discontent, there is also a 
pervasive commitment to the idea of a country alive and well and living. 
Romantic notions do die hard. Yet, the pretense that what is alive is more 
than one massive theater of the absurd is becoming more difficult. "Pro-
lifers" killing in the service of life is just one example of how vital this 
theater of absurdity is and how confused we are. 
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Other ironies abound. Technology meant to provide time for leisure 
and relaxation between us has instead proliferated a more hectic work place 
(with FAXs, printers, computers) where more is demanded in less time and 
where human contact is diminished. Further, while technology is for the 
purpose of making our lives "better," it is due to technology that 350,000 New 
Yorkers lost their jobs last year, jobs now performed by automated computers. 
Technology in our homes has resulted in so much technological activity and 
noise that we fail to find one another. 
There is the absurd way in which we are addressing (or not addressing) 
violence in our schools. The meetings between administrators, teachers, and 
parents take up questions about how to manage children with handguns, 
what to do about monitoring weapons in the schools. Why are we not all 
outraged that the progression, a questionable adjective in this context, of our 
society has taken us to the point where our children are armed, are 
dangerous, and are scared? Where should we look to find out how this has 
happened and how should we respond in ways that alter the underlying 
forces that have driven our children to violence? 
In terms of the phenomenon of marriage, how are we thinking and 
acting about the data that indicates that 50% of marriages end in divorce? 
More than not, people can be heard to respond "isn't that a shame; what has 
happened to family values in this country?" Presently, there is a burgeoning 
backlash regarding divorce in response to a study showing the adverse effects 
159 
of divorce on children. One solution being proposed makes getting a divorce 
more difficult for people with children. What kind of a solution is this? It 
does not take too much imagination to envision the potential increase in 
domestic violence, alcoholism, deceitful marital affairs if attaining divorce 
becomes more difficult. 
A more ethical substantial approach would be to examine the 
foundations of relationship in terms of what individuals are taught or not 
taught about loving. This statistic, that half of marriages end in divorce, is 
not surprising in light of how little experience any of us have with mature 
relationship, how little we know of the complexities of life shared side by 
side. Early in our lives, when we are old enough to think about anything as 
profound as loving, the sacred, profound, and complex aspects of love need to 
be exhibited, but usually mature love is absent in a child's world. So much 
could happen around family meals and within the classroom that teach of the 
multi-dimensions of loving and the challenges of sharing life. 
Most of us have so little experience or knowledge of mature love when 
we walk down the aisle in protestant/catholic services professing marriage 
"till death do us part." In that we carry, in many instances, so little of 
existential self-knowledge within ourselves when we marry, it seems 
ludicrous that we are surprised by the divorce rate. In that we are in the 
collective cultural sense immature about loving, why is the divorce rate not 
90%? In short, it seems that there are more profound questions to be asking 
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about marriage and relationship than how to legally make it more difficult 
for people to divorce. 
The madness in the way we are approaching some of the dilemmas in 
our culture is prophesied in books such as Brave New World (Huxley, 1932), 
1984 (Orwell, 1949), Future Shock (Toffler, 1970). In Brave New World. 
Huxley writes of the infiltration of technology into all aspects of human lives. 
In the technological society, all social problems have been solved and life is 
virtually painless, but meaningless. Human life begins in test tubes in 
Huxley's world's society and are classified for life according to intelligence. 
Alphas are brilliant and creative. Epsilons are stupid and relegated to the 
most base menial jobs. Soma is a panacea drug (Christianity without tears, 
morality in a bottle) that pacifies people constantly. 
In his book, Huxley portrays the human need to control through 
technological means the vicissitudes of human existence and the tendency to 
seek escape from that not controllable. In relation to the addictive nature in 
present life and the technological advances that make it possible for people to 
live much of their lives in a virtual reality, Huxley appears prophetic 
(Huxley, 1932). 
In 1984. any thought differing from that of the totalitarian system of the 
society described is renounced. Individuals are watched over by Big Brother 
and controlled by the Thought Police. Prophesized in Orwell's piece is the 
mass conformant consciousness we are in the midst of today. This tendency 
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towards conforming to external order and suspending our own particular 
questions and struggles in the suppression of our individual interpretations 
is driven by the same fear of experiencing experience found in Brave New 
World (Orwell, 1949). 
Future Shock (1970), the title of his book, is a term Toffler coined to 
describe the stress that shatters and the disorientation induced in individuals 
when they are subjected to too much change in too short a time. The 
acceleration thrust breeds odd personalities, Toffler writes: 
Children who at twelve are no longer childlike; adults who at fifty are 
children of twelve. There are rich men who playact poverty, computer 
programmers who turn on with LSD. There are anarchists who, 
beneath their dirty denim shirts, are outrageous conformists, and 
conformists who, beneath their button-down collars, are outrageous 
anarchists. There are married priests and atheist ministers and Jewish 
Zen Buddhists. We are pop ... and op ... and art cinetique ... There 
are Playboy Clubs and homosexual movie theaters . . . amphetamines 
and tranquilizers . . . anger, affluence, and oblivion. Much oblivion, 
(p. 10) 
Too much stimuli, too much activity is often felt as a numb oblivion on the 
one hand and a feeling of disorientation on the other. The feeling of 
numbness and disorientation both, Toffler notes, are similar to the effects of 
culture shock when visiting a foreign culture and becoming overwhelmed by 
the differences in language, gestures, sounds, sights to which one is 
accustomed. Future shock, however, differs from culture shock in that there 
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is no time when the trip ends and one may return to a familiar world. There 
is no familiar world to which to return. 
Toffler writes that people have referred to this period of future shock 
misleadingly as the "second industrial revolution." The changes of the latter 
part of this century, Toffler believes, are in all likelihood more important, 
profound, and more far-reaching than the changes brought about by the 
industrial revolution. In fact, some scholars call this period the second great 
divide in human history, the first great divide being the shift from a 
barbarian to a civilized world (Toffler, 1970). 
Toffler quotes Kurt Marek, author of Gods, Graves, and Scholars: 
We, in the twentieth century, are concluding an era of mankind five 
thousand years in length .. . We are not, as Spengler supposed, in the 
situation of Rome at the beginning of the Christian West, but in that 
of the year 3000 B.C. We open our eyes like prehistoric man, we see a 
world totally new. (cited in Toffler, 1970, p. 13) 
One factor that makes this period unique is the reversal of the relationship 
between humans and resources. To varying degrees, prior to the super-
industrial technological era, resources limited our decisions. No longer. 
Today, it is human decisions that make and limit the resources. Vegetables 
and fruits are mass-produced in greenhouses, decisions are made to decimate 
trees so cattle can graze and be ultimately slaughtered and manufactured into 
beef. Decisions are made and technology accommodated to produce products 
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we previously depended on nature to produce. Often these decisions lead to a 
life ecologically out of balance. 
What further distinguishes this time is the access that people 
worldwide have to information. The billions of people who have televisions 
can watch daily events happening all over the world. The rapidity with 
which the scenes are flashed across the screen and the devastation that is 
exhibited appear from its effects to be numbing rather than amazing. The 
scenes shown, the news reported, is most often too much and too fast to 
absorb, to feel and rarely is the news about the people who control us and 
how/why they do. 
Perhaps, if our lives were not so obsessively accelerated, the 
information coming at us could be absorbed, felt, discussed between us. More 
than not, however, the information explosion seems not to encourage 
rumination and insightfulness but rather a reaction of numbness to the 
constant barrage of sights, sounds, and ideas. When Thomas Jefferson 
thought of access to knowledge as the core of democracy, he, I believe, had a 
different relationship to knowledge in mind than what feels to be a cultural 
mood of frenzied oblivion to our knowledge of one another. 
People who are computer literate and who can afford computer 
hardware and software have access to information and communication 
networks that can be plugged into any time of the day or night. Several 
people I know have social lives that are primarily computer generated. In the 
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evening, they go "on line" to "communicate" with "other humans." There 
are "rooms" for feminists, sexists, S/M aficionados, Democrats, racists, 
African-Americans, singles, therapists, and any other imaginable group that 
come together to converse. A friend of mine decided to quit going in the 
room he had spent most of his evenings in because of the terse, caustic nature 
of the "people." According to him, there is often a fierce attitude expressed 
on-line that is more subdued or repressed when humans are physically 
present with one another. 
If it is so, that on-line people have a blunt and harsh way different than 
how they are when physically present, this presents an interesting 
phenomenon to study. What happens during on-line "social interactions" 
and in the cyberspaces of the evolving virtual reality in terms of relationship? 
How individuals interact in these technological contexts can provide an 
interesting realm in which to study contextual relationship. The study of 
technologically generated relationship is beyond the scope of this chapter and 
yet certainly relevant enough to questions about presence and relationship 
that a digression into aspects of the present technological phenomena of on­
line socializing and of virtual reality may be illuminating. 
On-line socializing is like having a modern day communal pen-pal. 
People who have never met in physical presence, that is who have never 
seen nor heard one another, converse through the computerized written 
word. Unlike what happens when pen pals "converse" through the mail 
165 
over the passing of days, sometimes with interminable lapses, 
communication on-line is generally instantaneous and an available context 
for the participation of many. It is as if people who have never met get 
together nightly for conference phone conversations. Differing from the 
experience of conference calls is that the word is written rather than spoken. 
In one sense, these technologized social hours represent the ultimate 
form of disembodiment. And yet, it is possible to imagine that if 
consciousness were lived as the embodiment of mind/body/soul rather than 
defined in disembodied categories, that meeting someone on-line solely 
through language would be similar to being physically present with her not 
in terms of what would be sensually possible in one another's physical 
presence but rather in terms of what could be known of another. In a 
consciousness of embodiment, our language would be indicative of who we 
are because our thoughts, concepts, logos would not be split off from how we 
live, from our experiencing. 
In other words, the predominant cliche that holds today that actions 
rather than words are the only trustworthy indicators of who and how an 
individual interprets and lives in her situatedness is a result of 
disembodiment. The distinction between language and experience would be 
unnecessary if consciousness was lived as embodiment because language 
(mind) would be necessarily body/soul. In this sense, an individual's spoken 
and written language would be revelatory rather than potentially deceptive. 
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On-line socializing, in a culture of embodiment, would seem not abstract and 
remote as it can seem today to individuals who are concerned with embodied 
presence. 
In the realm of virtual reality, once the technology evolves and 
becomes perfected and affordable, individuals will have access to the creation 
and experiencing of personalized movies that explore the fringes of one's 
imagination and exploit desires before they become repressed. The process of 
creating and acting in movies will no longer be limited to the expertise of 
people in the film and video industry. 
Studies of the phenomenological process of the making of these 
individual virtual movies could result in a study of the phenomenon of 
consciousness. New insights might evolve, for example, about how flexible 
or inflexible consciousness is in terms of breaking bounds with the familiar. 
For example, how constrained is imagination by that which is familiar? 
How bound is consciousness to internalized fears? If there are fears that exist 
solely because of cultural rules and regulations, seemingly these fears would 
dissolve in the experiencing of virtual reality. Or would they? Are there 
virtual fears? Can the external ever be separated from the internal or is what 
is instilled externally introjected in such a way that even when the external 
contexts are absent, the internalized effects of the world are present? Perhaps 
imagination can not transcend memory in any context. 
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Are the experiences within virtual reality visceral? Within virtual 
reality, are the time, space, contextual limitations of non-virtual reality 
binding? Virtual reality is a fertile context through which to live out all of 
these questions. Though technological relationship is not the focus of this 
paper, considering the possibilities and limitations of these more modern 
social contexts may be enlightening about the forces that act on our 
individual and collective existentiality, concerns central to this discussion. 
Finally, and as a return to Toffler, it is the impact of the acceleration of 
change on the feeling life of individuals that Toffler says may be the most 
discerning factor of all of our time. The impermanent, transient nature of 
our lives penetrates, tinges, and stains our consciousness, affecting the ways 
we respond to one another, to objects, to ideas, art, and values. We no longer 
feel one another as we did in the past (Toffler, 1970). 
Anti-existential Forces 
In the cries of Huxley/Orwell, and Toffler who warned of totalitarian 
intelligence, technological overwhelm and escapism, numbness of feeling, 
and the notion that time was becoming accelerated, few seemingly heeded the 
calls to act against the prophecy. Perhaps the warnings have come too late. 
Perhaps the systems of spiritual and intellectual repression and the systems of 
devastation were and are too intact, perhaps too pervasive for profound 
change. 
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Or perhaps the cries could not penetrate the denial of what is humanely 
important. The few who have responded in this century to the warning that 
something is very wrong in how we are approaching our lives can be found 
in some of the grass roots groups over the last thirty years, in some of the sub 
and sub-sub communities, and in the perspective of certain particular 
individuals. Different systems of values have been from time to time 
proposed by the efforts of these individuals but have been propositions not 
yet pervasive enough to alter existing forms, patterns, and systems of 
interaction. Some of our sacred cows are still male corporate power, money, 
work (even if for minimum wage), and church-going. 
Denied by many are the pains that grow out of living in the midst of 
tiiese confusing forms. Abuse of the people working in a corporation is 
sometimes, for example, an aspect of male corporate power. The driving 
concern for money often blinds us to a more ethical and aesthetic concern 
while strengthening a tendency toward greed and manipulation. Work can 
fatigue and deplete one's identity, coerce people into doing things in which 
they don't believe and often for a paycheck that barely contributes to making 
ends meet. Finally, going to church, too many of us have learned, often has 
little to do with meeting God. Instead of spiritual enrichment, what 
sometimes results is an increase in snobbery, self-righteousness, and the 
acquisition of a language that solidifies support for existing social and cultural 
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forms. Why are we so readily coerced into ways of thinking and acting that 
support repression and denial of important existential moments? 
When not mired in denial, awareness of our lives can lead us to be 
baffled and profoundly disturbed by what is happening in our personal and 
cultural contexts. 
Tanuarv 7.1993 She lands home at 5:48 P.M., jumps out of her work 
clothes and into something more comfortable . . . speedwalks her dog 
. .. rushes to her car, screeches out of her driveway and onto the street, 
accelerates to 63 mph ... she almost rearends into a car at a stop 
light.. . perspiring from the anxiety of the rush, she thinks to herself 
how much she does not want to be late for her relaxation yoga class. 
The rush to relax ... 
March 6.1970 "You get as much respect as you demand," Mom said as 
she whisked my sister downstairs to lecture her for having let her 
boyfriend Jimmy kiss her. I learned that night about the risky business 
of the body. Respect... demand... respect... demand. Three days 
later, Sunday afternoon with Dad at his bachelor pad, a new one of his 
paintings on the wall. This painting was of his girlfriend Frankie, 
painted by Dad of her nude body, hung over his bed. Dad paints nude 
portraits of his girlfriend. Mom does not want me or my sisters to 
kiss our boyfriends. Circuitous roads to sexuality ... 
March 5,1993 "When I was 10,1 thought I would be dead at 28," she 
said. "Now I'm 40 ... 12 years after I thought I would suicide and I'm 
still here. And yet I still don't know why I have not ended my life. Tell 
me, damnit, why am I still here? Why? Be honest with me — 
what do I have to dream about, to look forward to? 278 lbs., an alcoholic 
mother to take care of, addictions of my own to food, caffeine, nicotine." 
I look into the glaze of her eyes, the puffiness of her face, I who she is 
paying for an answer. All I can feel is the tremendous "ouch" in my 
heart and presence of my own tears in the face of her profound sorrow. 
In that moment I really don't know the why . . . 
April 10.1987 Ronnie, ruddied complexion, thin to the bone, torn and 
tarred bluejeans hanging off of his thin hips, thinned cotton t-shirt, a 
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pair of blackened white keds on his feet. In for his fourth DWI, a 
mandatory class on alcoholism, a part of his 28-day program at 
the High Point Alcoholic Center. 
Ronnie shows his punch card to the instructor, his evidence that he has 
attended his mandatory AA meetings. "Good Ronnie", she says. 
"Tonight we're going to talk about self-esteem ... her voice begins its 
droning. 
That liquid that poisons, kills close to 1,000,000 annually, that dangerous 
liquid was Ronnie's best and only friend. 
Beaten by his own alcoholic father, a small-framed loser in school, not 
intelligent in academically recognizable ways, Ronnie got lost early on. 
No friends ... no paternal nor maternal love ... no sense of purpose. 
His first high on beer gave him sensations different from his life of pain 
and nothingness. When drunk, he even felt sexy, like a girl might want 
him. 
"Point no. 2, self-esteem has to do with liking yourself .. . point no. 3 
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I looked at Ronnie; his half-cocked eyes made it look like he was awake 
but he was zoned out. .. oblivious to her words, he appeared sick and 
tired of it all. 
Though alcohol kills thousands, it appeared that at this moment his 
abstinence was killing him. Away from his best friend, he sat there 
oblivious, lost ("In my experience the yearning for the feeling of 
harmony in the womb is the most important cause of alcoholism or for 
that matter any form of addiction," Morris Berman writes in Coming to 
our senses. 1989, p. 27). 
Let's suppose Ronnie does get sober, what then 
is our hope for him? 
February 17.1991 The quintessential democratic empire sends troops 
abroad to fight Saddam Hussein and yet so persistently denies efforts to 
mobilize forces for the purpose of righting wrongs here at home, 
wrongs fundamentally related to the realities of poverty, domestic 
violence, homelessness, the health care crisis, addictions of every 
imaginable type, spiritual vapidity, and existential isolation. 
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What are the underlying beliefs, fears, seductions that lend themselves 
to these kinds of choices? 
These scenarios are emblematic of the confusions, pains, absurdities within 
our individual and collective consciousness. 
A Language of Hope 
What is required of us if we are to make different choices about how we 
live together in the 21st century? What are the most important and basic 
questions to raise? What are the basic challenges that we need to meet? 
Twenty years after the death of Gabriel Marcel, we are faced with 
different questions than he was addressing in his middle and upper middle 
class context of France. Yet is not the passion that drives us to think about 
how we want to live together today and in 2000 the same passion that drove 
Marcel to study and write? Living in the midst of a world shattered by two 
world wars, the latter war a symbol of the progressive destructive capabilities 
in the hands of human beings, Marcel was frustrated by academic discussions 
that missed the point of the concrete challenges and actualities of the 
individual life. 
Marcel sensed in the wake of the technological fever that the spiritual, 
intellectual, ethical life may be endangered if certain concerns were ignored. 
"For what shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own 
soul?" (Marcel, 1952, p. ix). Marcel believed there to be an "infrangible sphere 
of being to which techniques are never able to gain access" (Marcel, 1952, p. 8). 
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Technologized materialism and technological communication take 
place within the collective consciousness of society, a collective consciousness 
that Marcel believes develops "below" where love and intelligence are 
possible. For Marcel, the education of the collective is impossible; what is 
possible is the education of the person. Because an individual's sense of 
herself is dependent on her ideas of herself and the ideas of those around her, 
when cultural and individual ideas exclude the existential and are consumed 
with the technological, so is the individual's sense of herself degraded from 
concerns about the concreteness of relationship, for example, to concerns of 
technique and mechanization. 
Marcel believed the crisis of his day to be a metaphysical one. Two 
decades later, no doubt Marcel would still apply this belief of metaphysical 
crisis to our present world. He believed that no kind of social restructuring 
was sufficient to reverse the contemporary sense of disquiet, for the roots of 
the problem lay not in external forms but in the depths of being. It is out of 
these depths, or more correctly out of our dissociation from these depths, that 
we have allowed ourselves to structure techniques that degrade and divorce 
us from our existential spirits. 
In Marcel's thinking, every kind of technical advance ought to be 
balanced by an effort at inwardness directed toward self-knowing. The 
difficulty is that the more involved we become with the facility of technique 
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whose "smooth functioning assures a tolerable life at the material level", the 
more estranged we become from an awareness of our inner reality. 
I should be tempted to say that the centre of gravity of a man and his 
balancing point tend to become external to himself: that he projects 
himself more and more into objects, into the various pieces of 
apparatus on which he depends for his existence. It would be no 
exaggeration to say that the more progress 'humanity' as an abstraction 
makes towards the mastery of nature, the more actual individual men 
tend to become slaves of this very conquest. (Marcel, 1952, pp. 55-56) 
In and of themselves the products and processes of technology are not 
negative for the soul, according to Marcel. In fact, technological process 
Marcel believes to be a manifestation of a certain intelligibility of which we 
may be proud. 
The problems Marcel foresaw had to do not with technology per se but 
rather with the way in which our relationships within ourselves and between 
us, founded on seeking security rather than meaning, has taken us to use 
technology for the efficacy of experience rather than to enrich the inwardness 
of existence. Technology, according to Marcel, does not necessarily have a 
dehumanizing effect but has come to because we have utilized technology to 
point our lives toward the quest for material security rather than toward a 
quest for what it means to be existentially human. 
The aim of humans more often than not has been to use the 
technological to guarantee a certain sense of security and control over the 
unpredictable, which is to say a certain control over the flux of human life. 
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Facility, accuracy, and speed have become the driving technological concerns. 
Contemplation, wonder, and important inquiry have been relegated to the 
realm of the fanciful or the private philosophical. Marcel believes that when 
our preoccupation with security dominates mass society, as it does in our 
technological era, that the scope of human life is necessarily diminished. 
Life, as it were, tends to shrink back on itself, to wither. (Marcel, 1952, 
p. 59) 
A civilization which denies the place of contemplation and shuts out 
the possibility of contemplation sets us inevitably on the road towards a 
philosophy which is not so much a love of wisdom as a hatred of 
wisdom. (Marcel, 1952, p. 65) 
Technical man (if I may call him so), having in the deepest sense lost 
his awareness of himself - having lost, above all, that is, his awareness 
of the transcendental laws which allow him to guide his behavior and 
direct his intentions is becoming more and more disarmed in the face of 
the powers of destruction unleashed around him and in the face, 
also, of the spirit of complicity which these powers encounter in the 
depths of his own nature, (emphasis added) (Marcel, 1952, pp. 74-75) 
Have we focused so intently on control and power over one another and 
have we been in the process so successful at developing technology rather 
than at the same time nurturing being that we are now doomed to live as 
accomplices of spiritual degradation and existential denial? 
Throughout Marcel's works, he holds out hope that we can answer no 
to being such accomplices. As long as there is human life for Marcel, there is 
hope that the tendencies that incline us toward the degradation of being can 
be reversed. Because Marcel believed in an ontological spiritual foundation 
to being, he held that no matter how slick and technological our lives 
become, that there is an uncrushable aspect of being that may always 
potentially surface to call the consciousness of humanity to itself. For 
Marcel's hope to be more than a pipedream, for sacred piety towards one 
another to be present rather than potential, what? 
In Heidegger's work, "he exposes the ontological cover-up by which 
Being has successfully been obscured since Plato, but he fails to finger the 
culprit, to point to social forces which carried out the deed and political 
interests which oppose its reversal" (Stahl, 1979, p. 305). Whatever the forces 
of the culprit, it is easy to agree on the notion that western civilization is 
historically a story of ways in which humans have managed perhaps both 
intentionally and unintentionally to avoid being. 
Amidst the remains of the broken forms of the patriarchal domination 
system, we are experiencing confusion, despair, and cynicism. If Heidegger is 
right and we have for 2500 years sought ways to avoid being, why change 
now? Or can we? Perhaps the success of civilization actually has to do with 
humans' dexterity and ingenuity for producing means to avoid the struggle of 
being. In this definition of success, we should rest on our laurels, for we have 
continued to excel in our abilities to materialize and mechanize our lives to 
the point where we exist in a close to complete robotized world. We have 
evolved the most imaginative and destructive means for not experiencing 
being. 
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In that avoidance and denial of individual existential inwardness has 
been continuously chosen, and given that our denial mechanisms have 
become more sophisticated as technology has progressed, should we once and 
for all surrender being to a soul-less doing and having? What stops us from 
making peace with the idea that we can not live in contexts more humane, 
more ethically correct, and more spiritually fortifying? If being is so scary and 
we have evolved into experts of avoidance, why don't we surrender to our 
numbness? 
I believe that we can not surrender completely to our denial and 
numbness, at least not intentionally surrender, because to do so is to give up 
on being human. Though in so many ways, we have given up on one 
another and though we have done so willingly in many situations, I don't 
think we have done so happily nor peacefully nor hopefully. 
Vapid as some of our lives may be, there is still a hunger for gentle, 
loving human relationship. Empty as some of our spirits may feel, there is 
still the surprising moment when music sounds certain tones that remind us 
that we do feel. Hollow as our commitments may seem, there is still a need 
to believe in somebody, in some idea, in some hope. Materialistic and greed-
driven as our lives may be, there is still a presence in a cathedral that can awe 
us with a sense that there is something different and perhaps more 
meaningful than making money. 
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Hard as we may run from ourselves and from one another, within 
consciousness is a persistent force that surfaces from time to time to remind 
us that a fundamental part of being human is the seeking of what it is to be. 
We may run but we can not ultimately hide. That we avoid being shouts at 
us whenever the news announces another murder at the hands of a child. 
Our children are murdering, selling drugs, being violent in ways far 
surpassing what we have known before. 
We are losing at our hiding games. If something is not done on both an 
individual and a collective scale to recover being, we might as well give up 
surrendering the totality of our lives to violence, addiction, and virtual 
worlds that preclude actuality. 
The esprit of being is not present in megabytes, on computer screens, in 
televised images. Rather, becoming being has to do with meeting the felt-
dimension of the inwardness of existence. It is through contexts of meaning 
between individuals that this inwardness of feeling is encouraged. In these 
contexts, individuals attend to the underlying forces vital to living in a 
creative, ethical, communal way with one another. 
In contexts of meaning, individuals feel relationship as existential 
companionship. Honest truths are spoken, difficult dilemmas trudged 
through in processes of dignity and respect. Visceral feelings are not denied 
nor minimized rather are valued for the interpretations they provide of each 
of our particular existentiality. 
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Being is present in the in-between of subject and world when there is 
openness and receptivity in the subject who is in the world. What is present 
when being is is not a Utopian presence nor a metaphysical abstract entity but 
rather is related to the meeting of the subject and the world in particularized 
contexts. If the moment of the context is one of joy, there may be celebration. 
If the moment is one of death, there may be loss and immense sadness. If the 
moment is one of deceit, there may be a dizzying confusion and 
disorientation. Being is always in flux because the subject and the world of 
being are in flux. 
The Education of Being 
It has been the premise of this paper that meaning unfolds in 
relationship to one another. Though we are each of us solitary, we are also 
always in relationship to our worlds inhabited by one another. Each of our 
own particular and ongoing interpretations of our situations are not arrived 
at through hermeneutic processes encased within the confines of our own 
inwardness but rather our interpretations are in some sense always 
conversations within ourselves in relationship to conversations with one 
another. 
The systems of thought in which we have grounded our educational 
system are founded on the spirit of abstraction referred to throughout this 
paper and/or on the scientific world view of matter. One of the primary 
reasons that the being of being human is foreign to our experiencing is that 
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we are taught to come to the world through abstraction and/or through 
scientific formula. Being, in its existential meaning, is not met through the 
discussion of ideals abstracted from individual experiencing nor through 
scientific equations. 
A radical change in the foundations on which we build education is 
needed if we are to learn to revere and appreciate what it means to be human. 
To talk educationally about what these changes would entail means to find a 
language through which to talk to one another about being. What is? What 
does "to be" mean? Who is competent or impelled to raise questions about 
what is? 
In some sense, the tradition of western philosophy over the past 2500 
years has taken on the task of languaging and living out these questions. 
Because so much has been written about being within the philosophical 
tradition, studying philosophy is an important intellectual dimension to 
making questions of being present educationally. 
However, studying the ontological traditions, while important, is not 
sufficient in our educational commitment to being. As has been discussed, 
much of the western tradition has defined being in terms substantive and 
universally abstract, transforming being into something that can be studied as 
separated from experiencing and therefore outside of temporal existence. As 
has been reiterated in terms of the passion of Marcel's work as well as in the 
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preferences contained about the existential phenomenological foundations of 
being, being has to do with the radical immersion of the subject in the world. 
Understanding the traditions that we are born into is important in 
terms of understanding the evolution of western consciousness but if we are 
to know our own being, the philosophers most critical to study educationally 
are those who thought of being in terms of the dialectical relationship 
between the subject and the world. Aspects of the work of Plato, Hegel, and 
Goethe fall into this dialectical category of being as does the work of 
existential phenomenologists. 
Fundamental to the work of existentialists are questions about the 
meaning of being human. Fundamental to phenomenology is the unfolding 
of a methodical process through which to get at this meaning. Because the 
phenomenological method is a process of unfolding meanings of being, it 
would be transformative for our schools to be based on the 
phenomenological method rather than on the goal-oriented economic 
method. A succinct way to differentiate between these educational methods 
is that the former seeks to see how it is that one sees while the latter seeks to 
know how one can best be used. 
If we awakened tomorrow to a world in which it was decided that our 
schools would be transformed to be phenomenological in method, what kind 
of knowledge would educators need in order for them to succeed in this 
transformation? Primarily what would be needed is an understanding of 
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knowledge as based on ontological and methodological principles that ground 
being in experience. What would be understood out of this is that in order to 
know being, our children must know how it is they are experiencing their 
own experience. 
Education would become a context through which to teach that what is 
primary to ontology is the dialectic between individual and world. To teach 
this dialectic is to lay the foundations for lives built on creative fidelity 
because it speaks to the ongoing relationship between an individual and her 
world, a relationship continuously mediated by context and mood. Our 
children if taught to think and live phenomenologically would be taught to 
understand change and instability as qualities not to be avoided but as 
qualities underlying being human. 
In the sense that our lives are always changing, our children would be 
taught to embrace loss and confusion as signs that their lives are vital and 
dynamic. The pain that comes from having to continuously expand and let 
go of previously held truths would be recognized as an integral part of the 
process of being. 
Self-consciousness is not a fixed form existing prior to experience. Its 
universality depends, rather, on the ability to constitute itself in 
experience by constantly transcending its previous forms. Its 
universality is existential and historical rather than a priori and 
essentialistic . . . every property of 'the human mind' is thoroughly 
historical. (Davis, 1989, p. 345) 
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In that to be means to be always transcending previous forms, experiencing 
being has a tragic dimension (of loss). 
The dialectical logic is a logic of tragic drama, a logic of tragic 
interrogation and tragic growth. "Engaging in life can be a deeply disturbing 
and painful process for it demands that we constantly engage and then 
remake ourselves" (Davis, 1989, p. 335). It is one of the most telling 
symptoms of the insane dimension of our culture that we teach our children 
to hide pain, to be ashamed of hurting, to deny feelings of loss. 
It is absurd that many individuals in our culture who refuse to learn to 
shut off their pain end up in "insane" asylums, one of the few contexts in our 
culture where it is considered "normal" to exhibit pain, and yet even there we 
use drugs to "shield" people from their pain. Perhaps a visit to these asylums 
would give us an idea of the vitality that ought be allowed in the classroom. 
When education deadens being, individuals who refuse to kill being within 
themselves are often relegated to the fringes of society in one sense or 
another unless by chance, grace, or brilliance they find voice and courage to 
make a place to challenge the status quo in such a way that the social context 
is altered. 
More often than not, both in life and in philosophy, attitudes consume 
themselves in resisting the tragic. Doing so, they end in 
impoverishment or, its philosophic equivalent, the spirit of abstraction. 
Ceaseless obsessional reiteration of stereotypes cancels any movement 
toward new possibilities. Tragedy remains the deferred self-knowledge 
underlying such practices. Ill will toward suffering is the essential 
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barrier both to life and to authentic thinking, (emphasis added) (Davis, 
1989, p. 339) 
Imagine the different contexts of meaning within our educational system if 
educators, parents, and administrators based educational relationship on the 
notion that when we avoid suffering, we construct barriers to life and 
authentic thinking. 
Educating towards ethical lives of meaning seems dependent on setting 
educational contexts where we are attentive, deeply attentive, to one another 
in conversations that rigorously seek to get at what it means to be human or a 
human. Within these conversations, conflict is not resolved; it is met. The 
conflict that develops is based on the concrete dilemmas of our different 
desires, needs, opinions. The purpose is not the dissolution of difference but 
rather the construction of contexts in which lives are engaged with integrity. 
What are the connections between us? What are the differences? How 
can our relationships toward one another unfold in ways that justify each of 
our individual existences? A primary intention of rigorous and difficult 
conversations where these questions are lived out, where we plow together 
through our ideas and feelings, is to educate individuals to be resistant to 
cultural, social, and personal forces that dissolve the soul of being. 
Too often our classes are not devoted to the study of what it means to be 
attentive and devoted to being with one another in relationships of freedom 
and responsibility. Rather, what is taught is how to live with rules, that is, 
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how to be submissive to rules, rebellious against rules, or to live somewhere 
between being submissive and rebellious. The unfortunate focus becomes 
living with rules rather than with one another. 
For our children to know themselves ethically, central to education 
must be a concept of each life as sacred, particular, and primarily in need of 
the receptivity of other human beings. What is taught is the importance of 
receiving one another as presence. 
When I say that a being is granted to me as a presence or as a being (it 
comes to the same, for he is not a being for me unless he is a presence), 
this means that I am unable to treat him as if he were merely placed 
in front of me; between him and me there arises a relationship which, 
in a sense, surpasses my awareness of him; he is not only before me, he 
is also within me - or, rather, these categories are transcended, they no 
longer have any meaning. (Marcel, 1956a, p. 38) 
Great is the temptation to think of this presence as an object but this is 
the side of the problematical. Against this belief, fidelity raises up its 
voice 'Even if I cannot see you, if I cannot touch you, I feel that you are 
with me; it would be a denial of you not to be assured of this.' (Marcel, 
1956a, p. 39) 
The world of being, the world of persons, is a world where cause, necessity, 
and determinism give way to free participation. 
The lack of cause, necessity, and determinism in contexts of being is 
eloquently expressed by the silence which follows the question "why do you 
love her?" Any answer is inadequate to the visceral and complex moment of 
really loving another. If we are always planning lessons, planning away our 
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lives, the deepest meanings held in the silence of our profound experiencing 
will not evolve. 
In many ways, what Marcel stresses in his concept of creative fidelity is a 
definition of being that can not be grasped unless one knows love. The 
meaning of love as it is intended here is found in the works of Rainer Maria 
Rilke, a man to whom Marcel was deeply devoted. In the descriptions of love 
that Rilke extended, persons are loved as if evolving questions. To love in 
the Rilkean sense is not to hold one to definitive static ways; no, not at all, 
rather it is to profoundly encourage individuals in the most thorough way 
possible to live out their particular questions. In this sense, through love, we 
become the guardian of being for one another. 
Rilke (1934) writes: 
To love is good, too: love being difficult. For one human being to love 
another: that is perhaps the most difficult of all our tasks, the ultimate, 
the last test and proof, the work for which all other work is but 
preparation. For this reason young people, who are beginners in 
everything, cannot yet know love: they have to learn it. With their 
whole being, with all their forces, gathered close about their lonely, 
timid, upward-beating heart, they must learn to love.... Love is at first 
not anything that means merging, giving over, and uniting with 
another (for what would a union be of something unclarified and 
unfinished, still subordinate -?), it is a high inducement to the 
individual to ripen, to become something in himself, to become world, 
to become world for himself for another's sake, it is a great exacting 
claim upon him, something that chooses him out and calls him to vast 
things. Only in this sense, as the task of working at themselves ('to 
hearken and to hammer day and night'), might young people use the 
love that is given them. (pp. 53-54) 
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Perhaps it is one of the most poignant failings of our educational contexts, 
both within our homes and within our schools, that we are taught so little of 
love in this sense. 
The Creative Fidelity of Love 
In living the love of creative fidelity, life is affirmed in its complexities. 
The joyful, lighthearted moments are celebrated, the confusing times of fear 
and trembling are embraced. The darker sides of life having to do with 
emotions we are taught to be ashamed of and to negate like jealousy, hate, 
and terror are accepted. In this love, our being is guarded by our loved ones. 
In the literal and metaphorical sense, we are held. 
Life is hard. And it is complicated. We may choose to hide away from 
life's vicissitudes and complexities or we may choose to be present in all of it. 
In presence, we are clear at times about what it is that is happening in our 
worlds. At times we are baffled. In times we act compassionately; at times 
blinded and ignore-ant. What love allows in these latter times is a place to 
scream, cry, and seek understanding for what it is that is happening. 
Life is not encountered when we are afraid of our fear, afraid of our 
confusions, afraid of the hurt that comes with loss. When the fear is not 
accepted as part of living in our multifaceted and faceted existences, we fear 
the fear, hiding in numbness from the terror and everything else that we are 
afraid of. 
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We need one another to say "come out; your struggle is real; here you 
are loved and can love as you are, who you are with your confusions and 
questions." There is tremendous love in the statement "tell me more" . . . 
about your thoughts, feelings, dreams, nightmares. Tell me what it is you 
have been afraid to say, what it is that you have said before and been ridiculed 
for saying, or what you have been silenced because of, or hurt as a result of. 
Tell me you. 
There is the deepest love when we hold the immenseness of one 
another's lives. That human life is comprised of both body and spirit creates a 
tension of understanding. There are probably moments when reason and 
desire within each of us have mutual intentions yet more often there are 
contradictions within us at most given moments, pulls from different aspects 
of our desires and from the different dimensions of our rational beliefs. 
There is angst, fear, and tremendous loneliness when we realize the many 
facets of our inwardness in relationship to the world that is before us. At 
these times what is needed more than probably anything is someone who 
understands us and holds us with all of our contradictions, complexities, and 
our desires to be loved and to love. 
From my perspective, this kind of embracing, accepting love is 
inspiring. And when we are loved in this way we are in-spirited with the 
vitality and life of our own uniqueness, of our existence. This love in-spirits 
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us to labor, to create, to write, to contemplate, to dialogue, and to care for 
human life. 
Because life is encouraged in this love, more is felt. Greater feeling is 
greater joy and greater sorrow. The love of which I speak provides a place to 
laugh and cry. Feminist theologian Nelle Morton writes of people hearing 
one another into speech. Heidegger says we speak ourselves into reality. 
Similarly, through this essential love, people love one another into being. 
We have few contexts within our society through which we embrace 
the actuality of being body and spirit. We do not generally respond to one 
another in ways that reflect a perception of life as both. We do not, for 
example, think of one another in our work contexts as persons with spirit nor 
do we think of ourselves when and if we exercise as having soul. When we 
pray, often absent is a consciousness of our bodies. 
In his book The Last Temptation of Christ (1960), Nikos Kazantzakis 
writes: 
The dual substance of Christ - the yearning, so human, so superhuman, 
of man to attain to God or, more exactly, to return to God and to identify 
himself with him - has always been a deep and inscrutable mystery to 
me. This nostalgia for God, at once so mysterious and so real, has 
opened in me large wounds and also large flowing springs. 
My principal anguish and the source of all my joys and sorrows from 
my youth onward has been the incessant, merciless battle between the 
spirit and the flesh.. .. my soul is the arena where these two armies 
have clashed and met. 
The anguish has been intense. I loved my body and did not want it to 
perish; I loved my soul and did not want it to decay. I have fought to 
reconcile these two primordial forces which are so contrary to each 
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other, to make them realize that they are not enemies but, rather, fellow 
workers, so that they might rejoice in their harmony - and so that I 
might rejoice with them. (p. 1) 
It is an incessant and merciless battle in large part, this battle between the 
spirit and the flesh, and it ensues whether or not we attend to it. Each of us is 
born onto this metaphysical battlefield. When I feel the texture of this battle 
within myself and I know that it must be within those I love, the word mercy 
comes to mind. 
To be loving and to accept love we must have mercy on ourselves. This 
mercy toward the tensions, confusions, contradictions of desires within 
enables us to speak honestly to one another about our experiencing. Too late, 
if at all in our lives, we come to learn of creative fidelity. Most generally, we 
know how not to be close. Too often, we are deceitful. We learn to hide 
important pieces from one another of what we are doing and what we are 
feeling. It is no wonder that relationships die of dispassionate dullness. 
There is no panacea for the longevity of relationship, nor probably ought 
there be. What is needed is experiences between us that enlighten of the 
truths and complexities of sharing human existence. 
Existential love, in the measure that it is extended in time, cannot be 
the peaceful iclat of two souls, the one shining in the light of the other. 
At best this would be but an uncomprehending debauchery of feeling 
concealing the reality which lies behind. Existential love implies an 
ardent and mutual questioning. (Marcel, 1964, pp. 248-249) 
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